Kronstadt Uprising: Revolt Against the Bolshevik's Revolutionary System in Russia

Michael Streich

October 3, 2009

 

In March 1921 the sailors at Russia’s Kronstadt naval base rose in revolt against the Bolshevik-led government of V. I. Lenin. Kronstadt sailors had played a significant role in the October 1917 revolution and one historian characterized them as Lenin’s “praetorian guard.” Yet by early 1921, conditions in Russia had deteriorated, notably in the rural areas where many of the new recruits were from.

 

They felt betrayed by the revolution and attempted to return to the original ideals of the 1917 revolution which included “all power to the Soviets.” Historian Paul Avrich writes that the Kronstadt Revolt was the “proletariat rising up against the dictatorship of the proletariat.”

 

Causes of the Kronstadt Uprising

 

Lenin’s policy of War Communism was felt keenly in the cities and the countryside as requisition squads removed foodstuffs into the cities to keep the factories running. Although the Whites were becoming less of a threat to the Communist government, the on-going effects of the Civil War were everywhere. In Petrograd, severe food shortages as well as the dwindling supply of heating fuel posed serious problems.

 

The Kronstadt garrison reacted to these events with threats of militancy, forming committees to draft demands that included freedom of speech and the press. The sailors represented a variety of political ideologies but none of these were remotely in sympathy with the Whites or royalist tendencies. Despite this, Lenin branded them the tools of the “White Guard generals” and labeled their movement as “petty-bougeois counterrevolution…”

 

Response of the Bolsheviks

 

Tensions escalated as both sides refused compromise. Prominent leaders of the revolution and the government, men like Kalinin and Zinoviev, went to Kotlin Island to speak to the dissidents, only to be drowned in criticism and threats. The men once referred to as “the pride and glory of the revolution” by Trotsky, became the greatest single threat to Communist rule.

 

Under the leadership of S. M. Petrichenko, the revolting garrison was confident that their movement would spread beyond the walls of Kronstadt. This “expectation,” as stated by Leonard Shapiro, was sparked by the harsh treatment of the people of Petrograd where factories were bring forcibly closed, worker strikes and demonstrations responded to violently, and steep increases in food costs that left most inhabitants on the threshold of starvation.

 

The winter ice still shielded Petrograd from the heavy guns of the Baltic Fleet, notably the Petropavlovsk and the Sevastapol. Kronstadt was surrounded by smaller fortresses and initial attempts to take them had not been successful. The Bolsheviks brought in forces from other cities, hard-core supporters who would have no empathy with the Kronstadt defenders. The strategy worked, despite adverse weather conditions, and the naval base fell. Those that were not shot were sent to penal camps. Petrichenko, along with a few fortunate survivors, fled to Finland.

 

Results of the Kronstadt Revolt

 

Some revolutionaries like Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman who were in Petrograd in March 1921 and left an account of events, were genuinely shaken. The Bolshevik leadership characterized the uprising as inspired by help from the West and by forces seeking to undo their power.

 

Without a doubt the uprising represented a serious threat and Lenin was forced to deal with it in the harshest possible way. Portraying the dissidents as counterrevolutionaries and White Guard tools mollified the average Russian. At the same time, Lenin phased out War Communism in favor of his New Economic Policy. The Kronstadt Revolt was soon to lose the very reasons for its inception.

 

Sources:

 

Paul Avrich, Kronstadt 1921 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1974)

George F. Kennan, Russia and the West (New York: New American Library, 1961)

W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory: A History of the Russian Civil War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989)

Leonard Shapiro, The Russian Revolutions of 1917 (New York: Basic Books, 1984)

Adam Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Random House, 1984)

[Copyright owned by Michael Streich; any republishing requires written permission. Article first published in Suite101]

Isolationists and American Foreign Policy:

Pearl Harbor Forever Ends a Failed Ideology

Michael Streich

November 11, 2011

 

On Monday, December 8, 1941, every U.S. Senator and representative except one, voted to go to war with the empire of Japan. Only Montana Representative Jeanette Rankin, a life-long pacifist, demurred. The Pearl Harbor attack united Americans and instantly converted the isolationists in Congress. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg recalled his own immediate change after receiving a telephone call about the attack Sunday at four o’clock in the afternoon: “That day ended isolationism for any realist.”

 

Isolationism before the Pearl Harbor Attack

 

Isolationism is still used to describe the ideology of those not willing to intervene in foreign matters if the impact of such affairs affects U.S. security interests. In the years before Pearl Harbor, isolationists believed that the Pacific and Atlantic oceans were natural barriers, protecting the United States from the anti-democratic regimes creating havoc in Europe and Asia.

 

Extreme isolationists believed that any U.S. assistance either directly or indirectly would result in foreign entanglements inconsistent with Constitutional prerogatives. They pointed to World War I and deplored the prospect of sending American boys to fight in foreign wars.

 

Isolationists Represented Liberal and Conservative Views

 

Pearl Harbor and World War II changed the meaning of isolationism. Pre-war isolationists that criticized Franklin Roosevelt’s handling of the war were, often ironically, dubbed reactionaries and anti-interventionists despite their life-long liberal pedigrees. This included Democrat Burton Wheeler and Jeanette Rankin. Wheeler, in his memoirs, comments that, “Never before had the question of whether one was a liberal or conservative turned on his view of foreign policy.”

 

Isolationists like Vandenberg hated Communism and fascism as much as those eager to commit to war. On September 15, 1939 Vandenberg wrote in his diary, “…I decline to embrace the opportunistic idea…that we can stop these things in Europe without entering the conflict.” Isolationists viewed every White House attempt to assist Britain and France as a potential door through which the United States would step into a long and bloody conflict much like World War I.

 

Senator Gerald P. Nye’s committee hearings on World War I, culminating in a controversial report in 1936, provided some ammunition for isolationists and Americans favoring neutrality. Historian Wayne Cole states that, “It is significant that the particular controversy that ended the investigation in 1936 involved President Woodrow Wilson’s role in World War I – not the activities of munitions makers.” Like Wilson, FDR appeared to be maneuvering the nation into war, a perception that led to later conspiracy theories linking Roosevelt to the Pearl Harbor attack. Senator Tom Connally writes in his memoirs that, “…the most effective medium for channeling American public opinion into isolationism during this period was the Nye Committee investigation…”

 

Connally blamed Gerald Nye and “his cohort” Arthur Vandenberg for using the committee hearings to publish “half-truths” in order to further their isolationist agenda. According to Connally, this included a blistering indictment of Wall Street and U.S. bankers that “duped” the government “…into shedding American blood” in 1917. Connally also identified different “schools” of isolationism, equating, for example, Burton Wheeler with anti-British sentiments. Another isolationist viewpoint was attributed to William Borah who believed in the two-ocean defense idea and had been one of the chief opponents of Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations.

 

Japanese Action Unites Americans

 

1941 was a crucial year for Britain as it struggled against what was perceived as an imminent invasion by Nazi Germany. In January 1941, as the issue of Lend-Lease was being debated in Congress, the New York Times stated that, given the scope of European affairs, the ideology separating isolationists from “interventionists” had become academic. According to the Times, “The Roosevelt Administration opposed ironclad isolation, insisting that a great nation must lift its voice against treaty violations and infringements of international law…”

 

Pearl Harbor ended the debate. A New York Times editorial, referring to the years of “Hamletlike irresolution,” concluded that the declarations of war “instantly united us” and brought a sense of relief to all Americans: “Their spirit was no longer troubled; their soul was no longer divided; they knew at last what they must do.”

 

The same sentiment had been expressed in Congress on December 8^th where one representative referred to the “war mad Japanese devils…” American hero Charles A. Lindbergh, a leader in the isolationist movement, volunteered to serve with the Army Air Corps. His acceptance was hailed as “a symbol of…newfound unity.”

 

Burton Wheeler’s early 1941 predictions that the “New Deal Triple A foreign policy [would] plow under every fourth American boy…” were not unfounded, but other observers compared the United States to 1917 when a declaration of war was almost too late. The Pearl Harbor attack, defended by General Tojo at his trial in 1947, forever ended isolationism.

 

The subsequent Cold War imposed an on-going interventionist policy supported by former isolationists like Arthur Vandenberg. The defense of democracy became a global imperative not by design but from the lessons of history and the impossibility of avoiding foreign entanglements.

 

References:

 

“America’s Role: A National Debate,” New York Times, January 19, 1941

Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations (The University of Minnesota Press, 1962)

Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally (Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954)

“The Lone War Dissenter,” NPR, December 7, 2001

Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952)

Burton K. Wheeler, Yankee from the West (Doubleday & Company, 1962)

[First published in Suitew101; copyright owned by Michael Streich. Reprints require written permission]

 

Enlightenment Ideas Challenge the Old Regime

Thinkers like Voltaire and Rousseau Left a Long Legacy of Criticism

• Jun 29, 2009
• Michael Streich

Voltaire: Crush the Infamous Thing! - Mike Streich

Enlightenment thinking applied the rational principles of the Scientific Revolution to social and political institutions, seeking to liberate man from the Old Regime.

Writing in 1996, Russian history professor David MacKenzie ended his section on Jean-Jacques Rousseau by stating, “It should be evident why nineteenth century radicals and conspirators like Babeuf, Buonarroti, and Mazzini venerated Rousseau so greatly as their spiritual father.”

Rousseau and Voltaire, two of the greatest Enlightenment thinkers, may well have been the ideological architects of the French Revolution, influencing men like Robespierre and Mirabeau. Yet they were part of a larger movement that, taken as a whole, challenged the Old Regime throughout Europe.

Literary Revolt against the Status Quo

Enlightenment thinkers believed in the perfectibility of man, that the same rationalism used to explain the Cosmos in mathematical terms could be applied to the social condition. This meant challenging the fundamental underpinnings of the Old Regime: press censorship, capital punishment, religious intolerance, and the lack of an independent judiciary.

Particular criticism was leveled against the Catholic Church, which in France and Austria had immense land holdings and represented an entirely separate estate. “Enlightened despots” like Joseph II of Austria took on the church, bringing it under royal control. France was another matter.

Voltaire, when asked about the church, famously answered, “crush the infamous thing!” Rousseau was also a critic of the church, writing about moral laxity among priests and equating the hierarchy with the corrupt and extravagant nobility. Indeed, most bishops and archbishops came from the upper nobility.

Writing in the early 1840s, Mikhail Bakunin, the father of Anarchism, stated in a letter that “he shared Rousseau’s faith in the future victory of mankind over priests and tyrants.” (Kelly, 108) Not only did the church perpetuate mysticism and superstition to control the people, according to Enlightenment thinkers, but it was intimately allied with the ruling elites that merely exploited the masses.

Rousseau and the Social Contract

The Social Contract begins with one of Rousseau’s most often quoted phrases: “Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains.” Rousseau’s point is that natural freedom does not translate into natural rights because of barriers erected by the ruling elites. As in his book Emile, only nature can produce and stimulate the freedom of innate goodness. In contrast, the political, religious, and social institutions that maintained the status quo structures corrupted man. In the next century, Russian radicals would apply this concept to the millions of Russian serfs.

Other Enlightenment Thinkers

Philosophes like Montesquieu influenced the forms of government. Montesquieu’s book, Spirit of the Laws, called for, among other things, a separation of governmental powers, highlighting a strong and independent judiciary. The American idea of “separation of powers” and “checks and balances” was influenced by Montesquieu.

Scottish philosopher Adam Smith rejected mercantilism and government regulation of trade and business in The Wealth of Nations (1776), arguing that laissez faire would produce a prosperous and unfettered merchant and business class, creating in England a “nation of shop keepers.”

Men of Letters and Correspondence

The ideals of Enlightenment thinking were spread at fashionable salons, Masonic lodges, and coffeehouses. The proliferation of printing presses helped disseminate Enlightenment thinking. But it was the correspondence networks that perhaps most influenced the spread of progressive ideas. Voltaire and Diderot corresponded with Russia’s Catherine the Great, Diderot even accepting an invitation to visit Catherine at the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg.

Long Term Effect of the Enlightenment

Although the 19th Century would rebel against sterile rationalism and foster movements like Romanticism and, in America, the Second Great Awakening, social philosophies, notably those of Voltaire and Rousseau, would fuel Utopian Socialism and subsequent movements of revolution. Long after death, Rousseau would prove that empires might rise and fall, but ideas live on forever.

Sources:

• Michael Burleigh, Earthly Powers: The Class of Religion and Politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War (HarperCollins, 2005)
• Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation Volume II (Alfred A. Knopf, 1969)
• Aileen Kelly, Mikhail Bakunin: A Study in the Psychology and Politics of Utopianism (Yale University Press, 1987)
• David MacKenzie, Violent Solutions: Revolutions, Nationalism, and Secret Societies to 1918 (New York: University Press of America, 1996)

Copyright Michael Streich. Contact the author to obtain permission for republication.

 

Alexander the Great Conquers Persia

Three Significant Battles Enabled the Greeks to Defeat Darius III

• Jun 27, 2009
• Michael Streich

Frequently out-numbered, Alexander demonstrated risk-taking as well as strategy against the forces of Darius III, ultimately conquering the empire of Cyrus.

Alexander the Great was only twenty years old when his father was assassinated in 336 BCE. After consolidating his power in Macedonia and putting down revolts in Greece, notably at Thebes, he turned his attention to the Persian Empire. A military risk-taker, Alexander was also a superb strategist, seen in the siege of Tyre, the Scythian defeat at the River Jaxartes, and his final battle against Darius III at Gaugamela (Arbela in older history texts).

Alexander Marches into Anatolia

Crossing the Hellespont in 334 BCE, Alexander hastened to Troy where he sacrificed to Athena and paid homage to Achilles, the legendary Greek hero he believed to be an ancestor. Educated by the great philosopher Aristotle, Alexander had become devoted to the works of Homer, traveling with a copy of the Iliad and influenced by the super-human exploits of past history.

The Persian satraps hastily gathered a force that included Greek mercenaries to stop Alexander. In that same year, the two forces met at the River Granicus. Against the recommendation of his generals, Alexander attacked immediately, massacring the Persian cavalry and infantry although almost losing his life in the process.

The Persians fled in disarray, leaving the Greek mercenaries to their fate. Several thousand of these unfortunates were sent back to Greece as slaves, the rest were massacred. Turning south, Alexander marched along the Aegean coast, capturing cities and leaving Macedonian garrisons that maintained control.

Syria and Persia Conquered

At the battle of Issus in 333 BCE Darius III confronted Alexander with a mighty army. The Persians relied on a larger force but would repeat mistakes made at earlier battles with the Greeks such as at Plataea and the Marathon plain. Alexander’s cavalry, positioned on the Greek right flank, attacked the Persian left flank, driving toward the army’s center. Darius himself was positioned on the left flank. Darius turned and fled, sending his army into a rout.

Alexander marched south to Egypt, accepting the surrender of numerous Persian cities and strongholds. Only Tyre and Gaza resisted. Both were besieged and taken. With the destruction of Tyre, Alexander also neutralized Persian naval abilities in the Mediterranean. Arriving in Egypt in 332 BCE, Alexander extended Greek influence, further beginning a process historians refer to as Hellenization.

The battle of Gaugamela was the last fight against Darius and would clear the way for Alexander’s triumphal entry into both Babylon and Susa. At Gaugamela Darius assembled a vast army, choosing the battle site himself. Much like at Issus, however, Alexander employed his infantry on the left flank and his cavalry on the right. He also kept men in reserve.

Alexander’s cavalry again helped to win the day as the Macedonian phalanx held back Persian onslaughts. Darius turned and fled. Alexander was now the master of Persia. Appointing Greeks to command garrisons, Alexander also retained Persian officials, particularly those that had treated him favorably.

Both Babylon and Susa were spared from destruction. The Greeks were under strict orders not to plunder or harass the inhabitants. Persepolis, the spiritual center of the Persian Empire, was not as fortunate. Accounts relate that the decision to burn the city after having looted the palaces and temples came during a night of riotous drinking and that Alexander himself danced naked before the flames of the city.

The destruction of Persepolis in 330 BCE was highly symbolic. In many ways, the firing of the city was an act of revenge for Persian destruction of Greek temples, notably in Athens, during the Persian wars. From Persepolis Alexander turned toward India. He reached the Indus River but turned back after his men refused to go any further. In 323 BCE Alexander died in southern Persia, leaving no heirs.

Sources:

• Martin Van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought (London: Cassell & Co, 2000)
• Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages 3rd Ed (New York: Harper and Row, 1960)
• Sarah B. Pomeroy, Stanley M. Burnstein, and others, Ancient Greece: A political, Social, and Cultural History (Oxford University Press, 1999)

Copyright Michael Streich. Contact the author to obtain permission for republication.

Michael Streich - Former Adjunct Instructor, History & Global Studies

 

Rise of the Planter Class in Pre-Revolutionary Colonial America

• Jul 8, 2011
• Michael Streich

The colonial Southern planter class traced its power and wealth to the profitable English mercantile system and the growth of slave labor.

The growing prosperity and power of the Southern elite planter system can be traced to the seventeenth century. By the time the American Revolution began, a small group of elite planters managed to consolidate their control from Virginia to the Carolinas. Much of this prosperity and power was based on the profits tied to the protected market of the British mercantile system as well as an ever-growing population of slaves. Elite planters lived better, ate better, and socialized better than their poorer counterparts, developing what historian David Hawke refers to as “opulent plantations.” According to Hawke, “The wide gap between rich and poor in the Chesapeake…had already appeared before the seventeenth century ended.”

Increasing Wealth of the Southern Planter Class

The increasing wealth of the Southern planter class coincided with the rapid growth of port cities and towns, enabling them to send raw materials to England while at the same time ordering luxury items that defined a new class of colonial American aristocrats. Writer Henry Wiencek comments that, “The pride of the planters demanded that no expense be spared to proclaim their status.”

Prior to the American Revolution, an already debt-prone George Washington, for example, ordered a new coach from England. No expense was spared on a carriage that featured only the finest trimmings and made out of the costliest materials.

At the same time, Washington was transforming Mount Vernon into an enviable estate, first with tobacco profits and later with funds from his wheat crop as well as an inheritance. Historian Ira Berlin states that, “Planters took on the airs of English gentlemen…” as they forged “seats of small empires…”

Birth of the First Families in the Pre-Revolution South

Much earlier, the diary of planter William Byrd II demonstrated a life that included civic duties and leisure. Byrd described what he ate everyday, including such selections as boiled beef, roast beef, goose, and mutton. Few poor farmers could afford to sit down at a table to the types of food mentioned by Byrd. His social pursuits, when not tending to his plantation, included much merriment and card playing. Byrd was an educated man who read Greek.

Tobacco and rice, the chief export commodities of the colonial South, received generous subsidies through the mercantile system; both were enumerated goods. Historian Oliver M. Dickerson writes that, “Next to tobacco, rice was the most important commercially grown agricultural crop of the continental colonies.” Both became the seeds of fortune that created the great plantation estates and the “First Families” that, ultimately, would rule the South politically.

Slavery Helps to Create Powerful Planter Elites in the South

Slavery, however, made the cultivation of such crops highly profitable. Elite planters possessed the financial means to purchase slaves, frequently reselling slaves to less powerful, fledgling planters. According to Berlin, “Having enslaved black people…the grandees knit themselves together through strategic marriages, carefully crafted business dealings, and elaborate rituals, creating a style of life which awed common folk, and to which lesser planters dared not aspire.”

As the political leaders, the elite planters wrote the slaves codes, beginning with the 1676 Virginia revolt led by Nathaniel Bacon. Slave codes deprived free blacks of their rights and helped to separate slaves from poor whites, many of whom began their colonial experiences as indentured servants. Slave codes were amended throughout the years, giving planters unlimited control over their slaves. Further, slavery became more advantageous as mortality rates decreased, an initial problem with the influx of Africans unaccustomed to the climate and diseases.

Permanence of the Southern Slave System

By the time of the American Revolution, Southern planters identifying with the Patriot cause were powerful enough to ensure that the Jeffersonian phrase, “all men are created equal” did not apply to people of color. After the Revolution, the same elites ensured that any hint of slave emancipation was quashed. Slavery was an integral component of the plantation system, ensuring both prosperity and political power.

The ante-bellum planter class was rooted in pre-revolutionary conditions that in large measure owed its success to the profitable British mercantile system. This emerging success, based on agricultural profits, coincided with the growing importation of slaves. By the time of the Revolution, a distinct Southern planter class formed sectional goals that would eventually conflict with the an industrializing North.

Sources:

• Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries Of Slavery In North America (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998)
• Oliver M. Dickerson, The Navigation Acts And The American Revolution (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951)
• David Freeman Hawke, Everyday Life In Early America (Harper & Row, 1988)
• William A. Link and Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, The South In The History Of The Nation, Volume One (Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999)
• Henry Wiencek, An Imperfect God: George Washington, His Slaves, and the Creation of America (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2003)

Copyright Michael Streich. Contact the author to obtain permission for republication.

 

Napoleon III and French Foreign Policy to 1871

Manipulated by Cavour and Bismarck, France was Isolated

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Jul 16, 2009 Michael Streich

By the time Otto von Bismarck declared the German Empire in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, Napoleon III had been out maneuvered and diplomatically isolated.

By January 1871, the political landscape of Europe changed dramatically. The German Confederation, led by Austria since its establishment in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, was no more. A unified German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles by Otto von Bismarck, the brilliant statesman who altered the European balance of power, and in Italy unification had produced a kingdom created by another realist, Count Camillo Cavour. Napoleon III of France would soon be in exile in Britain, yet it was he who helped precipitate the events that isolated France in 1870 and set the stage for World War I.

Napoleon III and French Foreign Policy

Nephew of the great Napoleon Bonaparte, Napoleon III became emperor in 1851. Bored with domestic policy, Napoleon sought to enhance his prestige and turn his peoples’ attentions away from domestic concerns through foreign adventurism. Unfortunately, Napoleon III lacked any depth in terms of the fluid events of European foreign policy and was easily manipulated by Cavour and Bismarck.

French troops participated in the Crimean War of 1853-1856. Although most of the great powers were allied against Russia, Prussia remained neutral. Napoleon III took this as a sign of weakness, an impression he carried as the 1866 Austro-Prussian War broke out. Also known as the “Seven Weeks’ War,” the conflict ended Austrian dominance in Germany. As Bismarck consolidated the recalcitrant German duchies and kingdoms into the Prussian state, the stage was set for the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

France, Italian Unification, and Russia

Camillo Cavour manipulated Napoleon III into a war against Austria in 1859. In return for French assistance, France received Savoy and Nice in 1860, two “buffer” states established in 1815 to thwart future French expansion. These land exchanges were viewed unfavorably by Britain.

Napoleon was also viewed negatively by the autocratic Russian state. The Russian tsar considered Napoleon III an upstart with a revolutionary past. Further, Napoleon had openly supported the Poles in their revolt against Russia and attempts at independence. Napoleon’s past betrayed him: as a young man, he championed self determination and promoted revolutionary activity.

Blunders and False Assumptions

Napoleon III was the first French leader to deviate from the principles established by Cardinal Richelieu in the early 17th Century. The cornerstone of Richelieu’s policy was to keep Germany divided and fragmented. Toward that end, Richelieu covertly supported the Protestant cause in the Thirty Years’ War against Catholic Austria.

A divided Germany was in the best interests of French security and European dominance. Napoleon III’s help in driving Austria from Italy earned him scorn in Vienna. During the Austro-Prussian War, Napoleon merely watched events unfold, fully believing Prussia would be defeated. Napoleon believed that once Prussia was defeated, he could offer his services as a peace mediator to help reconstruct central Europe.

Coming of the Franco Prussian War

By the time Prussian forces crossed into French territory in 1870, Napoleon III was completely isolated. Austria was in no position to support France nor was it inclined to given French actions in the past. Austria was involved in internal problems, notably the establishment of the dual monarchy with Hungary.

Great Britain, always reluctant to commit armies in a continental war, and dealing with global imperial problems, turned a deaf ear to any alliance with France. Further, Napoleon had sought to meddle in the affairs of Belgium, a neutral state with strong ties to Britain. Italy had received Venetia from Austria as gratitude for support in the Austro-Prussian War. There would be no help from Italy.

The failed policies of Napoleon III resulted in a humiliated France and the establishment of the Second German Reich. The face of Europe was changed, and the countdown to the First World War had begun.

Sources:

• George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984)
• Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994)

The copyright of the article Napoleon III and French Foreign Policy to 1871 in W European History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Napoleon III and French Foreign Policy to 1871 in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

 

Realpolitik and Idealism in Foreign Policy

State Security Policy Began with Cardinal Richelieu's Raison d'etat

Oct 16, 2009 Michael Streich

European and American foreign policy initiatives followed moralist approaches of idealism or the ruthless actions of Realpolitik to achieve goals favorable to the state.

The dichotomy between realism and idealism in history can be traced to the early 16th Century French statesman, Cardinal de Richelieu who advanced the idea of raison d’etat, writing that “the state has no immortality; its salvation is now or never.” A little over 200 years later, Count Camillo Cavour, in unifying Italy, stated that “if we did for ourselves what we do for our country, what rascals we should be.” Both Richelieu and Cavour demonstrated the success of Realpolitik, solutions based on realism. In both Europe and the United States, realism would contend with idealism, the notion that even states must exhibit morality.

Count Cavour and Otto von Bismarck

Both Cavour and Germany’s Bismarck ruthlessly employed Realpolitik in their efforts at state unification. Bismarck’s tools were “blood and iron.” For Germany’s chancellor, the old alliances such as the Holy Alliance dating to the times of the Congress of Vienna (1815) were worthless. Bismarck’s alliance system enabled him to defeat Austria in the Seven Weeks’ War in order to forcibly bring German kingdoms and principalities under Prussian domination. Diplomatically, Bismarck isolated Napoleon III of France in order to provoke the hapless emperor into a ruinous war.

Cavour also manipulated Napoleon III, provoking a war with Austria with French help in order to bring northern Italy under the leadership of Piedmont-Sardinia. By 1870, Cavour, using both war, plebiscites, and threats, unified Italy, even to the point of earning the scorn of the papacy which had lost its lands and was confined to what would later be the Vatican city-state.

Realism versus Idealism in the United States

Although Europe had its idealists, like British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain whose policy of appeasement paved the way for Nazi domination of Europe, idealism in America is best characterized by the visionary policies of Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter, both Nobel Peace Prize recipients.

Woodrow Wilson, coming from a strict Calvinist background, chose the so-called “moral high ground” when formulating his Utopian Fourteen Points, a blueprint for a new world order where war was not an option for settling disputes among states. The world, however, was not ready for Wilson’s political Sermon on the Mount. Similarly, Jimmy Carter, elected toward the end of the Cold War, injected his version of human rights into foreign policy. He altruistically returned the Panama Canal to the Panamanians, reversing US policy begun by a realist president, Teddy Roosevelt, who presided over the acquisition and building of the canal.

Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy is often equated with the old African maxim, “walk softly and carry a big stick.” The “big stick” fell hard on nations threatening American interests but was also used domestically against monopolists like J.P. Morgan. Roosevelt also received a Nobel Peace Prize, in part, for negotiating an end to the Russo-Japanese War.

Yet even this action was based on Realpolitik. US interests in Asia, notably China, were better served by salvaging a weak Russian presence rather than allowing the emerging Japanese military machine an opportunity to threaten the western “Spheres of Influence.” This motivation was lost on the Peace Prize committee.

The Modern Contradiction of Morality and Immorality in State Policy

When Cardinal Richelieu embarked upon a foreign policy radically different from earlier centuries, he set a precedent for state building and the pursuit of favorable foreign policy initiatives. In his book Diplomacy, Dr. Henry Kissinger writes that “raison d’etat replaced the medieval concept of universal moral values as the operating principle of French policy.” In the post-modern world of the 21st Century, realism may be more of a necessity than an optional policy.

President Jimmy Carter learned this lesson well when Soviet Russia invaded Afghanistan and when competing Middle East agendas made a mockery of the lofty Camp David Accords. Ronald Reagan’s covert support of Afghan rebels as well as Central American “Contra” groups was a realist approach to clandestinely further American security interests. The contradiction continues and it is up to American citizens to decide which best serves the nation’s interests.

Sources:

• Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster, 1994)
• Various general history survey texts like America Past and Present (Divine) and The Western Heritage (Kagan)

The copyright of the article Realpolitik and Idealism in Foreign Policy in American History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Realpolitik and Idealism in Foreign Policy in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.