Revolutionary Charleston Marks the Beginning of the End for British in Southern Campaign

Michael Streich June 29, 2009

By the end of 1779, Sir Henry Clinton, British commander of North American forces during the latter part of the Revolutionary War, turned his attention south, dispatching a sizeable force to take Charleston. The South Carolina campaign, begun with much promise, rapidly deteriorated into a type of guerrilla warfare with atrocities committed by both sides. Much of this was due to Lord Cornwallis, the southern commander after Sir Clinton returned to New York.

 

Clinton Moves against Charleston, South Carolina

 

According to Sir Henry Clinton’s memoirs, the taking of Charleston had long figured in his overall strategy to win the war against the American rebels. Loyalist support was thought to be strongest in the South, notably in the Carolinas. Finally, recent British successes in Georgia seemed to confirm a southern campaign might swiftly change the course of the entire war.

 

Charleston was defended by 5,000 men, many from militia units, under the command of Major General Benjamin Lincoln. (some sources cite the number of defenders at 7,000) Clinton left New York with almost 100 ships under the command of Vice Admiral Arbuthnot and nearly 8,000 troops. His second in command was Lord Cornwallis, who had only returned from England following the death of his wife.

 

The Siege of Charleston

 

After suffering losses on the seas, the British landed south of Charleston on John’s Island. The siege would last 42 days. General Lincoln, well aware that his forces could not successfully defend the South’s largest city, made plans to evacuate the Continentals while escape was still possible.

 

However, according to General William Moultrie’s journal entry of April 26, 1780, leading Charleston citizens threatened to open the gates to the city and “cut up his [Lincoln’s] boats,” if he evacuated his troops. What some military historians call Lincoln’s decisive mistake probably resulted in the largest single military defeat of the war.

 

At the same time Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s “British Legion,” composed primarily of saber-wielding cavalry, pacified the countryside, cutting off supply routes such as at Biggin’s Bridge, north of Charleston. Admiral Arbuthnot’s warships easily sailed past Forts Johnson and Moultrie. Charleston would endure a relentless bombardment from both land and sea.

 

The fall of Charleston

 

Lincoln surrendered Charleston on May 12, 1780. Although the Continentals were taken prisoner, civilians and militia soldiers were allowed to return to their farms, some officers even allowed to keep their swords. Clinton returned to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis and 4,000 men. Before he left Charleston, however, Sir Henry Clinton issued an order that was to prove fatal to the British cause.

 

Clinton, in essence, forced all provincial inhabitants to take an oath of loyalty to the Crown or be branded as rebels. Militiamen that had returned home viewed their repatriation as duplicity. Many neutral citizens that had not taken sides were now forced into a decision. Clinton’s order was the first step in the coming rural warfare that would culminate in some of the bloodiest atrocities of the war.

 

The Second Fatal Blunder

 

The second blunder occurred when Colonel Tarleton’s cavalry overtook the Virginia Infantry, commanded by Colonel Buford. Buford was heading north to join rebel forces in North Carolina. The encounter resulted in a bloodbath. Tarleton gave no quarter as surrendering men were cut down with saber. The wounded were bayoneted.

 

This atrocity galvanized Patriot forces in the Carolinas as men rushed to join the opposition, including a young Andrew Jackson who had helped to treat the few fortunate survivors of the massacre. Rebels attacked the homes and wives of Loyalists; Tories and British raiding parties retaliated. Many innocent civilians died. As historian Walter Edgar comments, the British stirred up a hornet’s nest. Much of the blame rests with Cornwallis, who allowed field commanders extensive freedom of movement and chose not to intervene.

 

Sources:

 

Walter Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats: The Southern Conflict That Turned the Tide of the American Revolution (HarperCollins, 2001)

Christopher Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes (New York: Avon Books, 1991)

The Spirit of Seventy-Six: The Story of the American Revolution as Told by its Participants Edited by Henry S. Commager and Richard B. Morris (Castle Books, 2002)

Copyright owned by Michael Streich. Contact Michael Streich for permission to republish. First published in Suite101.

 The Battle of Saratoga: Turning Point in the Revolutionary War

Best Laid Plans Doomed to Fail

Michael Streich

July 4, 2009

The 1777 battle of Saratoga was the most important and decisive battle of the Revolutionary War until Yorktown. Frequently termed the “turning point” of the conflict, American victory at Saratoga dramatically lifted sagging American morale, gave impetus to those in England pressuring Parliament for a negotiated settlement of the war, and convinced the French to support the American cause with material and men.

 

John Burgoyne and the Plan to Capture Albany

 

General Burgoyne, senior British commander in Canada (though nominally under Sir Guy Carleton), used his considerable influence with powerful London war policy-makers to receive approval to march a formidable British army south into New York with the intent of capturing Albany and splitting the colonies.

 

Success of the plan depended upon Sir William Howe, technically Burgoyne’s senior as commander-in-chief in North America, sending an army up the Hudson River to support Burgoyne’s march south. Howe never received a direct order to that effect, however, and resented the fact that Burgoyne had been given complete independence to use the Northern Army for his own purposes.

 

At the time Burgoyne began preparing his army in June 1777, he was unaware that Howe was not planning to send any troops north. Howe was busy brilliantly defeating George Washington in a series of skirmishes that ended with British occupation of Philadelphia where only a year earlier the Declaration of Independence had been adopted.

 

Howe’s second in command, Sir Henry Clinton, remained in New York with a much smaller force and, although initially supportive of Burgoyne’s plan, had no intention of weakening his position. As Burgoyne began his march into the interior after debarking at Lake George, he had no way of knowing that his 7,000 men would be forced to fight an army four times as large without the assumed support from Howe.

 

Benedict Arnold at Bemis Heights

 

Although General Philip Schuyler was responsible for American defenses and the eventual strategy that would result in the encirclement of Burgoyne, he was replaced by Horatio Gates, referred to by historians as the most political of all American generals. Burgoyne, arrogant and uncompromising, severely overextended his supply train, making it easier for the Americans to defeat him at Saratoga. Additionally, Burgoyne’s army included hundreds of women and dependants.

 

After some minor victories along the route (including the capture of Ticonderoga), Burgoyne lost a sizeable number of troops at Bennington where they were ambushed. His march, however, was halted at Bemis Heights. American troops under Benedict Arnold inflicted heavy casualties, forcing Burgoyne to withdraw north to Saratoga where his army dug in.

 

At this point Burgoyne was still able to evacuate northward, an action counseled by some senior officers including Baron von Riedesel, commander of the two German brigades. But Burgoyne still anticipated relief from either Howe or Clinton.

 

The ensuing battle, including an attack on Burgoyne’s center by Benedict Arnold who was acting against orders, resulted in such carnage that Burgoyne was forced to seek surrender terms. His army had less than a week’s worth of food and, as one desperate German officer wrote, “Never can the Jews have longed more for the coming of the Messiah than we longed for the arrival of General Clinton.”

 

Terms and Aftermath

 

Horatio Gates accepted Burgoyne’s counter-terms to the unconditional surrender he had requested. Although Burgoyne threatened to fight to the death if his terms were not accepted, Gates would be undone by the generous terms that included marching the prisoners to Boston and allowing them safe passage home on the promise not to fight in America again. Washington, jealous of Gates’ victory, pressed home this point. An exiled Continental Congress later abrogated the terms. Saratoga was a prime example of why the British lost the war.

 

Sources:

 

William Digby, “The Saratoga Campaign: New York, July-October 1777,” The American Revolution: Writings from the War of Independence, John Rhodenhamel, Editor (New York: The Library of America, 2001)

Robert Harvey, “A Few Bloody Noses” The Realities and Mythologies of the American Revolution (Woodstock: the Overlook Press, 2002)

Christopher Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes (New York: Avon Books, 1990)

Copyright owned by Michael Streich; Republishing requires permission in writing.

 Triumph of the Will

Leni Riefenstahl's Classic Film of the Nazi Rallies at Nuremberg

© Michael Streich

 May 29, 2009

Leni Riefenstahl's Nazi era films have been hailed and criticized as Nazi documentaries, propaganda, and superb film making although she defended them as works of art.

Triumph of the Will (1935) has been called the greatest propaganda film ever made although the creator, Leni Riefenstahl, vigorously denied that the film was made for propaganda purposes. Riefenstahl, often called the “mother of modern film,” frequently said in her defense after the war that she was coerced by the Nazis into making the movie. Whether her goal was pure art or propaganda or a mixture of both, Triumph of the Will took a ranting demagogue and turned him into a modern god.

The Appeal of Triumph of the Will

The so-called documentary begins with aerial pictures of Nuremberg through billowing clouds. Hitler’s plane is filmed flying out of the clouds. Over the city, the plane’s silhouette shadowed on the streets below, moves block to block to the grounds where the Nazi Party rallies took place. In the background, the viewer can hear the Horst Wessel song.

Filmed from many angles, the black and white chronicle of the 1934 party rally captures all of the ritual, pageantry, and martial qualities of the movement. Flags flutter everywhere; Hitler youth bands play popular party marches. Hitler makes emotional speeches, demonstrating his charisma with the people who stop him with wild applause, holding up their arms in the Nazi salute and shouting “Sieg Heil!”

Riefenstahl accomplished an effect that simply could not be the same without the use of black and white. Hundreds of jubilant facial shots capture the total participation of the crowd. German historian Klaus Fischer points out that in films like Triumph of the Will, the people themselves became “coactors.”

Hitler the Artist

Adolf Hitler loved the film. Triumph of the Will represented a massive spectacle that appealed to a man whose initial background was as an artist. It should also be remembered that Hitler’s favorite composer was Richard Wagner, the 19th Century romanticist whose resume included being a revolutionary and a rabid anti-Semite.

The backdrops and staging of the party rallies throughout the 1930s were much like the elaborate and heroic Wagnerian operas that were performed, most ideally, at Bayreuth, a theater constructed around the needs of Wagner’s grandiose operas, similar to the immense structures at the Nazi Party Rally Grounds.

Leni Riefenstahl after the War

In a May 11, 1965 television interview, Riefenstahl claimed that in 1934/1935, she did not consider Triumph of the Will to be propaganda but conceded that, in hindsight, future generations might see it as such. Throughout the interview, she portrayed herself as a victim, noting her troubles with Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister.

Of the wars years, she stated, “I didn’t know it was so dangerous.” During a National Public Ratio obituary upon her death in September 2003, commentator Bob Edwards played an excerpt from an earlier interview in which Riefenstahl stated firmly, “It is not a propaganda film” (NPR, Morning Edition, September 9, 2003).

Riefenstahl made several post-war “come backs.” She mastered photography, demonstrating her talents in Africa. She learned under-water photography and produced spectacular pictures. Leni Riefenstahl had a singular gift for capturing uniquely spatial events and moments.

Riefenstahl’s other “great” movie demonstrates this quality as well. Olympia or Gods of the Stadium (1938) captured the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games in a documentary that some film critics hail as one of the best movies ever made.

Never a member of the Nazi Party, Riefenstahl, during her interviews, comes across like many Germans of the time who became caught up in a movement without stopping to question the motives or means. And like other Germans coming out that period, Riefenstahl saw herself as a victim. She died in 2003 at the age of 101.

Sources:

• Documentation Centre Nazi Party Rally Grounds, VHS Tape, Nuremberg Museums, 2000
• Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany: a New History (New York: Continuum, 1995)
• Anna Maria Sigmund, Women of the Third Reich (NDE Publishing, 2000)
• National Public Radio (several interviews on-line)

The copyright of the article Triumph of the Will in German History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Triumph of the Will in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

Hitler in Nuremberg 1935

 General Braddock's Disastrous March Encourages Native American Resistance and French Boldness

Braddock's Arrogance and Ignorance of Local Culture and Conditions Guarantee Failure

Michael Streich

 The start of the French and Indian War hardly achieved the grand objectives envisioned by England in an attempt to dislodge the French from the colonial frontier. Instead, the war began with the spectacular defeat of General Edward Braddock’s army composed of two regiments, assorted militia, and a handful of Indian scouts within a mile of their destination, Fort Duquesne in Pennsylvania. Braddock’s is often maligned for his role in the disaster, yet other factors may have contributed to the defeat in a more direct manner.

 

Braddock Arrives in Maryland

 

Braddock was appointed by the Duke of Cumberland, second son of the king. Known as the “Butcher of Culloden,” Cumberland and his protégés relied on the efficiency of continental military strategy, never considering the geographical differences of colonial America or the mindset of the colonial peoples.

 

Braddock, according to Simon Schama, was a “…unsentimental administrator and a stickler for discipline.” Like many commanders sent to America, Braddock viewed colonial militias and officers with contempt. Expecting to find supplies for his campaign, neither Virginia nor Pennsylvania provided food or transportation until Benjamin Franklin, almost at the last minute, arrived with 150 wagons obtained from Pennsylvania farmers as well as large amounts of food.

 

Virginia had no surplus food. Virginia agriculture was dominated by tobacco. In Pennsylvania, the colonial Quaker proprietors, clinging to the pacifism, refused to grant funds for a military operation, relenting in the end to support the endeavor with food supplies.

 

Ironically, it was the wagons and 500 pack horses that slowed his column as the army hacked a trail through the wilderness to Fort Duquesne. Braddock’s colonial aide-de-camp was Virginian George Washington, whose past experience fighting the French and their Indian allies would be valuable. Washington had written to Braddock, requesting consideration as a member of the general’s staff.

 

Also assisting Braddock was the experienced and highly trust frontiersman George Croghan who brought with him several Indian guides to scout the path. According to Dale Van Every, Braddock respected the Indians, giving gifts to friendly Indians he encountered on his trek, yet smarting that the Catawba and Cherokee had not come to assist him, as had been promised.

 

Braddock within Sight of Fort Duquesne

 

Having divided his force, Braddock led 1700 of his best men toward the French outpost. Vastly outnumbered, the French commander, Pierre Contrecoeur, contemplated surrendering his position. Excessive drought had lowered river levels, making resupply virtually impossible.

 

Contrecoeur’s second in command, Captain Daniel Hyacinth Beaujeu, however, convinced the commander to allow him to attempt a daring ambush as Braddock’s troops were crossing the Monongahela. Beaujeu caught Braddock after the river had been forded. Although killed in the ambush, Beaujeu’s Indians began to slaughter the English, firing into the disciplined ranks from the safety of the dense forest. Braddock lost two thirds of his command and would die during the retreat from a bullet wound. The French lost 23 men.

 

Washington would write in a letter, “we have been most scandalously beaten by a trifling body of men.” As the war continued, new leadership in England, learning some lessons from the initial disasters, appointed commanders willing to adapt to wilderness fighting and willing to share fully with colonial officers and militias.

 

Braddock Assessed

 

Edward Braddock was a product of European military experience. The colonial war was an entirely new experience. His antipathy for “backwater” provincials inclined him to disregard advice. Practically, he was hindered in movement by his supply train and the necessity of creating a path to the destination. Additionally, the strategic aims had been laid out by the Duke of Cumberland; Braddock was obliged to follow orders even if a more prudent policy appeared to promise more successful results.

 

Sources:

 

Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (Vintage, 2001)

Walter R. Borneman, French and Indian War: Fate of North America (Harper, 2007)

Dale Van Every, Forth to the Wilderness: the First American Frontier 1754-1774 (Mentor Book, 1961)

Simon Schama, A History of Britain, Volume II, The Wars of the British 1603-1776 (Hyperion, 2001)

Copyright Michael Streich; reprints require written permission.

Article first published in Suite101

 Why the US Pioneered Modern Constitutionalism

A Tradition of Limited Representation Provided Experience

© Michael Streich

Mar 3, 2009

Both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution came out of an English tradition of limited representative government mirrored in colonial governments.

During the American Revolutionary War, delegates of the Continental Congress created a new government for the soon-to-be independent United States that was called the Articles of Confederation. At the end of the war in 1783, the Articles formed the basis of the national government even as individual states wrote constitutions. Because the Articles proved inadequate, by 1787 it became apparent that a new Constitution needed to be written. That effort resulted in a central government that has governed the nation ever since constitutional ratification. The question often raised, however, is why this happened in America.

The Enlightenment and a Constitutional Tradition

From the very beginning of seventeenth century colonial efforts, colonial charters detailed not only the formation of colonial communities but political relationships. In rudimentary form, the Mayflower Compact established a social order agreed to by the consensus of Separatists. Other charters were more elaborate and went through several incarnations, such as that of Pennsylvania.

Puritan thinkers advanced the notion of a covenant or contract form of government that was later employed by John Locke at the time of the Glorious Revolution. William and Mary accepted these principles, embodied in part in the English Bill of Rights, and constitutionalism replaced divine right theory that had been held so dearly by earlier Stuart kings.

Ben Franklin, perhaps the greatest example of colonial Enlightenment thinkers, advanced an early blue print of colonial union with his Albany Plan at the start of the French and Indian War, but it was rejected both by colonial leaders and Britain. Most colonies, mirroring the English Parliamentary system, had Assemblies comprised of upper and lower houses. In short, the notions of representative government were planted long before the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.

The Lessons of History and Enlightenment Writing

Colin Goodykoontz writes that the crafting of the US Constitution called attention to “the contributions of the Americans to the development of the convention method of forming constitutions and giving reality to the compact theory.” Goodykoontz demonstrates that the delegates sought inspiration from the experience of history rather than reason, recalling Athenian democracy and the Roman Republic. Yet the greatest example for the framers was the unwritten English Constitution.

While providing a vehicle for self-government, however, the framers also understood the dangers posed by “the violence of popular bodies,” according to Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania. This view, held by almost all of the framers, helps to explain the later fears associated with the French Revolution and the mob rule during the French “reign of terror.” Yet it was one French Enlightenment thinker, the Baron Montesquieu, whose book The Spirit of the Laws, inspired the separation of powers.

Goodykoontz quotes Pierce Butler at the Constitutional Convention: “We had before us all the Ancient and modern constitutions on record, but none of them was more influential on Our Judgments than the British in Its Original purity.” American Constitutionalism developed out of a constitutional and covenant tradition, something other European societies lacked. Coupled with a strong agricultural base and the growth of manufacturing, the American democracy would evolve into what Gordon Wood called the “most egalitarian society” the world had ever seen.

Sources:

Scott Douglas Gerber, To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation (New York University Press, 1995).

Colin B. Goodykoontz, “The Founding Fathers and Clio,” The Vital Past: Writings on the Uses of History, Stephen Vaughn, Ed. (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1985).

Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution: How a Revolution Transformed a Monarchical Society Into a Democratic One Unlike Any That Had Ever Existed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992).

The copyright of the article Why the US Pioneered Modern Constitutionalism in Colonial America is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Why the US Pioneered Modern Constitutionalism in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

Colonial Williamsburg

 Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan of Union

An Early Attempt to Unify the Thirteen Colonies by a Founding Father

© Michael Streich

Dec 22, 2008

The Albany Plan represented an efficient approach to a more centralized government able to address general colonial issues but still under Parliamentary control.

Benjamin Franklin has been called the greatest Enlightenment thinker on this side of the Atlantic. In political matters, Franklin may have envisioned the future of the thirteen colonies better than anyone. His 1754 Albany Plan of Union was a daring first step in bringing together the colonies under one central government. Although rejected by colonial governments and the English Parliament, it represented a prophetic look at what Franklin felt was an inevitable future.

Benjamin Franklin’s Albany Plan

Franklin’s plan called for the establishment of a Grand Council, led by a President-General appointed by the king. Members of the Grand Council would be elected by colonial assemblies and serve for three years. The Grand Council would meet in Philadelphia once a year for a six week period and could not be dissolved “without their own consent or the special command of the crown” (point 7). The Council would have specific powers:

• Power to choose their Speaker.
• Power to regulate Indian trade.
• Power to make land purchases from Indians.
• Power to make new settlements and to make laws governing those settlements.
• Power to raise and pay soldiers and build forts to protect the colonies.
• Power to equip ships to guard the coasts and protect trade.
• Power to levy taxes for the above noted endeavors.
• Power to appoint a General Treasurer.
• Power to ratify military commissions.
• 
  

Members of the Grand Council were to be paid for their services and the general constitution elaborating the plan of union was not to interfere with the individual colonial assemblies or their governors.

Future Constitutional Elements in the Albany Plan

Many of Franklin’s proposals foreshadowed the eventual Constitution of 1787. Representation was based on population with Massachusetts and Virginia having 7 delegates each. The power to levy taxes for the general good of the colonies, notably in military matters, would be absent in the Articles of Confederation (1777) but become an important express power of the House of Representatives in 1787.

Franklin’s plan would take Indian Affairs out of the hands of appointed Indian agents. Although there were superbly gifted agents such as Sir William Johnson, many colonists mistrusted the motives of the crown when it came to Indian matters, an issue made abundantly clear in 1763 when Parliament passed the Proclamation Line limiting colonial expansion beyond the Appalachian Mountains.

Although the President-General had the power to nominate “military commission officers” (point 23), these nominations had to be confirmed by the Grand Council, much as the Constitution calls for the confirmation of Executive Branch nominations by the Senate.

Point 21 of the Plan defers all final approval of laws made by the Grand Council to the King and details that any such laws must be “agreeable to the laws of England.” The Albany Plan was not a call for independence. It was a blueprint for more efficient governance with the aim of providing the colonies a faster vehicle of response to emergencies.

Like the earlier Mayflower Compact and the formation of Virginia’s House of Burgesses, Franklin’s Albany Plan represented a stepping stone toward a more organized and popular representation in line with Enlightenment notions limiting monarchical power. But this should not be construed to mean that the Plan’s intent, direct or indirect, was to slight the King. Colonists knew that English law was embodied in Parliament and that Parliament could make no laws violating the English Bill of Rights (Blackstone).

Sources:

Benjamin Franklin’s Albany Plan of Union

The copyright of the article Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan of Union in Colonial America is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan of Union in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

Benjamin Franklin

 Propaganda in the American Colonies

Boston Massacre greatly exaggerates Anti-British Sentiments

Michael Streich

 The old saying that a “picture is worth a thousand words” goes a long way in portraying the past but often at the cost of historical truth. Nikolai Tolstoy, writing about Joseph Stalin, quotes the composer Shostakovich talking about the numerous painters Stalin ordered shot because their portrayals of the Soviet leader “didn’t please him.” [1] Not as tragic as Tolstoy’s example, pictures from American history, however, often present embellished tales that added to the propaganda quality of the event.

 

The Boston Massacre and Paul Revere

 

On the evening of March 5^th, 1770, a crowd of angry Bostonians, many unemployed, confronted a group of British “red coats” or “lobster backs.” Taunted by the crowd, the soldiers eventually fired, leaving five dead. This became the Boston Massacre. But it was Paul Revere’s engraving of the event, based on a drawing made by Henry Pelham that created anti-British fervor throughout the colonies.

 

Revere’s engraving, reprinted in most American history texts, gave a grossly distorted view of what actually happened. One of the mob leaders, a mulatto named Crispus Attucks, was the first shot. Yet the Revere engraving shows no person of color. Those fallen in the foreground are white. The actual incident occurred in front of the customs house and only seven British privates and one officer were involved.

 

According to the lithograph, there is no impression that the British soldiers were surrounded by the mob. The incident began when a group numbering about twenty people started to intimidate a lone sentry, Hugh White. After retreating to the customs house, he was supported by seven others, commanded by Captain Thomas Preston. By now the mob had grown in numbers.

 

According to eye witness accounts, later used in the public trail of the soldiers, struck one of the soldiers with a club, causing a shot to be fired. Although the order to “shoot” was heard by witnesses, Preston denied giving the order and other witnesses claimed that it came from a direction away from where Preston stood. The Revere depiction gives the impression of a premeditated volley at near point blank range into a group of innocent citizens.

 

The classic engraving does not show the crude weapons used by some members of the mob nor does it show any snow on the ground. The Boston Massacre encounter was not the first time angry mobs threw stones wrapped in snow. March 5^th was the culmination of three days of provocation. None of the above facts are portrayed in the Revere engraving.

 

Paintings, Patriotism, and Propaganda

 

The story of the Boston Massacre is not alone in presenting false facts in order to achieve a desired response. Patriotism can do much the same. The classic painting of Teddy Roosevelt at the forefront of the Rough Rider’s charge up San Juan Hill during the Spanish American War is frequently used in history texts such as The American Vision. The Rough Riders, however, had left their horses in Florida. The charge was made on foot, and contrary to the intent of the picture to glorify “TR,” he was not the commander of the group.

 

The 1851 picture of George Washington crossing the Delaware by Emanuel Leutze has become iconic in Revolutionary War history lore. The men who ferried Washington across the Delaware were white and black sailors under the command of Colonel John Glover yet one would be hard pressed to find any persons of color in the painting (one is to the right of Washington). Additionally, the troops crossed on barges, not open row boats and the general was not standing as in the painting: indeed, in the barges, everyone was standing!

 

Sources:

 

Robert Harvey, “A Few Bloody Noses:” The Realities and Mythologies of the American Revolution (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2002)

Henry Wiencek, An Imperfect God: George Washington, His Slaves, and the Creation of America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003)

Hiller B. Zobel, The Boston Massacre (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970)

See also Howard Zinn’s A People’s History on-line version.

 

[1] quoted in Nikolai Tolstoy, Stalin’s Secret War: A startling expose of his crimes against the Russian people. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981) p. 19

Copyright Michael Streich; no reprints without written permission.

 How the Boston Tea Party Unified the American Colonies

Michael Streich

American independence was rooted in a number of events that occurred immediately after the ending of the French and Indian War in 1763. One of the architects of that peace, William Pitt, saw, however, that any war between Britain and the colonies, most notably following the events in Boston between 1774 and 1775, would be unwinnable. Prior to the Boston Massacre and the Tea Party, British public opinion was still divided. This changed following the imposition of the Intolerable Acts.

 

Misjudging the Colonial Resolve after the Boston Tea Party

 

Historian Simon Schama notes that as the English colonies expanded and prospered, Parliament and various ministerial officials underestimated colonial resolve: “…Grenville, like most of his contemporaries…really knew pitifully little about the reality of the American colonies.”

 

The colonies could function self-sufficiently and had established important relationships apart from the British mercantile system. As such, the colonies boasted a higher standard of living than their English relations and were able to retired locally levied taxes more quickly.

 

Colonial Unity Questioned by Parliament and King George III

 

In 1754 Dr. Ben Franklin proposed a framework for colonial unity. This plan was rejected. Although formulated, in part, to deal with the French frontier threat, colonial opposition strengthened the view that independence and unity among the colonies was not to be taken seriously.

 

English leaders Opposed to a Colonial War

 

Numerous writers counseled a policy of conciliation, including the philosophers David Hume and Edmund Burke, who emerged as the leader of the Whigs. Speaking in Parliament May 2, 1774, Burke predicted that, “A great many red coats will never govern America.” Burke also called for Parliament to “hear the parties” in the wake of the 1773 Boston Tea Party.

 

4^th of July 1776 Creates a New Nation

 

Jefferson’s Declaration of independence was presaged by the May 15, 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights, which stipulated that, “government is or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people…” Jefferson published his Declaration on the basis that King George III was a tyrant and, as such, could be replaced. English Whigs, however, chose to identify “ministerial policy” as tyranny. Regardless, red coats and Hessian mercenaries were already marching through the colonies, unable to coordinate meaningful military strategy in the vast expanse of land.

 

English misjudgment did far more to help unite the colonies and further independence than any other single cause. By 1781, a veteran army commanded by Lord Cornwallis was trapped at Yorktown in southern Virginia, ending the myth of British military invincibility. Parliament finally took notice, asking how many more soldiers would be sent to the colonies to force acceptance of parliamentary policies.

 

Sources:

 

Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, editors, The Spirit of Seventy-Six (HarperCollins, 1967)

Simon Schama, A History of Britain, Volume II: The Wars of the British 1603-1776 (Hyperion, 2001)

Page Smith, A New Age Now Begins: A People’s History of the American Revolution, Volume I (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976)

Copyright owned by Michael Streich; reprints require written permission

Happy Birthday, Mom! Miss You Everyday!
 

 

General Heinz Guderian and Tank Warfare

Development of Armored Formations Led to Swift Victory in 1939

May 25, 2009 Michael Streich

Despite significant opposition in the German General Staff, Heinz Guderian demonstrated the effectiveness of Panzer divisions with the invasion of Poland and France.

German successes at the start of World War II, both in Poland and in France, are attributed in large measure to the efforts of General Heinz Guderian, whose development of armored formations – the first Panzer divisions, enabled the swift victories. The “Father of the German tank,” however, made enemies and, although loyal to the end of the war, spoke his mind openly, even with Adolf Hitler

Preparing for the Second World War

As an officer in the Signals division during World War I, Guderian developed a keen interest in the later use of radio on the battlefield. The success of his four Panzer divisions in May-June 1940 rested, in part, with their ability to rapidly communicate. According to military historian Kenneth Macksey, this was his “greatest technical contribution to the tank forces.”

Guderian also witnessed the use of the first crude tanks in the Great War by the British. After the war ended, many of Guderian’s conclusions were drawn from British sources. Advocating tanks and a strategy of armored formations independent of infantry, however, was not in vogue among members of the German General Staff.

Senior commanders were still wedded to the failed strategies of the First World War. Additionally, once Germany rearmed, resources went to the building of submarines and the creation of Herman Goring’s Luftwaffe. Further, many senior commanders were “gunners,” that is their background predisposed them to reject Guderian’s theories.

Guderian’s book, Achtung – Panzer!, published in 1937, won some converts, notably among the younger officers, but vindication would not come until the invasion of Poland in 1939.

General Guderian’s World War II Contributions

Military historians suggest that Guderian accepted the Russian view of “Deep Battle,” conducting an offensive with all elements working together in tandem. This worked successfully in the Polish campaign to the extent that history books refer to the operation as a blitzkrieg. Attributed to Hitler, Historian Paul Harris traces the first use of the term to a late 1939 article in Time magazine.

By the summer of 1940, Guderian’s Panzers were chasing the Allies to the Channel, halting just before Dunkirk on direct orders from Hitler. The British and French had enough time to evacuate across the Channel. Hitler’s order had been on the advice of the army commanders in OKW (Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht) who were concerned that the infantry was too far behind and that the lines of battle too stretched.

Guderian vigorously opposed the 1941 German invasion of Russia. He was well aware of long-term Russian capacities. The invasion found Guderian leading his Panzers in the effort to take Moscow, only to be redeployed to the Ukraine. As the bitter winter settled in, Guderian was relieved of command by Hitler for ordering a retreat without authority.

Toward the end of the war, Guderian was recalled, and after the failed plot to kill Hitler in July 1944, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. His knowledge of the plot is debated. Some historians claim he knew of the plot after having been approached by generals to join in the conspiracy. Others, however, claim that he knew nothing whatsoever.

Guderian did, however, act as judge during tribunals that convicted plot conspirators. His overall response to the plot was criticized by other officers yet most of his biographers refer to his complete military bearing and the fact that he valued honor, including the sacred oath taken by every soldier to the state.

His disagreements, often violent, with Hitler, ended his role shortly before the war concluded. He was one of the few officers that weren’t afraid to speak his mind when he thought he was right.

Sources:

• Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff (Westview Press, 1985)
• Major General Heinz Guderian, Achtung – Panzer! Introduction by Paul Harris (London: Brockhampton Press, 1999)
• Kennth Macksey, “Guderian,” Hitler’s Generals Edited by Correlli Barnett (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989)
• Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages (Harper & Row, 1960)

Copyright Michael Streich. Contact the author to obtain permission for republication.