Children's Heroes of the 1950s and Early 1960s

Great Men and Famous Deeds in Childcraft's 1961 Primer

Michael Streich

March 19, 2009 

In 1961, the Childcraft series of books featured thirty-five brief stories in volume six of the collection titled Great Men and Famous Deeds. Published throughout the thirties, forties, and fifties, the Childcraft series included volumes on child rearing, poetry and music, technology, and geography. Today, these books represent a glimpse into the American past, enabling students of history to see what was being taught in the 1950s and what was omitted. Volume six offers an excellent example of 1950s and early 1960s American education.

 

Analysis of the Thirty-Five Stories

 

The late 1950s and early 1960s was a time of both conformity and uncertainty. The United States was involved in an ever expanding nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union. It was a time of home bomb shelters and an emphasis on the traditional American family. All of the stories in the Childcraft selection highlight those virtues associated with a distinctly American “ideal:” courage, integrity, determination, risk-taking, and making good decisions.

 

The story about George Washington relates how, as a young teenager, he was tempted to go to sea. At the last minute, however, he saw his mother’s despair and the tears in her eyes and changed his mind. He was humble and obedient – but not a “mother’s boy.” He befriended the elder Sir Thomas Fairfax who developed a fatherly relationship with the young man, helped Washington begin a career as a surveyor, and became a positive role model.

 

The thirty-five selections include three other presidents: Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt, and Franklin Roosevelt. Of the thirty-three stories of “Great Men,” twenty-six are devoted to men while only eight detail famous women (of those eight, only five are American women). Of all the entries, the story of George Washington Carver is the only one about an African-American. Two selections are devoted to Canadians.

 

Native American culture is nominally represented in the selection on Captain John Smith and Pocahontas as well as a Canadian story about Catholic missionaries among Indian tribes titled, “The Feast of Eat-Everything.” Indian Americans also figure prominently in the story of Columbus, the first selection in the book. Although politically incorrect today, the 1961 overview paints Columbus as a hero and a risk-taker but never alludes to the negative aspects of Indian treatment, well-documented in later decades by historians like Howard Zinn.

 

Impact of the Childcraft Book in 1961

 

Although select women appear in the volume, there was no hint of feminism. Madame Curie’s story focuses on the encouragement and love of her Physicist husband and does not mention her death caused by experimentation with radium. The story has a happy ending. Jenny Lind’s story demonstrated that her “discovery” and success came because men heard her sing and gave her a chance. The underlying message could be found both in the stories included as well as how they were written: the decade of the 1950s and into the 1960s was still “a man’s world.” Madame Curie’s story includes her role as a mother.

 

Many of the included stories tell of events that occurred when the “great men” were still children or teenagers: “The Boy Lafayette and the Wolf,” “When Mark Twain was a Boy,” “Teddy Roosevelt, the Boy Naturalist,” and others. It was important to teach children that the completion of “famous deeds” begins early. The sub-heading of the contents page reads, “Adventures of Famous Persons.” John Audubon’s love for nature began as a boy; Thomas Edison’s career started as a “Young Scientist.”

 

Marketed to white, middle-class families, the Childcraft series told parents and their children what was important in terms of growing up as an American. They also preached conformity. None of the stories challenge legitimate authority. Children are obedient and adults serve as positive role models. Sometimes, extraordinary events force people to do very courageous things, like Dolly Madison saving the White House portrait of George Washington. Even here, the author’s message was clear: “She didn’t expect people to think that she was wise or brave or smart. She was just helpful and friendly. And that was enough.”

 

Sources:

 

“Great Men and Famous Deeds,” Vol. Six, Childcraft (Chicago: Field Enterprises Educational Corporation, 1961).

First published in Suite101. Copyright Michael Streich. Written permission required for republishing

                                              Author in Hamburg. Rathous in background
 Hanseatic League Dominance in Northern Germany

Trade Monopolies and Merchant Associations in Early Modern Europe

© Michael Streich

 Mar 29, 2009

Early merchant associations, equated with the beginning of town life and European trade fairs, enabled powerful organizations like the Hanseatic League to dominate.

Centuries before Europe would merge itself into a powerful, continental force known as the European Union, merchant settlements and towns in the medieval and early modern periods were forming trade associations that worked to benefit from commercial monopolies, tax exemptions, and the granting of import and export privileges from kings and other feudal lords. Emerging out of these often competing associations, the Hanseatic League, controlling the lucrative markets along the Baltic and North Seas, would thrive well into the fifteenth century and dominate most of northern and middle European trade.

Rise of the Hansa

By the eleventh century, trade fairs enabled wealthy Europeans to purchase a variety of goods from distant lands unknown during the period between the fall of Rome and the beginnings of town living. Emerging early towns often owed their existence to these trade fairs as well as several centuries of developing trade routes, linked perhaps to the Viking raids of the eighth century and beyond. Vikings were known to raid and eventually trade as far south as Marseilles in southern France.

The growth of towns was accomplished by the ever increasing need for skilled craftsmen catering to growing populations. Innovations in agricultural production in the eleventh century also impacted population growth, leading to a plethora of twelfth century towns that weaned themselves of feudal control through town charters and bound burghers by a common law.

Fueled by this town expansion, European merchants began to form associations, one of the earliest being the Cologne Hansa. Special commercial privileges and trade monopolies made the Hansas attractive as other towns affiliated with Cologne. In northern Germany, cities like Lubeck – one of the first German ports on the Baltic, and Hamburg on the Elbe River began to compete with Cologne and other associations.

Rise and Dominance of the Hanseatic League

Cities of the German Hansa guarded their independence fiercely, resisting the frequent attempts by princes to incorporate them into ducal landholdings such as in the case of Schleswig and Saxony’s attempts to harness the wealth of Lubeck. The Lubeck city hall, still standing today, was considered one of the finest and demonstrated the city’s commercial might at its mercantile zenith. Along with Hamburg, Lubeck is still referred to Hansestadt.

The shrewd dominance of Hanseatic commercial power is best demonstrated by its dealings with Norway through the Hansa port, Bergen. All grain imported into Norway came aboard ships of the League. In return, Norway’s fish export was carried to other ports, such as London or Antwerp, by German ships. The monopoly made the Hansa wealthy. When Norway balked at perceived unfair trade practices in 1294, the League boycotted Bergen, forcing Norway to accede.

A boycott against Bruges, from which Flemish cloth entered northern Europe, was also successful and ended with even greater concessions made to the League. At the same time, however, the League promoted industries such as in Sweden where copper and iron production increased, in part due to innovations introduced by the League.

Decline of the Hanseatic League

By the mid to end of the fifteenth century, early modern nation states were forming and, embracing their own mercantilist policies favorable only to national economies, limited earlier trade monopolies and commercial privileges. The same can be said of the Baltic region where cities like Danzig, associated with Poland, were competing apart from the League.

Fernand Braudel, in his book on 15th-18th Century commerce, sites the economist Walter Eucken suggesting that one very basic reason the League “failed to become great in the sixteenth century” was due to its refusal to adopt the practice of double-bookkeeping. (573)

Although Hamburg would remain a free city with its own stock exchange – the oldest in Germany, dating to 1558, many Hanseatic cities lost their independence or free-city status as early modern nation states developed. The exclusive “trade stations,” such as Bryggen in Bergen, Norway, or the Hanseatic station in London, also lost their privileges in these years of change.

Sources:

Fernard Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization & Capitalism 15th-18th Century Volume 2 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1979).

Johannes Schildhauer, The Hansa: History and Culture (Leipzig: Druckerei Fortschritt Erfurt, 1985). [A professor of General History at Greifswald University in the mid 20th century, Schildhauer is considered an expert on the Hansa and on Baltic history]

The copyright of the article Hanseatic League Dominance in Northern Germany in Late Middle Ages is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Hanseatic League Dominance in Northern Germany in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

 The Fall of Richmond in 1865

Michael Streich May 9, 2009

By the end of March 1865 the Civil War was drawing to a long awaited close. Atlanta, Savannah, Charleston, and Columbia had become a part of that brutal history, associated forever with General William Sherman’s often quoted phrase, “war is hell.” Only outside of Richmond, the Confederate capital was the final scene of this drama being played out. The fall of Richmond signaled the end of the war, evoking jubilation among Southern slaves and millions of Northerners while igniting absolute despair in the South.

 

Robert E. Lee Abandons Richmond

 

Richmond and Washington are separated by less than 100 miles. Yet in four years, neither side came close to capturing either capital. The South might have accomplished taking Washington early in the war, following up their victory at First Bull Run. Had Lee followed advice in June of 1863 to take his army east instead of engaging Meade at Gettysburg, the Confederacy might have captured Washington.

 

Similarly, General George McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign in 1862 aimed at taking Richmond came very close to success, yet the general’s vacillation enabled the South to thwart any serious attempt to take the city, and McClellan withdrew.

 

By March 1865, the Army of Northern Virginia was entrenched at Petersburg in a desperate attempt to stop Union advances. By April 2^nd, however, their lines were breached and General Lee sent messages to Jefferson Davis in Richmond that the city would have to be abandoned.

 

Sunday in the Confederate Capital

 

Davis was attending the Sunday morning service at St. Paul’s Episcopal Church when word arrived that Richmond must be abandoned. Leaving the service, Davis returned to his executive mansion as the Confederate bureaucracy began to burn documents.

 

Having sent his family out of the city on a train bound for Charlotte, North Carolina, Davis and his Cabinet evacuated Richmond that evening on the last train out of the city, relocating the Confederate capital to Danville, Virginia.

 

General Lee’s plan was to withdraw south in order to link with Joseph Johnston, but was prevented from doing so by Phillip Sheridan. Cutoff and his troops disintegrating for lack of food and clothing, Lee surrendered his army at Appomattox Station on April 9^th, several days after Richmond fell.

 

A Night of Horror in Richmond

 

Richmond authorities ordered all alcohol to be destroyed. As casks of whiskey and other spirits were destroyed, homeless men, including escaped prisoners, helped themselves. With the liquid in their veins, they became a mob, numbering in the thousands before the night ended, looting and pillaging Richmond.

 

The order to burn the tobacco warehouses also caused unexpected calamities. Surging flames spread beyond the warehouses, igniting homes, churches, and businesses. Over 900 homes and businesses were destroyed. Many inhabitants were left homeless and pauperized.

 

Confederate vessels, notably iron-clad ships, were scuttled and set ablaze. These ships, however, stored thousands of shells. As the fires engulfed the sinking vessels, thousands of shells rained destruction on Richmond.  Union troops, arriving on April 3^rd, found a city smoldering.

 

Richmond Taken by Union Forces

 

One of the first units to arrive at Richmond was comprised of black cavalry, commanded by Major Charles Francis Adams, Jr., grandson of one President and great-grandson of another. Richmond, “Babylon the Great,” was finally captured. For Richmond’s black population, many of whom were slaves, it was the final Jubilee.

 

Union troops sang “The Battle Hymn of the Republic” and “John Brown’s Body.” Yet for the Southern whites, especially the many women adorned in black signifying mourning, it was the end of life itself.

 

On April 4^th, against the advice of his advisors, President Lincoln visited Richmond. It was a moment of sublime retribution. One former female slave expressed it best, saying, “I know that I am free, for I have seen Father Abraham…”

 

The capture of Richmond represented the final scene in a long and bloody war. Little wonder that Lincoln felt compelled to walk its streets. It was the end of a civilization and the beginning of decades of rebuilding.

 

Sources:

 

Page Smith, Trial By Fire: a People’s History of the Civil War and Reconstruction (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982)

Jay Winik, April 1865: the Month that Saved America (Harper Perennial, 2001)

Copyright Michael Streich; republishing with written permission.

 The Know Nothing Party in 1854 and 1856

The Move Against Irish and German Immigration

© Michael Streich

 Mar 24, 2009

Nativism, strongest in the American Northeast, affected political realignments during the early and mid 1850s through the American or "Know Nothing" Party.

Begun as a secret society in New York in 1849, the “Know Nothings” or American Party – as they appeared on national ballots in 1856, could be traced to the virulent nativist movement of the 1830s and 1840s. Fiercely anti-immigration, Know Nothings aimed their wrath at Irish and German migrants, many of whom were Roman Catholic. The Know Nothings would achieve some political success during the mid-term elections of 1854. In the 1856 general election led by former President Millard Fillmore, the party split over the Kansas-Nebraska Act but sill gained 871,731 popular votes and 8 electoral votes.

Know Nothing Success in the Mid 1850s

Paul Boller, a Professor Emeritus of History at Texas Christian University, attributes the Know Nothing name to an initial attempt at secrecy. “When members of the party were asked about the organization, they were directed to answer, ‘I don’t know…’” (93) As the party gained support, however, the secrecy gave way to public awareness. “America For Americans,” Know Nothings chanted, demanding a twenty-one year period of naturalization and the banning of any non-native born Americans from office-holding.

Irish immigrants, clustered in the larger urban centers, bore the brunt of nativist ire. Seen as charity cases dumped onto American shores by a British government willing to assist immigrants in order to lessen the pressure on poverty relief, the Irish were willing to work for lower wages in unskilled jobs, taking away work from native-born Americans. Fear of Catholicism also contributed.

German immigrants, flooding America after the failed 1848 revolutions, also attracted fear and suspicion. Like the Irish, they were Catholic and did not “keep the Sabbath” the way Protestants did. And Germans brought beer, a particular evil among New Englanders that still clung to Puritan values. Finally, Germans were perceived as socialists, identified with the various liberal movements in Europe.

These fears enabled the Know Nothings to achieve some success in the 1854 mid-term election. In both the North and the South, the party attracted former Whigs searching for new political homes. In his valuable study on 1850s American politics and the expansion of slavery, Harvard University Historian Frederick Merk (died 1977) isolates Whig strength in 1854 to New York, Pennsylvania, Missouri, and Vermont with small pockets in mid-Virginia, Illinois, Ohio, and Tennessee.

The Presidential Election of 1856

By 1856 the Know Nothing Party was beginning to disintegrate in the wake of the ill-advised Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. Anti-Nebraska Know Nothings and Whigs “bolted” to support the Republican Party’s candidate, John C. Fremont. By now the “American Party,” the Know Nothings nominated former president Millard Fillmore.

Professor Merk’s analysis of the 1856 election demonstrates a remarkable change for the party over the two-year interval. The party had lost ground in Missouri and the Northeast. Small pockets of Know Nothing strength existed in every southern state except South Carolina. Fillmore’s 8 electoral votes came from Maryland, although his popular vote was 871,731. (407)

None of the national political leaders respected the Know Nothings. Stephen Douglas, in an October 6, 1855 letter to Howell Cobb, wrote that “Abolitionism, Know Nothingism, and all the other isms are akin to each other and are in alliance…against national Democracy.” In several other letters Douglas equates Know Nothingism with Abolitionism.

Abraham Lincoln, quoted by University of Massachusetts Professor Stephen Oates, preferred to live in Russia if the Know Nothings ever succeeded. According to Lincoln, “When the Know Nothings get control, it will read ‘all me are created equal, except Negroes, and foreigners, and Catholics.’” (165)

Southern “bolters” from the Know Nothing Party would emerge in 1860 as the Constitutional Unionists, led by former pro-Union Whig John Bell. After 1856, the Know Nothings ceased as a viable political party, northern supporters joining the rapidly rising Republican Party. Yet another decade of xenophobic Americanism had come to an end, although it would not be the last time nativism dominated political extremes.

Sources:

Paul F. Boller, Jr. Presidential Campaigns From George Washington to George W. Bush (Oxford University Press, 2004).

Stephen A Douglas, The Letters of Stephen A Douglas, edited by Robert W. Johannsen (University of Illinois Press, 1961).

Frederick Merk, History of the Westward Movement (Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

Stephen B. Oates, The Approaching Fury: Voices of the Storm, 1820-1861 (Harper-Collins, 1997).

Page Smith, The Nation Comes of Age: A People’s History of the Ante-Bellum Years Volume Four,(McGraw-Hill, 1981).

The copyright of the article The Know Nothing Party in 1854 and 1856 in American History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish The Know Nothing Party in 1854 and 1856 in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

Millard Fillmore

 Outlines in History Instruction

Why Students Hate History and Lack Basic Knowledge

© Michael Streich

 Mar 26, 2009

Outlining, power points, and rote memorization deaden the study of history in high schools and produce generations of citizens that fear and hate studying history.

Studying history in high school – any level of history from freshman to senior year – can be a mind numbing experience. Too often, students are subjected to daily power points, forced to outline textual readings, and memorize endless names and dates. This is the graveyard approach to teaching history. History becomes not only a dead subject, but becomes, in itself, deadening. Rote memorization of often inconsequential facts as well as outlining (an activity that of itself has little pedagogical value) sections and chapters leaves the student bereft of actual concepts, pertinent historical issues, and makes the overall experience intolerable.

Why Outlining Doesn’t Work and when it Does Work

Blanket linear outlining never assures an understanding of content. Most history texts, especially on the high school level, break sections down by bold print headings and paragraph concepts. Hence, most students merely copy the already existing textual breakdowns. Because outlines are difficult to grade, teachers that employ this method of reading accountability seldom pick up the fact that most of their students are merely regurgitating already printed outlines.

Students can easily create outlines on any text that follows this format without actually reading the material. If the purpose of the outline is to force students to read and understand the material, the effort is usually wasted. Even students that strive to receive A’s will submit outlines, though often very elaborate, purely as a mean to an end. These students will actually read the material and resent the outlining as extra busy work.

If teachers are determined to assign outlines, the best approach is a web-outline, preferably completed in colors. Web outlines actually force students to develop connections in the readings and link key ideas and concepts. Although much more difficult to grade, web-outlines provide a level of critical thinking that goes beyond the linear approach.

Outlining may also be crucial in some upper level classes such as the Advanced Placement or IB courses. Most text books used in advanced classes are not broken down by sections and never include concept headers. Most students that enroll in these courses are not prepared to read 30 or 40 pages and rapidly lose focus. Some form of outlining is necessary, at least initially, in helping students to identify key concepts.

The Shame of Rote Memorization

Some memorization is necessary. Key historical dates, some understanding of chronology, and perhaps even knowing the Presidents of the United States may help students develop a framework of understanding. Rote memorization as the fundamental structure of historical study, however, ignores how students think, how they absorb material, how they understand the concepts behind the dates, and finally, how they can make meaningful connections.

Is it more important to know that the Missouri Compromise was passed in 1820 or that the measure divided Americans on the issue of slavery, perhaps for the first time on a national level? What is the pedagogical outcome of knowing the Gettysburg Address without an understanding of the crucial 1864 battle? Good history teachers will employ both methodologies with success: knowing the salient facts and how those facts affected society and the on-going American experience.

When Teachers Get Lazy

Mindless outlines, power points, and superficial assignments highlight lethargic teaching or a lack of subject knowledge. The end result is that students walk away from the history class laughing at the simplicity of instruction or scoffing at the nature of assignments. These students will remember for the rest of their lives why they hated history.

The copyright of the article Outlines in History Instruction in High School Lesson Plans is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Outlines in History Instruction in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

Mindless Outlines

 

Lincoln's Proclamation of April 15, 1861

The President Called for Volunteers to Force Southern Compliance

May 3, 2009 Michael Streich

The April 1861 Proclamation was not a war declaration, although Southern States would respond to it as if it was, setting the stage for a long and bloody conflict.

On April 15th, 1861, President Abraham Lincoln issued a Proclamation that called for 75,000 men from the various states “in order to suppress said combinations…” The Proclamation followed the surrender of Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina after P.T. Beauregard’s bombardment. The South had fired the first shot, outraging the North. Excepting the Border States, Lincoln’s Proclamation was well-received but it would be weeks before the mostly untrained militia arrived in the nation’s capital.

Scope of the Proclamation

Lincoln opened the Proclamation by addressing the needs for his actions. The Laws of the United States were opposed and their execution “obstructed.” Lincoln listed the offending states: South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. These “combinations” represented a force too powerful to be dealt with through ordinary channels of compliance such as the judiciary and the Federal Marshals.

The language of the Proclamation indicates that Lincoln viewed his response as a “police action” designed to “repossess” Federal property, i.e., forts, armories, and other assets. This was not a “Civil War” but an “insurrection.” There was to be no “…devastation…destruction…or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens…” Lincoln was well aware that pro-Union sentiment still existed in the South.

Lincoln, in calling a special July session of Congress, referred to unfolding events as “an extraordinary occasion.” As Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln believed that the Constitution supported his call for state militia volunteers to serve in the armies being planned in defense of Washington and the securing of Border States like Kentucky and Missouri.

As the Proclamation resulted in an outpouring of support and unity in the North, it extinguished lingering pro-Union sympathies in the South. Governor Jackson of Missouri replied to Lincoln that his request for men was “illegal” and “unconstitutional.” Both sides rushed to enlist men, dooming Lincoln’s “police action.” The April 27th, 1861 Harper’s Weekly commented that, “Nobody – outside of lunatic asylums – doubts that civil war is an enormous calamity.”

Results of the Proclamation

Initial plans by the end of April suggested three separate army groups. The first, under the command of General Scott, would defend Washington with 50,000 men. A “New York Army” commanded by General Wood would be held in reserve while General Sumner was to encamp around the Cincinnati area with 75,000 men to protect the river systems, ultimately enabling Union troops to control the Mississippi. (“The War,” Harper’s Weekly, April 27, 1861)

Most of the soldiers arriving from various Northern states were ill-trained. It took the troops several weeks to reach Washington, facing hostile opposition in Baltimore. Additionally, some of the army’s best officers resigned their commissions and returned to the South, as did Robert E. Lee, for example. The navy, it was predicted, would ensure that all Southern ports would be “hermetically sealed.”

In the South in the weeks following the Proclamation, war plans were also being refined. William T. Sherman, who visited Virginia months before these events, had already reported then that the South was preparing for war. General Beauregard wanted to attack Washington with 32,000 men but was overruled by Jefferson Davis on advice from Robert E. Lee. Although the advice was given based on military considerations, Davis did not want to be the aggressor, falling back on his oft repeated phrase, “I hope they leave us alone.”

The Proclamation Not a Call to War

Lincoln’s purposes were very clear: the Proclamation was not a call to war nor was it a war declaration – only the Congress can declare war. Any such war declaration would have legitimized the Confederate States of America. For Lincoln, the Proclamation was a carefully worded document aimed at recovering Federal property and forcing insurrectionists to comply with Federal law. It was the South that construed the Proclamation as a war declaration and responded accordingly.

Sources:

• Harper’s Weekly, April 27, 1861 (President Lincoln’s Proclamation reprinted, commentary, and daily news)
• Shelby Foote, The Civil War: Fort Sumter to Perryville (Vintage Books – Random House, 1986)

 

Civil War Political Generals

Promoting Men Through Patronage Helped Serve a Purpose

May 4, 2009 Michael Streich

The appointment of political generals by Abraham Lincoln was part of an effort to help unify the North and guarantee support from ethnic and political constituencies.

When the Civil War began, Northern troop strength was low and it would take some weeks to begin the process of building an army. Exacerbating this situation was an acute shortage of officers. The majority of “West Pointers” on General Winfield Scott’s staff came from the South and most resigned their commissions to return to Southern states. Other seasoned officers – like Grant and Sherman, had left the army to pursue private ventures. Filling this gap, President Lincoln turned to political generals that frequently resulted in leadership incompetence.

The Benefits of Promoting Political Generals

Both the North and the South employed political generals, although the practice was, by far, more common in the North. Jefferson Davis was fortunate to have a large number of West Point graduates; 306 such men served in Southern armies. Yet even in the South political expediency caused the promotions of such unskilled men as Robert Toombs and Henry Wise.

Abraham Lincoln welcomed the opportunity to appoint political generals, but for reasons related to national unity. Civil War historian James McPherson writes that, “Each of the political generals represented an important ethnic, regional, or political constituency in the North.” Lincoln’s actions demonstrated patronage, an important element for producing loyalties, either from ethnic groups like the Germans or northern Democrats.

The classic example cited my many Civil War historians involved Lincoln’s choice of Alexander Schimmelfennig for the position of brigadier general, over the protests of Secretary of War Stanton. Lincoln, however, wanted a truly “Dutch” sounding name (the term “Dutch” often employed for German). Lincoln reasoned that ethnic Germans would be more apt to support his efforts if their local newspapers, often in the native language, highlighted the exploits of their own.

Contributions of Political Generals

Newspaper stories did, in fact, bolster the feats of political generals even if the reality of their combat contributions was far different. Schimmelfenning, fighting at Chancellorsville, was made the scapegoat by General Joseph Hooker for the large Union losses and setback. Others fared no better. Commenting on Benjamin Butler, a Massachusetts corporate attorney who managed to secure a command position, the young John Hay observed that Butler was “perfectly useless and incapable for campaigning.”

Politicians turned generals rarely had the experience necessary for leading men. Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson, enduring the rigors of military life for the first time, took ill and resigned after spending days inspecting the defenses of Washington. New York Senator Daniel Sickles, a Democrat, commanded no respect from the men under him and was frequently referred to as “brutal.”

Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman also owed their commissions to political connections. Grant was championed by an influential Illinois congressman; Sherman’s older brother was the United States Senator from Ohio and a founding member of the Republican Party. Unlike other appointments resulting from political considerations, however, both Grant and Sherman were West Pointers.

Some politicians given a rank distinguished themselves such as Rutherford B. Hayes and William McKinley, both from Ohio and both future presidents. It didn’t hurt James Garfield’s presidential election bid in 1880 to remind voters that he had served, albeit briefly, as a brigadier general.

Lincoln’s Strategy in Promoting Political Generals

Lincoln knew that the North would ultimately triumph even though some command positions were given to men without training or experience. These appointments filled a political necessity that was deemed important in the early months of the war. Lincoln needed a unified North behind him; political generals helped in that process.

Inevitably, this gave the South, initially at least, a distinct advantage, demonstrated by their ability to thwart many of the early advances of the North, beginning at Bull Run in July 1861.

Sources:

• James M. McPherson, “Lincoln and the Strategy of Unconditional Surrender,” Lincoln the War President, Gabor S. Boritt, ed. (Oxford University Press, 1992)
• Page Smith, Trial by Fire: a People’s History of the Civil War and Reconstruction (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982)
• T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (Alfred A. Knopf, 1952)

Copyright Michael Streich. Republishing requires written permission.