General Charles Gordon Avenged at Omdurman:
Kitchener Defeats Large Sudanese Force
Michael Streich
July 3, 2011
In early September 1898,
General H.H. Kitchener, commanding at Omdurman
in the African Sudan, informed his government that, “The remnant of the
Khalifa’s forces has surrendered, and I have now a very large number of
prisoners on my hands.” Omdurman was located up
the Nile River,
across from Khartoum
where Major-General Charles Gordon had been killed by the Mahdist forces
fourteen years earlier. Kitchener,
at that time, was part of the relief operation led by Viscount Garnett Wolsey.
The expedition arrived too late; Omdurman
was to be the long awaited act of revenge. Yet Omdurman was also a transitional object
lesson perpetuating the belief of European superiority.
Avenging Governor-General
Charles Gordon of Khartoum
General Gordon had returned
to the Sudan
to confront the Mahdi, whose personal ambitions rested on Islamic mysticism and
posed a serious threat to Egyptian hegemony over the vast expanse of desert. It
would not be until Kitchener’s victory at Omdurman in 1898, however, that, as the London
Times postulated, the territory would be re-opened, “to the benefits of
peace, civilization, and good government.”
Following the death of Gordon
and the destruction of Khartoum, the Mahdi
himself died, succeeded by the Khalifa Abdullahi, who turned the fort at Omdurman into a citadel
housing his palace and the tomb of the Mahdi. According to writer Philip
Ziegler, Omdurman was “Africa’s
largest slum.” Kitchener’s army, composed of a
well-trained Egyptian contingent as well as the British Brigade, began the long
and arduous march up the Nile to Omdurman,
vastly outnumbered by the dervishes. But, as Ziegler writes, “…arithmetic
counted for nothing in the fierce joy of battle.”
Omdurman Victory Attributed to Several Factors
As a transitional event, Omdurman would witness a
heroic cavalry charge by the 21st Lancers, as well as the use of
heavily armed gunboats and a significant advantage in artillery. As the London Times
correspondent pointed out, the siege of Khartoum
several years earlier lasted 317 days; the siege of Sevastopol during the Crimean conflict took
slightly over 300 days. Omdurman
fell after five hours.
Kitchener’s success was due to excellent planning as well as
moments of good luck. The Khalifa, for example, was frequently guided by
dreams. These dreams caused him to withdraw his troops from points along the
Nile such as Berber, concentrating his men at Omdurman. Further, the battle would be fought
on the Kerreri plain rather than a house-to-house battle within the city.
A notable exception was Atbara. 20,000 dervishes took part in the battle of Atbara under Emir Mahmoud. It was a foolish move. Sandhurst
military historian Philip Warner argues that had those 20,000 men been
available at Omdurman,
“the outcome of that critical battle might well have been different.”
Role of the Forces under Kitchener’s Command
Both Egyptian and British
forces were eager to fight. According to the London
Times, the lesson of Omdurman showed that British soldiers “will
go anywhere and do anything.” Lt. General Francis Grenfell, commander of the
British troops, wrote that, “…never, in the course of my service, have I seen a
finer body of troops than the British contingent…as regards physique,
smartness, and soldier like bearing.” (The
London Gazette, September 30, 1898) To this must be added the contributions
of loyalist Sudanese units.
Detractors like the young Lt.
Winston Churchill, involved in his first conflict, showed their arrogance with
criticism of Kitchener and fellow officers. Churchill became a life-long critic
of Kitchener, attempting to blame the later
Field Marshall in 1915 for Churchill’s own debacle at Gallipoli in Turkey. Kitchener had been selected to command over much older and
seasoned officers, but had the confidence of Sir Evelyn Baring, Britain’s proconsul in Cairo.
Kitchener’s Success at Omdurman Assisted by Modern Technology
Victory at Omdurman was achieved by daring and bravery,
but not without the presence of gunboats. This firepower saved the Camel Corps
from almost sure annihilation, an action that could have altered the battle
outcome. To this must be added the actions of Lt. Colonel H.A. Macdonald, whose
native brigade managed to hold the line against an unforeseen mass of
dervishes, as well as the charge of the 17th Lancers. By the afternoon
of that fateful day, the Khalifa’s power was broken as he fled in disguise to
the south.
Omdurman had all of the elements of a modern battle: the use
of railroads, superior firepower, artillery placement, and gunboats
specifically designed for the conflict. Unlike Islawanda or the much earlier
devastation of Hicks Pasha in the Sudan desert, few British lives
were lost but thousands of dervishes lay before the Khalifa’s capital in great
bleeding piles. The British euphoria reinforced the notion of western
superiority, a belief still held today in the technological war against Middle East extremists.
Gordon is Memorialized
Gordon was avenged with the
fall of Omdurman.
A memorial service was conducted in Khartoum
with the 11th Sudanese band playing Gordon’s favorite hymn, “Abide
with Me.” It was the same hymn played at the memorial service for Kitchener in 1916 after he
died aboard the HMS Hampshire. With Omdurman achieved, Kitchener
turned his attention southward to confront French incursions into British-claimed
territory. Carving up Africa would continue as
European powers used their technology to expand empires.
Sources:
Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (W.W.
Norton & Co., 1985)
London Gazette, September 30, 1898
London Times,
various articles, September 1898
John Pollock, Kitchener: Architect of Victory, Artisan of
Peace (Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1998)
Philip Warner, Dervish (Mackays, 2000)
Philip Warner, Kitchener: The Man Behind The Legend (Atheneum,
1986)
Philip Ziegler, Omdurman (Dorsett Press, 1973)
First Published in Suite101. Copyright owned by Michael Streich. All republications subject to written permission.