Napoleon III and French Foreign Policy to 1871

Manipulated by Cavour and Bismarck, France was Isolated

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Jul 16, 2009 Michael Streich

By the time Otto von Bismarck declared the German Empire in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, Napoleon III had been out maneuvered and diplomatically isolated.

By January 1871, the political landscape of Europe changed dramatically. The German Confederation, led by Austria since its establishment in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, was no more. A unified German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles by Otto von Bismarck, the brilliant statesman who altered the European balance of power, and in Italy unification had produced a kingdom created by another realist, Count Camillo Cavour. Napoleon III of France would soon be in exile in Britain, yet it was he who helped precipitate the events that isolated France in 1870 and set the stage for World War I.

Napoleon III and French Foreign Policy

Nephew of the great Napoleon Bonaparte, Napoleon III became emperor in 1851. Bored with domestic policy, Napoleon sought to enhance his prestige and turn his peoples’ attentions away from domestic concerns through foreign adventurism. Unfortunately, Napoleon III lacked any depth in terms of the fluid events of European foreign policy and was easily manipulated by Cavour and Bismarck.

French troops participated in the Crimean War of 1853-1856. Although most of the great powers were allied against Russia, Prussia remained neutral. Napoleon III took this as a sign of weakness, an impression he carried as the 1866 Austro-Prussian War broke out. Also known as the “Seven Weeks’ War,” the conflict ended Austrian dominance in Germany. As Bismarck consolidated the recalcitrant German duchies and kingdoms into the Prussian state, the stage was set for the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

France, Italian Unification, and Russia

Camillo Cavour manipulated Napoleon III into a war against Austria in 1859. In return for French assistance, France received Savoy and Nice in 1860, two “buffer” states established in 1815 to thwart future French expansion. These land exchanges were viewed unfavorably by Britain.

Napoleon was also viewed negatively by the autocratic Russian state. The Russian tsar considered Napoleon III an upstart with a revolutionary past. Further, Napoleon had openly supported the Poles in their revolt against Russia and attempts at independence. Napoleon’s past betrayed him: as a young man, he championed self determination and promoted revolutionary activity.

Blunders and False Assumptions

Napoleon III was the first French leader to deviate from the principles established by Cardinal Richelieu in the early 17th Century. The cornerstone of Richelieu’s policy was to keep Germany divided and fragmented. Toward that end, Richelieu covertly supported the Protestant cause in the Thirty Years’ War against Catholic Austria.

A divided Germany was in the best interests of French security and European dominance. Napoleon III’s help in driving Austria from Italy earned him scorn in Vienna. During the Austro-Prussian War, Napoleon merely watched events unfold, fully believing Prussia would be defeated. Napoleon believed that once Prussia was defeated, he could offer his services as a peace mediator to help reconstruct central Europe.

Coming of the Franco Prussian War

By the time Prussian forces crossed into French territory in 1870, Napoleon III was completely isolated. Austria was in no position to support France nor was it inclined to given French actions in the past. Austria was involved in internal problems, notably the establishment of the dual monarchy with Hungary.

Great Britain, always reluctant to commit armies in a continental war, and dealing with global imperial problems, turned a deaf ear to any alliance with France. Further, Napoleon had sought to meddle in the affairs of Belgium, a neutral state with strong ties to Britain. Italy had received Venetia from Austria as gratitude for support in the Austro-Prussian War. There would be no help from Italy.

The failed policies of Napoleon III resulted in a humiliated France and the establishment of the Second German Reich. The face of Europe was changed, and the countdown to the First World War had begun.

Sources:

• George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984)
• Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994)

The copyright of the article Napoleon III and French Foreign Policy to 1871 in W European History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Napoleon III and French Foreign Policy to 1871 in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

 

Realpolitik and Idealism in Foreign Policy

State Security Policy Began with Cardinal Richelieu's Raison d'etat

Oct 16, 2009 Michael Streich

European and American foreign policy initiatives followed moralist approaches of idealism or the ruthless actions of Realpolitik to achieve goals favorable to the state.

The dichotomy between realism and idealism in history can be traced to the early 16th Century French statesman, Cardinal de Richelieu who advanced the idea of raison d’etat, writing that “the state has no immortality; its salvation is now or never.” A little over 200 years later, Count Camillo Cavour, in unifying Italy, stated that “if we did for ourselves what we do for our country, what rascals we should be.” Both Richelieu and Cavour demonstrated the success of Realpolitik, solutions based on realism. In both Europe and the United States, realism would contend with idealism, the notion that even states must exhibit morality.

Count Cavour and Otto von Bismarck

Both Cavour and Germany’s Bismarck ruthlessly employed Realpolitik in their efforts at state unification. Bismarck’s tools were “blood and iron.” For Germany’s chancellor, the old alliances such as the Holy Alliance dating to the times of the Congress of Vienna (1815) were worthless. Bismarck’s alliance system enabled him to defeat Austria in the Seven Weeks’ War in order to forcibly bring German kingdoms and principalities under Prussian domination. Diplomatically, Bismarck isolated Napoleon III of France in order to provoke the hapless emperor into a ruinous war.

Cavour also manipulated Napoleon III, provoking a war with Austria with French help in order to bring northern Italy under the leadership of Piedmont-Sardinia. By 1870, Cavour, using both war, plebiscites, and threats, unified Italy, even to the point of earning the scorn of the papacy which had lost its lands and was confined to what would later be the Vatican city-state.

Realism versus Idealism in the United States

Although Europe had its idealists, like British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain whose policy of appeasement paved the way for Nazi domination of Europe, idealism in America is best characterized by the visionary policies of Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter, both Nobel Peace Prize recipients.

Woodrow Wilson, coming from a strict Calvinist background, chose the so-called “moral high ground” when formulating his Utopian Fourteen Points, a blueprint for a new world order where war was not an option for settling disputes among states. The world, however, was not ready for Wilson’s political Sermon on the Mount. Similarly, Jimmy Carter, elected toward the end of the Cold War, injected his version of human rights into foreign policy. He altruistically returned the Panama Canal to the Panamanians, reversing US policy begun by a realist president, Teddy Roosevelt, who presided over the acquisition and building of the canal.

Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy is often equated with the old African maxim, “walk softly and carry a big stick.” The “big stick” fell hard on nations threatening American interests but was also used domestically against monopolists like J.P. Morgan. Roosevelt also received a Nobel Peace Prize, in part, for negotiating an end to the Russo-Japanese War.

Yet even this action was based on Realpolitik. US interests in Asia, notably China, were better served by salvaging a weak Russian presence rather than allowing the emerging Japanese military machine an opportunity to threaten the western “Spheres of Influence.” This motivation was lost on the Peace Prize committee.

The Modern Contradiction of Morality and Immorality in State Policy

When Cardinal Richelieu embarked upon a foreign policy radically different from earlier centuries, he set a precedent for state building and the pursuit of favorable foreign policy initiatives. In his book Diplomacy, Dr. Henry Kissinger writes that “raison d’etat replaced the medieval concept of universal moral values as the operating principle of French policy.” In the post-modern world of the 21st Century, realism may be more of a necessity than an optional policy.

President Jimmy Carter learned this lesson well when Soviet Russia invaded Afghanistan and when competing Middle East agendas made a mockery of the lofty Camp David Accords. Ronald Reagan’s covert support of Afghan rebels as well as Central American “Contra” groups was a realist approach to clandestinely further American security interests. The contradiction continues and it is up to American citizens to decide which best serves the nation’s interests.

Sources:

• Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster, 1994)
• Various general history survey texts like America Past and Present (Divine) and The Western Heritage (Kagan)

The copyright of the article Realpolitik and Idealism in Foreign Policy in American History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Realpolitik and Idealism in Foreign Policy in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

 

The Franco-Prussian War and Balance of Power

Prussian Defeat of France Ensured a Powerful Continental Germany

Dec 14, 2009 Michael Streich

Defeating France in 1871 after unifying Germany enabled Otto von Bismarck to create the most militarily powerful nation in Europe, altering the prior balance of power.

When German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck proclaimed the German Empire at Versailles in January 1871 following the Franco-Prussian War, the final act was played that would change the European balance of power and lead toward the catastrophic conflict of 1914 that would be called the “Great War.” Bismarck had convinced German liberals before unification resulted in empire that the creation of the German state would not be accomplished by speeches but by blood and iron.

The German Empire and the New Balance of Power

After skillful diplomacy ensured a neutral Russia and a short war with Austria diminished Hapsburg influence in Germany, Bismarck maneuvered France’s Napoleon III into the Franco-Prussian War. The Ems telegram, which Bismarck likened to “waving a red cloak” in front of the French bull, resulted in a French declaration of war against Prussia. Because of the defeat of Austria in the earlier Seven Weeks’ War, all German principalities joined Prussia in the war against France.

It was a short war. Napoleon III was captured on the battlefield and Paris fell in January 1871. France, building a new Republic and a new identity, mentally prepared for the revenge that would surely come. France had lost Alsace and Lorraine to the newly proclaimed German Empire.

Austria, the “big brother” caretaker of the Germanic principalities since the 1815 Congress of Vienna, was forced to look elsewhere to expand its empire and influence. That expansion focused on the Balkans, setting up a competition with the fading Ottoman Empire and Imperial Russia, focused on Pan-Slavism and the protection of Orthodox Christians. Although the Ottomans were inconsequential (dubbed the “sick man of Europe” by British pundits, although also attributed to Tsar Nicholas I), the Russians were far more formidable, honoring an alliance with Serbia made in 1830.

The British Empire and Continental Europe

While British leaders viewed the rise and expansion of Prussia with a certain degree of consternation, the government was focused on the global empire. If Prime Minister Gladstone, for example, was adamantly opposed to sending British armies to police the world, the thought of entering a general European war was anathema. Further, the British did not maintain military alliances with the great powers of continental Europe. In an age of Imperialism, all European powers were potentially lethal competitors.

Even events between Turkey and Russia first at the time of the Crimean War of 1853 and later during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 invited British intervention solely because Russian domination of Constantinople and the Dardanelles would have adversely affected British interests in the Middle East, notably Egypt.

The Changing Balance of Power in Europe

The Concert of Europe, coming out of the 1815 Congress of Vienna, had been instrumental in confronting and resolving regional problems that might have disturbed the equilibrium of peace on the continent. The Crimean War effectively ended this system. Austria’s refusal to support Russia in 1853 ultimately led to an Austrian alliance with a newly unified Germany. Additionally, a newly unified Italy by Count Cavour brought another power to the European table.

After 1871, Imperial Germany represented the most significant force in Europe. Bismarck’s alliances with Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy bought time for Germany to further develop militarily and industrially. It was not until 1890, when the young Kaiser William II dismissed Bismarck, that the carefully constructed system unraveled. The Franco-Russian alliance again altered the balance of power, this time negatively affecting Germany.

Sources:

• George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War (Pantheon Books, 1984)
• Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster, 1994)
• Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (Random House, 1991)
• Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (The Macmillan Company, 1962

The copyright of the article The Franco-Prussian War and Balance of Power in W European History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish The Franco-Prussian War and Balance of Power in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

 

Poltava and the Rise of Imperial Russia

Defeat of the Swedes Altered the European Balance of Power

Jan 21, 2010 Michael Streich

Charles XII's invasion of Russia was halted at Poltava June 8, 1709 when Peter the Great decisively defeated the Swedes, ultimately winning the Great Northern War.

On June 8, 1709, a vastly outnumbered Swedish army was decisively defeated by the highly drilled troops of Peter the Great at Poltava on the banks of the Vorskla River in the Ukraine. Hailed by scholars as one of the top twenty battles of importance, Russian victory prompted Tsar Peter to exclaim, “Now with God’s help the final stone has been laid in the foundation of St. Petersburg.” Poltava thrust Russia into European affairs as a dominant force, altering the balance of power as the supremacy of Sweden in Northern Europe declined.

Charles XII Invades Russia

Swedish king Charles XII, seeking to capture Moscow, divide Russia, and end the Great Northern War, advanced into the Ukraine in 1708. Over-confident and arrogant, Charles XII was not prepared for the unusually severe winter nor the lack of support from the Ukrainians. His supply train from Riga was destroyed while many soldiers succumbed to the effects of frigid weather conditions.

Reinforcements and supplies were destroyed in September 1708 at Lesnaia by Peter’s friend and general, Alexander Menshikov. With few serviceable artillery pieces and dwindling gunpowder, the Swedish army encamped in the small commercial city of Poltava. Charles XII’s only allies were 2,000 Ukrainian Cossacks under Hetman Mazepa, a far smaller number than he had anticipated.

Battle of Poltava

After Peter’s earlier defeat at Narva, the new Russian army had been reformed and was well trained. With more artillery than the Swedes, the Russians laid siege to Poltava, erecting strategic redoubts along the northern side of the city. Charles XII’s 22,000 veterans faced an army of 50-60,000 Russians. Most of the Swedes were exhausted after spending nearly two years in enemy territory. Charles had been wounded earlier and was unable to lead his troops. Additionally, the Swedes failed to deploy their artillery.

Ordering a direct attack against the Russians, Charles, carried into battle on a litter, watched his best men die, first from the unrelenting gun fire from the Russian redoubts and then from continuous cannon shots. After two hours of heavy fighting, Tsar Peter ordered a counter-attack, his army enveloping the Swedes in a semi-circle.

The Swedes turned in retreat, a disordered march down the banks of the Vorskla until they reached the Dneiper River. Only 1,500 men escaped across the river, seeking refuge in Turkish held lands. Among them were Charles XII and his ally Hetman Mazepa. Poltava decisively turned the tide of the Great Northern War. According to military historian Lynn Montross, “On that June day in 1709 a new European war power came into being as an old one declined.”

Altering the Balance of Power

Although Charles XII eventually returned to Sweden after cajoling the Turks into war with Russia, Swedish domination of Northern Europe ended. A new Russian fleet, built by Tsar Peter, supplanted Swedish naval hegemony in the Baltic. After Poltava, Peter commanded the largest military in Europe. The effects would be profound and long lasting. 19th Century Russian writer and radical Vissarion Belinsky saw Poltava as a battle “for the existence of a whole nation, for the future of the whole state.”

Soviet historian E. V. Anisimov, writing in 1989, stated that, “The Poltava victory allowed Peter to seize the initiative… [resulting in] the birth of a new empire…” Russia’s rise as a great power with expanding influence would not have happened without Poltava. As historian N. V. Riasanovsky pointed out, this dramatic change in the balance of power “came as something of a shock” to other European countries, straining relations, notably with Britain.

Sources:

• David Eggenberger, An Encyclopedia of Battles (NY: Dover Publications, 1985)
• Lindsey Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (Yale University Press, 1998)
• David MacKenzie and Michael Curran, A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond 4th Ed (Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993)
• Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages 3rd Ed (NY: Harper & Row, 1960)
• Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (Oxford University Press, 1969) 
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• The copyright of the article Poltava and the Rise of Imperial Russia in E European History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Poltava and the Rise of Imperial Russia in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

 

The Western Front Bias in Historical Studies

Rehabilitating Russian Contributions In Western European History

Feb 25, 2010 Michael Streich

Russia seldom receives equal treatment in the retelling of history, from the Napoleonic Wars to the Great Patriotic War and the subsequent defeat of Hitler's Germany.

Ever since the end of World War II in 1945, a Western bias has existed in the retelling of war events. Most general history texts barely mention Russia and the Eastern Front, other than to highlight, for example, the turning point battle of Stalingrad. Part of this bias is directly linked to the Cold War, which began very soon after the Potsdam Conference, and the Soviet Union was transformed into what Ronald Reagan would later call, the “Evil Empire.” Discounting the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over Hitler also had much to do with traditional views of Russia as a backward and foreign nation whose credentials as a “Western” power were scorned.

Western Historical Views of Russia

Historically, Russia was always distant and perceived as a cold, barren, and under-developed nation with pretensions to power. After Peter the Great modernized the military, Europe took greater notice but clung to the traditional beliefs that it could never be equal to the great states of the defined “West.” Even as World War I dawned, for example, the fear of the Russian “steamroller” forced the German General Staff to tinker with the Schlieffen Plan and deploy more divisions to the East. After decisive German victories, however, beginning early in the war at Tannenberg, the conventional views of Russia reemerged.

Russia and the War of 1812

After Tsar Alexander I abrogated the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon a prostrate Europe watched the mighty French army enter Russia. Napoleon had fought many battles in Western Europe and histories highlight Austerlitz, Jena, and Waterloo. Yet it was at Borodino, not far from Moscow, that the bloodiest battle of the Napoleonic Wars took place. The Russians denied the French invaders supplies, burning their fields. Eventually, Napoleon, badly beaten, returned to Europe proper. Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, according to historians, probably led to and hastened his downfall, yet this singular fact has become part of the Western Front bias.

The Soviet Union and the Great Patriotic War

Josef Stalin once said that “one death is a tragedy; one million is a statistic.” After World War II, Soviet Russia, based on a 1959 census, reported a population deficiency of twenty million Russians. While it is estimated that six million Russians died at the hands of Stalin and his policies, the fact remains that Soviet Russia lost more people than any other belligerent nation.

Some of the most decisive battles of the war were fought in Russia. Stalingrad in 1942 has long been considered the turning point of the war, forcing German retreat. The largest tank battle ever fought took place at Kursk. At Leningrad, a thousand-day siege failed to conquer the city, even as the inhabitants were starving to death; one million died defending their city.

The Red Army “liberated” most of what would be referred to as “Eastern Europe.” Notwithstanding the horrors of Omaha Beach, the Battle of the Bulge, and Patton’s drive north through Italy, the Soviet Union did more to hasten the defeat of Hitler than the western allies. Yet all of this has become part of the Western Front bias, the indifferent retelling of events that favored the West in defeating a common enemy.

Selective Statistics Favor the Writers of History

Mark Twain wrote that there are, “Lies, damned lies, and statistics.” Russia has always suffered from the bias of statistics, numbers and charts that manipulated the role of Western Powers in their favor. This has not changed. The 21st Century view of Russia remains unchanged from a traditional perception that excludes Russia as a European power. Both the Tsars and the Soviet leaders may have known this as they sought to build up their nation, on occasion over-compensating for the stigma of backwardness.

References:

• Walter Kirchner, History of Russia, 4th Ed (Barnes & Noble, 1966)
• John Lawrence, A History of Russia (New American Library, 1969)
• David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran, A History of Russia and the Soviet Union and Beyond, 4th Ed (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993)
• Nicholas W. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 2nd Ed (Oxford University Press, 1969)

The copyright of the article The Western Front Bias in Historical Studies in E European History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish The Western Front Bias in Historical Studies in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

 The St. Louis and U.S. Policy Failures

German Jews Denied Entrance to America in 1939

© Michael Streich

 Aug 21, 2009

Allowing 937 Jews to leave Germany in May 1939 served Nazi propaganda goals, particularly when the the United States rejected asylum after Cuba refused their entry visas.

In May 1939, the S.S. St. Louis sailed out of Hamburg, Germany bound for Havana with 937 Jewish men, women, and children. It was only seven months since Kristallnacht had wrecked a bloody havoc on the Jews in the German Reich and only five months from the outbreak of World War II. The plight of these Jews would become intimately entangled with insensitive American immigration quotas, President Franklin Roosevelt’s political expediency, and deeply rooted Anti-Semitism in the United States.

Nazi Propaganda and the St. Louis

The passengers on the St. Louis were a varied group. They represented young and old, professional and worker. Some had been in concentration camps. Both Dachau and Buchenwald camps were in full operation, a fact known to most foreign governments including the United States. Dr. Joseph Goebbels, Nazi Minister of Propaganda, used the sailing of the St. Louis to strengthen the ideological posture of Germany toward the Jews to appeal to world public opinion.

On the one hand, Germany was demonstrating compassion by allowing these Jews to leave, albeit at a steep price. Those with property forfeited everything to the Reich. This aspect of the Nazi procedures was not for public opinion. Although issued exit visa, the passenger’s entry documents into Cuba would not be honored. The passengers did not know this.

Dr. Goebbels, Reichsmarschal Goering, and Hitler knew that, inevitably, the St. Louis would be turned away, proving to the world that nobody wanted the Jews. Most European nations had already stopped the flow of refugees crossing their borders. Britain not only curtailed Jews from entering Britain, but severely limited the number of Jews migrating to Palestine, a viable and logical destination coming out of late 19th-Century Zionist efforts.

The St Louis and United States’ Reaction

When the ship entered Havana it was not permitted to dock. As the hours went by, panic began to fill the passengers. Once the official decision was announced that the St. Louis would have to return to Germany, pandemonium ensued. Some passengers jumped overboard; some committed suicide. Captain Gustav Schroeder, not a member of the Nazi Party, deeply empathized with his passengers.

Schroeder sailed for Miami as Jewish organizations in America and Europe drafted frantic appeals to various governments. According to survivor accounts, passengers could see the lights of Miami. But the St. Louis was met by the U.S. Coast Guard, warning it away from the American coast. Reluctantly, Schroeder returned to Europe.

Researcher Lyric W. Wink, in a December 7, 2003 Parade cover story, details the arduous search for the 937 passengers. The research demonstrates that a number of the passengers eventually made it to the United States during and after the war years.

President Roosevelt was keenly mindful that the majority of Americans opposed any changes in the immigration quota system, particularly since unemployment was still high. This applied even more to European Jews. Anti-Semitism, fed by such luminaries as the radio-priest, Father Charles Coughlin, was rampant. Even German-American enclaves, like New York’s “Yorkville” along East 86th Street, identified with Nazism and had no sympathy for Jews.

Return to Europe of the St. Louis

Captain Schroeder threatened to scuttle his ship off the coast of England, forcing, under international law, Britain to take in the refugees. Negotiations hastily led to Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium agreeing to take a portion of the refugees. This represented a short reprieve to many of the Jews that would be caught up in the Nazi web after the 1940 Blitzkrieg occupation of much of Western Europe.

The United Stares must take significant blame for the tragedy of the St. Louis. Artifacts from the ship’s voyage can be seen at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, along with other exhibits such as the Evian Conference of 1938. The St. Louis affair should provide a template for the future.

Sources:

• Robert H. Abzug, America Views the Holocaust 1933-1945: A Brief Documentary History (Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999)
• Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan Witts, Voyage of the Damned (Stein and Day, 1974)
• Lyric Wallwork Winik, “The Hunt For Survivors of a Doomed Ship,” Parade, December 7, 2003

The copyright of the article The St. Louis and U.S. Policy Failures in Modern US History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish The St. Louis and U.S. Policy Failures in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

St. Louis in Havana