Thursday, April 28, 2022

 Louis Kossuth Comes to American abroad the USS MISSISSIPPI as Congress Seeks to Help Hungarian Revolutionary

Foreign Affairs Under President Fillmore   -Michael Streich

 

America’s thirteenth president and second “accidental” president, Millard Fillmore, is often subjected to scorn and criticism. Serving only three years and unable to secure nomination in his own right, some have argued that he was a weak chief executive with few credits to his name. President Fillmore, however, holds a legacy of achievements affecting Americans positively. Further, he was one of the first self-made men to reach the highest office, coming out of dire poverty as a child.

 

Fillmore’s Early Years

 

Born in a log cabin in Cayuga County, New York, Millard Fillmore was one of nine children. In the absence of formal education, he taught himself to read and eventually apprenticed himself as a cloth maker. With the help of a local judge who saw promise in the young man, he paid off his indenture and studied law.

 

Rising in New York politics and government, Fillmore represented New York in the Congress for four terms. During the Tyler administration, he was instrumental in breaking a tariff impasse by shepherding a new tariff through the House Ways and Means Committee, which he chaired.

 

By the time the Whig Party nominated him as Vice President in 1848 to run with General Zachary Taylor, Fillmore’s resume included the New York State Assembly, a failed run for the governorship, and his years in the National Congress.

 

Millard Fillmore as President

 

Fillmore became President upon the untimely death of Zachary Taylor on July 9, 1850. At the time, he set a precedent by refusing to deliver an inaugural address. The most pressing issue before the Congress was the Compromise of 1850 or “Mr. Clay’s Compromise,” which Fillmore supported but Zachary Taylor opposed. A friend and admirer of Clay, Fillmore would sign the five separate bills passed by the Congress that summer through the efforts of Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas.

 

The 1850 Compromise, according to Fillmore, represented the “final settlement” regarding territorial disputes regarding the expansion of slavery. Everyone involved fervently hoped that the legislation would avert a civil war. Fillmore himself opposed and hated slavery, but believed that the Constitution protected it.

 

1850 was also the year that President Fillmore negotiated the release of Hungarian freedom fighter Louis Kossuth, who had taken refuge in Turkey. Fillmore sent the USS Mississippi to bring Kossuth, his family, and numerous other veterans of the 1848 European revolutions to the United States.

 

During Fillmore’s presidency, a movement to invade Cuba revolved around Narciso Lopez, an ambitious Spaniard who capitalized on Spain’s inept governance of the island. The movement was viewed favorably by Southern leaders like Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee, who was approached about leading the invasion force made up mostly of Southern volunteers. Cuba had always been an inviting acquisition for the Southern slavery advocates.

 

Fillmore, however, rejected these efforts and sent federal officials to Southern ports to turn back would be invaders. Fillmore’s decision was prudent and in keeping with his moderate Whig views. Japan, however, was another matter.

 

Although the Treaty of Kanagawa “opening Japan” is associated with President Franklin Pierce, it was Fillmore who sent Commodore Matthew Perry to Japan, arriving just weeks ahead of an Imperial Russian delegation. President Fillmore’s message to the Japanese rulers was polite but firm: “We wish that our People may be permitted to trade with your People, but we shall not authorize them to break any law of your Empire.”

 

Fillmore’s Attempt to Win a Second Term

 

When the Whig Party met in 1852 it took them 53 ballots to finally nominate a presidential candidate, General Winfield Scott, “old fuss n’ feathers.” Fillmore, Daniel Webster, and Scott had been the front runners and at one point Fillmore almost clinched the nomination during negotiations with Webster supporters.

 

The protracted fight to nominate Fillmore is a testament to his strength and leadership. Millard Fillmore should be historically rehabilitated as a President whose achievements were noteworthy.

 

Monday, April 4, 2022

 

 

 The Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, Russia




Built by Francesco Bartolomeo Rastrelli during the reign of Russia’s Empress Elizabeth, the Winter Palace would come to symbolize Russian Imperial power. Rastrelli’s magnificent palace, referred to by W. Bruce Lincoln [1] as. “one of the last great baroque buildings to take shape anywhere in the world,” was constructed, according to Rastrelli, “solely for the glory of all Russia.” It would be the home of the Imperial family until 1917.

 

The Fourth Winter Palace

 

Facing the Neva River in St. Petersburg, Rastrelli’s masterpiece was completed at enormous costs. Although commissioned by Empress Elizabeth, she never lived to see its completion, dying in 1761. With 1,054 rooms and a quarter of a million square feet, the palace “symbolized the power of empire itself,” according to Bruce Lincoln. According to Suzanne Massie, “It is Rastrelli’s triumph that, massive as it is, the palace turquoise blue…with its reflection shimmering in the waters of the Neva, seems almost to be floating.” [2]

 

After the death of Peter III in 1762, the Winter Palace found in Catherine II its greatest patron. Catherine, who once referred to herself as a “glutton” when it came to collecting works of art, began to fill the palace with some of Western Europe’s greatest masterpieces, buying entire collections at once. Whenever significant collections came on the market, Catherine’s agents snatched them up and shipped them to Russia.

 

The State Hermitage Museum, of which the Winter Palace is a part, today boasts the finest collection in the world with works by Rubens, Van Dyck, Rembrandt, El Greco, and Matisse. Although the Winter Palace was not open to the public until 1852, it was after the fall of the Romanov Dynasty in 1917 that the imperial residence became the vast public museum that it is today.

 

Catherine the Great’s Contributions

 

Enlarging the Winter Palace in 1765, Catherine added a “hermitage,” her “little retreat,” and filled it with paintings, sculpture, and rare antiquities. Subsequent hermitages would be built as the collection grew. A voracious collector, Catherine bought both Voltaire and Denis Diderot’s libraries and placed them in her palace. Walking the palace halls alone at night, she enjoyed her paintings and took inspiration from them.

 

Not a particularly religious women, her collection features many religious works including the “Litta” Madonna by Da Vinci. The Hermitage Theatre allowed Catherine to enjoy private plays and concerts with her inner circle of friends.

 

The Symbol of Imperial Power

 

The palace square is dominated by the Alexander Column, commemorating Russian victory during the struggles with Napoleon. It was from the great balcony facing the square that Tsar Alexander I blessed his troops as they prepared to march against France. The palace square reveals the immensity of the palace. According to Bruce Lincoln, “the palaces of Europe’s kings and queens never conjured up moods and meanings in the way the winter palace did.” [3]

 

It was in the Winter Palace that Russia’s Provisional Government was captured during the Bolshevik Revolution of October, 1917. The room is preserved as is the original clock, stopped at the moment the government fell. Rastrelli’s greatest work became the property of the state and is today one of the greatest repositories of art and historical antiquities.

 

Sources:

 

[1]W. Bruce Lincoln, Sunlight at Midnight: St. Petersburg and the Rise of Modern Russia (New York: Basic Books, 2000) p. 40-41

[2] Suzanne Massie, Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980) p.126.

[3] Lincoln, p.81

 

Friday, March 11, 2022

 Taking Berlin in 1945: the Russians Always Respected Power Over Bravado

In 1949, General Dwight Eisenhower was asked about one of the most controversial decisions made in 1945, the taking of Berlin. Eisenhower’s answer was based on military considerations, yet he conceded that political issues – already agreed to at the earlier Yalta Conference, influenced the decision. Eisenhower’s decision to halt the Allied advance at the Elbe River ultimately supported Soviet domination of what would come to be called “Eastern Europe,” a region separated by what Winston Churchill labeled an “Iron Curtain.” Would the taking of Berlin have changed that?

 

The Allied Invasion of Nazi Germany 1944-1945

 

By the fall of 1944, it had become obvious that German resistance was weakening. Aachen became the first German city occupied by allied troops on October 21. Subsequent strategy called for smashing through the Siegfried Line and crossing the Rhine River for the final push to Berlin. Even as allied troops were accomplishing these goals in early 1945, the Soviet army under Marshall Zhukov was closing in on Berlin.

 

Beginning with Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group Rhine River crossing on March 7th, the allies spectacularly advanced into the heart of Germany through March and into April 1945. Field Marshall Montgomery’s “Market Garden” operation, though not entirely successful, ultimately resulted in the encirclement of Field Marshall Model’s army group, the last field army to stand between Eisenhower and Berlin.

 

But on March 28th, Eisenhower changed the plan. Although nothing stood between the allies and Berlin, army groups were ordered to secured the Baltic port cities like Lubeck, as well as moving into the Leipzig-Dresden area where German war industrialization was still in progress. The British were outraged; Field Marshall Montgomery stated afterwards that he could have taken Berlin before the Russians.

 

Effects of Eisenhower’s Decision

 

Eisenhower reasoned that the Russians were only 35 miles from Berlin while the bulk of his forces were 285 miles from the German capital. Additionally, taking Berlin might have cost 100,000 lives. Finally, Eisenhower was under pressure to end the European war quickly so that resources could be diverted to the Pacific theater.

 

It is also a fact, however, that American advance units were already in Potsdam and General William Simpson’s 9th US Army had crossed the Elbe River. Simpson later wrote that, using the German autobahn, his army could have been in Berlin in 24 hours. The Russians, in contrast, had not yet crossed the Oder River. In essence, American units were only 53 miles from Berlin on April 11th.

 

On April 12, however, Franklin Roosevelt collapsed and died. This act of destiny neutralized the vigorous efforts of Prime Minister Churchill and British military planners. On April 14, General Eisenhower ordered a halt at the Elbe River and called back American units that had already crossed. In 1949, Eisenhower stated, “The political heads of our government had already agreed that our line of occupation would be way back, starting at the north at Denmark, with Linz on the south, so what good would it have done us to capture Berlin?”

 

Both the political and military consequences would be played out after Germany surrendered. Soviet troops occupied large areas of middle Europe, establishing pro-Russian governments. Stalin looted these countries, dismantling factories and deporting populations to Siberia. He excused these actions as reparations of war.

 

Could Taking Berlin have Limited Stalin’s Gains?

 

If the allied leaders at Potsdam followed the agreements and protocols of the Yalta Agreements (February 4-11, 1945), it would not have made a difference which country actually “took” Berlin. But as Churchill had shown early in 1945 with the bombing of Dresden, the Soviets responded to a show of force and respected power. The new American President, Harry Truman, might have been able to call Stalin’s bluff, particularly with the success of the atomic bomb test in New Mexico.

 

Sources:

 

Douglas Botting, From the Ruins of the Reich: Germany 1945-1949 (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1985)

Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany: A New History (New York: Continuum, 1995)

 

 The Battle of Poltava Alters the European Balance of Power: Russia Defeats Charles XII of Sweden

On June 8, 1709, a vastly outnumbered Swedish army was decisively defeated by the highly drilled troops of Peter the Great at Poltava on the banks of the Vorskla River in the Ukraine. Hailed by scholars as one of the top twenty battles of importance, Russian victory prompted Tsar Peter to exclaim, “Now with God’s help the final stone has been laid in the foundation of St. Petersburg.” Poltava thrust Russia into European affairs as a dominant force, altering the balance of power as the supremacy of Sweden in Northern Europe declined.

 

Charles XII Invades Russia

 

Swedish king Charles XII, seeking to capture Moscow, divide Russia, and end the Great Northern War, advanced into the Ukraine in 1708. Over-confident and arrogant, Charles XII was not prepared for the unusually severe winter nor the lack of support from the Ukrainians. His supply train from Riga was destroyed while many soldiers succumbed to the effects of frigid weather conditions.

 

Reinforcements and supplies were destroyed in September 1708 at Lesnaia by Peter’s friend and general, Alexander Menshikov. With few serviceable artillery pieces and dwindling gunpowder, the Swedish army encamped in the small commercial city of Poltava. Charles XII’s only allies were 2,000 Ukrainian Cossacks under Hetman Mazepa, a far smaller number than he had anticipated.

 

Battle of Poltava

 

After Peter’s earlier defeat at Narva, the new Russian army had been reformed and was well trained. With more artillery than the Swedes, the Russians laid siege to Poltava, erecting strategic redoubts along the northern side of the city. Charles XII’s 22,000 veterans faced an army of 50-60,000 Russians. Most of the Swedes were exhausted after spending nearly two years in enemy territory. Charles had been wounded earlier and was unable to lead his troops. Additionally, the Swedes failed to deploy their artillery.

 

Ordering a direct attack against the Russians, Charles, carried into battle on a litter, watched his best men die, first from the unrelenting gun fire from the Russian redoubts and then from continuous cannon shots. After two hours of heavy fighting, Tsar Peter ordered a counter-attack, his army enveloping the Swedes in a semi-circle.

 

The Swedes turned in retreat, a disordered march down the banks of the Vorskla until they reached the Dneiper River. Only 1,500 men escaped across the river, seeking refuge in Turkish held lands. Among them were Charles XII and his ally Hetman Mazepa. Poltava decisively turned the tide of the Great Northern War. According to military historian Lynn Montross, “On that June day in 1709 a new European war power came into being as an old one declined.”

 

Altering the Balance of Power

 

Although Charles XII eventually returned to Sweden after cajoling the Turks into war with Russia, Swedish domination of Northern Europe ended. A new Russian fleet, built by Tsar Peter, supplanted Swedish naval hegemony in the Baltic. After Poltava, Peter commanded the largest military in Europe. The effects would be profound and long lasting. 19th Century Russian writer and radical Vissarion Belinsky saw Poltava as a battle “for the existence of a whole nation, for the future of the whole state.”

 

Soviet historian E. V. Anisimov, writing in 1989, stated that, “The Poltava victory allowed Peter to seize the initiative… [resulting in] the birth of a new empire…” Russia’s rise as a great power with expanding influence would not have happened without Poltava. As historian N. V. Riasanovsky pointed out, this dramatic change in the balance of power “came as something of a shock” to other European countries, straining relations, notably with Britain.

 

Sources:

 

David Eggenberger, An Encyclopedia of Battles (NY: Dover Publications, 1985)

Lindsey Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (Yale University Press, 1998)

David MacKenzie and Michael Curran, A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond 4th Ed (Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993)

Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages 3rd Ed (NY: Harper & Row, 1960)

Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (Oxford University Press, 1969)

 

Monday, March 7, 2022

 Political Assassinations are Never an End to the Problems Existing

(Dedicated to US Senator Graham)

Political assassination has always been a means to replace leaders seen as weak, to eliminate political competition, create social insecurity, and instill terror. Frequently, assassinations are tied to radical groups furthering political agendas. This was true of late 19th Century Russian revolutionaries, the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914, and – in modern history, the attempted assassination of Harry S. Truman November 1, 1950. Some notable assassinations may have been carried out as acts of revenge, as the stabbing of Marat by Charlotte Corday July 13, 1793 or the murder of French King Henry IV in May 1610 by a crazed Catholic cleric.

 

Assassination Used to Incite Social Terror and National Insecurity

 

In 1878 in St. Petersburg, Russia, Vera Zasulich walked into the office of General D. F. Trepov and shot him. Zasulich was part of the Nihilists whose program of political reform condoned violence. Like the Anarchists and numerous other groups at the time, political assassination was part of that program. In The Catechism of the Revolutionary, authors Sergei Nechaev and Mikhail Bakunin provide a list of “categories” – those that must be eliminated. “…the first to be destroyed are people who are especially harmful to the revolutionary organization and those whose sudden and violent death will create the greatest fear in the government…” (Paragraph 16)

 

Although the June 1914 assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife Sophie were directly related to the political goals of the Black Hand, a secret Serbian nationalist cell, it also was successful in exploiting terror and insecurity. Already viewed as a “powder keg” waiting to be ignited, the Balkans pitted the territorial goals of Austria-Hungary against Russia. In this case, what might be called the “assassination of the century,” launched World War One.

 

Assassination to Replace Potential Political Threats

 

The history of Rome is full of assassinations, often engineered to end the careers of leaders that had become liabilities, as in the case of Nero. In 44 BCE, however, members of the Roman Senate perpetrated the assassination of Julius Caesar, an event destined to become the subject of innumerable books, plays, and mock trials. It also ended the Roman Republic. William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar focuses on both the fears that Caesar was about to make himself a king (thus inspiring Brutus’ motive) as well as the jealousies and ambitions of key senators like Cassius (with the “lean and hungry look…”)

 

In December 1934, the popular Bolshevik Party boss of St. Petersburg, Serge Kirov was assassinated, ostensibly by members of a group opposed to Stalin but supportive of Leon Trotskii. Through the newly formed NKVD, formerly the secret police or GPU, Stalin was able to implicate fellow Bolsheviks like Zinoviev and Kamenev. Show trials and subsequent purges rid Stalin of any potential political threats. The murder of Kirov accomplished several goals, all of which enhanced the power and control of Stalin.

 

Military Assassinations

 

The Roman Praetorian Guard was not the last military group to make and unmake leaders. On July 20, 1944, Colonel Klaus von Stauffenberg entered a conference room at OKW HQ in Rastenburg carrying a bomb. Operation “Valkyrie” was planned to kill Adolph Hitler and involved many top generals that felt Hitler had to be replaced in order to swiftly end the war. The plot, however, failed. It was also unsuccessful in creating an anti-Hitler vanguard within the army ranks. As one former officer wrote, “We all took an oath. These generals supported Hitler when Germany was winning and they were receiving medals. Now they wanted to save themselves.” [1]

 

Political Assassinations are never a Solution

 

The use of violence and murder in history in terms of political assassinations has never demonstrated a positive result. When the Roman Senate assassinated Tiberius Gracchus his place was taken by his brother Gaius, who was also murdered. Their assassinations only further exacerbated the conflict between Roman farmers and the Senate. Political assassination is a crime against all notions of law and order in society as demonstrated by the historical record.

 

See also The Assassination of Tsar Alexander II

 

[1] Unpublished memoirs of Gunter Streich

 

References:

 

Virginia Cowles, The Russian Dagger: Cold War in the Days of the Czars (NY: Harper & Row, 1969)

Basil Dmytryshyn, editor, Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917  (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967)

Constantine FitzGibbon, 20 July (Berkley Publishing Co., 1956)

David MacKenzie, Violent Solutions: Revolutions, Nationalism, and Secret Societies in Europe to 1918 (NY: University Press of America, Inc., 1996)

Jack Pearl, The Dangerous Assassins (Monarch Books, Inc., 1964)