Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan of Union

An Early Attempt to Unify the Thirteen Colonies by a Founding Father

© Michael Streich

Dec 22, 2008

The Albany Plan represented an efficient approach to a more centralized government able to address general colonial issues but still under Parliamentary control.

Benjamin Franklin has been called the greatest Enlightenment thinker on this side of the Atlantic. In political matters, Franklin may have envisioned the future of the thirteen colonies better than anyone. His 1754 Albany Plan of Union was a daring first step in bringing together the colonies under one central government. Although rejected by colonial governments and the English Parliament, it represented a prophetic look at what Franklin felt was an inevitable future.

Benjamin Franklin’s Albany Plan

Franklin’s plan called for the establishment of a Grand Council, led by a President-General appointed by the king. Members of the Grand Council would be elected by colonial assemblies and serve for three years. The Grand Council would meet in Philadelphia once a year for a six week period and could not be dissolved “without their own consent or the special command of the crown” (point 7). The Council would have specific powers:

• Power to choose their Speaker.
• Power to regulate Indian trade.
• Power to make land purchases from Indians.
• Power to make new settlements and to make laws governing those settlements.
• Power to raise and pay soldiers and build forts to protect the colonies.
• Power to equip ships to guard the coasts and protect trade.
• Power to levy taxes for the above noted endeavors.
• Power to appoint a General Treasurer.
• Power to ratify military commissions.
• 
  

Members of the Grand Council were to be paid for their services and the general constitution elaborating the plan of union was not to interfere with the individual colonial assemblies or their governors.

Future Constitutional Elements in the Albany Plan

Many of Franklin’s proposals foreshadowed the eventual Constitution of 1787. Representation was based on population with Massachusetts and Virginia having 7 delegates each. The power to levy taxes for the general good of the colonies, notably in military matters, would be absent in the Articles of Confederation (1777) but become an important express power of the House of Representatives in 1787.

Franklin’s plan would take Indian Affairs out of the hands of appointed Indian agents. Although there were superbly gifted agents such as Sir William Johnson, many colonists mistrusted the motives of the crown when it came to Indian matters, an issue made abundantly clear in 1763 when Parliament passed the Proclamation Line limiting colonial expansion beyond the Appalachian Mountains.

Although the President-General had the power to nominate “military commission officers” (point 23), these nominations had to be confirmed by the Grand Council, much as the Constitution calls for the confirmation of Executive Branch nominations by the Senate.

Point 21 of the Plan defers all final approval of laws made by the Grand Council to the King and details that any such laws must be “agreeable to the laws of England.” The Albany Plan was not a call for independence. It was a blueprint for more efficient governance with the aim of providing the colonies a faster vehicle of response to emergencies.

Like the earlier Mayflower Compact and the formation of Virginia’s House of Burgesses, Franklin’s Albany Plan represented a stepping stone toward a more organized and popular representation in line with Enlightenment notions limiting monarchical power. But this should not be construed to mean that the Plan’s intent, direct or indirect, was to slight the King. Colonists knew that English law was embodied in Parliament and that Parliament could make no laws violating the English Bill of Rights (Blackstone).

Sources:

Benjamin Franklin’s Albany Plan of Union

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Benjamin Franklin

 Propaganda in the American Colonies

Boston Massacre greatly exaggerates Anti-British Sentiments

Michael Streich

 The old saying that a “picture is worth a thousand words” goes a long way in portraying the past but often at the cost of historical truth. Nikolai Tolstoy, writing about Joseph Stalin, quotes the composer Shostakovich talking about the numerous painters Stalin ordered shot because their portrayals of the Soviet leader “didn’t please him.” [1] Not as tragic as Tolstoy’s example, pictures from American history, however, often present embellished tales that added to the propaganda quality of the event.

 

The Boston Massacre and Paul Revere

 

On the evening of March 5^th, 1770, a crowd of angry Bostonians, many unemployed, confronted a group of British “red coats” or “lobster backs.” Taunted by the crowd, the soldiers eventually fired, leaving five dead. This became the Boston Massacre. But it was Paul Revere’s engraving of the event, based on a drawing made by Henry Pelham that created anti-British fervor throughout the colonies.

 

Revere’s engraving, reprinted in most American history texts, gave a grossly distorted view of what actually happened. One of the mob leaders, a mulatto named Crispus Attucks, was the first shot. Yet the Revere engraving shows no person of color. Those fallen in the foreground are white. The actual incident occurred in front of the customs house and only seven British privates and one officer were involved.

 

According to the lithograph, there is no impression that the British soldiers were surrounded by the mob. The incident began when a group numbering about twenty people started to intimidate a lone sentry, Hugh White. After retreating to the customs house, he was supported by seven others, commanded by Captain Thomas Preston. By now the mob had grown in numbers.

 

According to eye witness accounts, later used in the public trail of the soldiers, struck one of the soldiers with a club, causing a shot to be fired. Although the order to “shoot” was heard by witnesses, Preston denied giving the order and other witnesses claimed that it came from a direction away from where Preston stood. The Revere depiction gives the impression of a premeditated volley at near point blank range into a group of innocent citizens.

 

The classic engraving does not show the crude weapons used by some members of the mob nor does it show any snow on the ground. The Boston Massacre encounter was not the first time angry mobs threw stones wrapped in snow. March 5^th was the culmination of three days of provocation. None of the above facts are portrayed in the Revere engraving.

 

Paintings, Patriotism, and Propaganda

 

The story of the Boston Massacre is not alone in presenting false facts in order to achieve a desired response. Patriotism can do much the same. The classic painting of Teddy Roosevelt at the forefront of the Rough Rider’s charge up San Juan Hill during the Spanish American War is frequently used in history texts such as The American Vision. The Rough Riders, however, had left their horses in Florida. The charge was made on foot, and contrary to the intent of the picture to glorify “TR,” he was not the commander of the group.

 

The 1851 picture of George Washington crossing the Delaware by Emanuel Leutze has become iconic in Revolutionary War history lore. The men who ferried Washington across the Delaware were white and black sailors under the command of Colonel John Glover yet one would be hard pressed to find any persons of color in the painting (one is to the right of Washington). Additionally, the troops crossed on barges, not open row boats and the general was not standing as in the painting: indeed, in the barges, everyone was standing!

 

Sources:

 

Robert Harvey, “A Few Bloody Noses:” The Realities and Mythologies of the American Revolution (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2002)

Henry Wiencek, An Imperfect God: George Washington, His Slaves, and the Creation of America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003)

Hiller B. Zobel, The Boston Massacre (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970)

See also Howard Zinn’s A People’s History on-line version.

 

[1] quoted in Nikolai Tolstoy, Stalin’s Secret War: A startling expose of his crimes against the Russian people. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981) p. 19

Copyright Michael Streich; no reprints without written permission.

 How the Boston Tea Party Unified the American Colonies

Michael Streich

American independence was rooted in a number of events that occurred immediately after the ending of the French and Indian War in 1763. One of the architects of that peace, William Pitt, saw, however, that any war between Britain and the colonies, most notably following the events in Boston between 1774 and 1775, would be unwinnable. Prior to the Boston Massacre and the Tea Party, British public opinion was still divided. This changed following the imposition of the Intolerable Acts.

 

Misjudging the Colonial Resolve after the Boston Tea Party

 

Historian Simon Schama notes that as the English colonies expanded and prospered, Parliament and various ministerial officials underestimated colonial resolve: “…Grenville, like most of his contemporaries…really knew pitifully little about the reality of the American colonies.”

 

The colonies could function self-sufficiently and had established important relationships apart from the British mercantile system. As such, the colonies boasted a higher standard of living than their English relations and were able to retired locally levied taxes more quickly.

 

Colonial Unity Questioned by Parliament and King George III

 

In 1754 Dr. Ben Franklin proposed a framework for colonial unity. This plan was rejected. Although formulated, in part, to deal with the French frontier threat, colonial opposition strengthened the view that independence and unity among the colonies was not to be taken seriously.

 

English leaders Opposed to a Colonial War

 

Numerous writers counseled a policy of conciliation, including the philosophers David Hume and Edmund Burke, who emerged as the leader of the Whigs. Speaking in Parliament May 2, 1774, Burke predicted that, “A great many red coats will never govern America.” Burke also called for Parliament to “hear the parties” in the wake of the 1773 Boston Tea Party.

 

4^th of July 1776 Creates a New Nation

 

Jefferson’s Declaration of independence was presaged by the May 15, 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights, which stipulated that, “government is or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people…” Jefferson published his Declaration on the basis that King George III was a tyrant and, as such, could be replaced. English Whigs, however, chose to identify “ministerial policy” as tyranny. Regardless, red coats and Hessian mercenaries were already marching through the colonies, unable to coordinate meaningful military strategy in the vast expanse of land.

 

English misjudgment did far more to help unite the colonies and further independence than any other single cause. By 1781, a veteran army commanded by Lord Cornwallis was trapped at Yorktown in southern Virginia, ending the myth of British military invincibility. Parliament finally took notice, asking how many more soldiers would be sent to the colonies to force acceptance of parliamentary policies.

 

Sources:

 

Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, editors, The Spirit of Seventy-Six (HarperCollins, 1967)

Simon Schama, A History of Britain, Volume II: The Wars of the British 1603-1776 (Hyperion, 2001)

Page Smith, A New Age Now Begins: A People’s History of the American Revolution, Volume I (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976)

Copyright owned by Michael Streich; reprints require written permission

Happy Birthday, Mom! Miss You Everyday!
 

 

General Heinz Guderian and Tank Warfare

Development of Armored Formations Led to Swift Victory in 1939

May 25, 2009 Michael Streich

Despite significant opposition in the German General Staff, Heinz Guderian demonstrated the effectiveness of Panzer divisions with the invasion of Poland and France.

German successes at the start of World War II, both in Poland and in France, are attributed in large measure to the efforts of General Heinz Guderian, whose development of armored formations – the first Panzer divisions, enabled the swift victories. The “Father of the German tank,” however, made enemies and, although loyal to the end of the war, spoke his mind openly, even with Adolf Hitler

Preparing for the Second World War

As an officer in the Signals division during World War I, Guderian developed a keen interest in the later use of radio on the battlefield. The success of his four Panzer divisions in May-June 1940 rested, in part, with their ability to rapidly communicate. According to military historian Kenneth Macksey, this was his “greatest technical contribution to the tank forces.”

Guderian also witnessed the use of the first crude tanks in the Great War by the British. After the war ended, many of Guderian’s conclusions were drawn from British sources. Advocating tanks and a strategy of armored formations independent of infantry, however, was not in vogue among members of the German General Staff.

Senior commanders were still wedded to the failed strategies of the First World War. Additionally, once Germany rearmed, resources went to the building of submarines and the creation of Herman Goring’s Luftwaffe. Further, many senior commanders were “gunners,” that is their background predisposed them to reject Guderian’s theories.

Guderian’s book, Achtung – Panzer!, published in 1937, won some converts, notably among the younger officers, but vindication would not come until the invasion of Poland in 1939.

General Guderian’s World War II Contributions

Military historians suggest that Guderian accepted the Russian view of “Deep Battle,” conducting an offensive with all elements working together in tandem. This worked successfully in the Polish campaign to the extent that history books refer to the operation as a blitzkrieg. Attributed to Hitler, Historian Paul Harris traces the first use of the term to a late 1939 article in Time magazine.

By the summer of 1940, Guderian’s Panzers were chasing the Allies to the Channel, halting just before Dunkirk on direct orders from Hitler. The British and French had enough time to evacuate across the Channel. Hitler’s order had been on the advice of the army commanders in OKW (Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht) who were concerned that the infantry was too far behind and that the lines of battle too stretched.

Guderian vigorously opposed the 1941 German invasion of Russia. He was well aware of long-term Russian capacities. The invasion found Guderian leading his Panzers in the effort to take Moscow, only to be redeployed to the Ukraine. As the bitter winter settled in, Guderian was relieved of command by Hitler for ordering a retreat without authority.

Toward the end of the war, Guderian was recalled, and after the failed plot to kill Hitler in July 1944, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. His knowledge of the plot is debated. Some historians claim he knew of the plot after having been approached by generals to join in the conspiracy. Others, however, claim that he knew nothing whatsoever.

Guderian did, however, act as judge during tribunals that convicted plot conspirators. His overall response to the plot was criticized by other officers yet most of his biographers refer to his complete military bearing and the fact that he valued honor, including the sacred oath taken by every soldier to the state.

His disagreements, often violent, with Hitler, ended his role shortly before the war concluded. He was one of the few officers that weren’t afraid to speak his mind when he thought he was right.

Sources:

• Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff (Westview Press, 1985)
• Major General Heinz Guderian, Achtung – Panzer! Introduction by Paul Harris (London: Brockhampton Press, 1999)
• Kennth Macksey, “Guderian,” Hitler’s Generals Edited by Correlli Barnett (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989)
• Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages (Harper & Row, 1960)

Copyright Michael Streich. Contact the author to obtain permission for republication.

 

Operation Barbarossa June 1941

Jun 14, 2010 Michael Streich

Numerous factors led to the German invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941 but the "lighting war" lasted well beyond the winter and ended in disaster for Hitler.

Operation Barbarossa began on June 22, 1941. Three million German soldiers were poised to invade Soviet Russia, breaking the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. The “lightning war” was to achieve its goals swiftly, before the onset of winter. Initially a stunning success, the German advance was broken as Josef Stalin rallied the Russian people in what he called the “Great Fatherland War.” German forces were finally put on the defensive in early 1942 at Stalingrad on the Volga River. Operation Barbarossa was a tremendous blunder for Hitler and helped alienate many top officers.

Why Hitler Ordered the Invasion of Russia

After defeating France, Hitler ordered detailed plans for the invasion of England. The German navy, however, was not up to the task and the plans were postponed. But Hitler never gave up the idea and it was one factor in his decision to attack Russia.

German control of European Russia served several goals. The conquered territory would provide lebensraum, lands on which to resettle Germans. Additionally, Hitler wanted Russian oil, wheat, and other natural resources to extend the overall war effort. This included the postponed invasion of England as well as securing North Africa and Cyprus.

Benito Mussolini’s invasion of Greece was another factor. By drawing Germany into the conflict, German forces had to advance through the Balkans. This created tension with Stalin who viewed the Balkans as a Russian sphere of influence. At the same time, Russia’s poor performance against the Finns gave a false impression of Russian military abilities.

Operation Barbarossa as a Racial War

Once German armies advanced into Russia, they were followed by the Gestapo and the liquidation units of the S.S. Jews and political leaders were exterminated in great numbers, as at Babi Yar outside of Kiev. Long term plans called for using the Slavs as forced laborers. Each republic would be turned into a Reich protectorate. Although the German General Staff, led by General Franz Halder, vigorously objected, they were overruled and in some cases replaced.

Historian Klaus P. Fischer writes that, “Few people realized that Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union was more than a conventional war: it was also a racial-biological war whose ultimate goal was the extermination of the ‘Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia.’” In an interview with the German news magazine Spiegel (January 28, 2010), Annette Schucking-Homeyer, who served as a Red Cross volunteer in the Ukraine at the time, says, “we saw German soldiers herding together women and children…There was no doubt that they were about to be shot.”

Failures of Operation Barbarossa

Army Group North, under Field Marshal von Leeb, failed to take Leningrad and link with Finnish forces. Field Marshal von Bock could have taken Moscow, but many of his troops were diverted south into the Ukraine by Hitler. When the Moscow offensive resumed, winter conditions prohibited the Germans from taking the Russian capital. Hitler’s stubborn refusal to evacuate General Paulus at Stalingrad signaled the turning point of the war.

Hitler relied on faulty information before ordering the operation, despite credible evidence that Russia was not as weak as perceived. This was most clear in the number of tanks the Russians actually possessed as well as their quality. On the German side, General Guderian, the father of the German panzer division, warned that Germany did not have enough tanks for the operation.

Historian David MacKenzie wrote that, “Overconfidence and fanaticism caused Hitler and his associates to overlook or fumble golden military and political opportunities.” Russia had many anti-Stalinist groups, notably in the Ukraine. In several cases, they offered their services to fight with the Germans against Stalin. Hitler, however, treated them as POWs and brushed aside their offers. Any goodwill extended to Germans was rapidly eliminated by the actions of the S.S. and the Gestapo.

Effects of the Russian Invasion

After the Stalingrad debacle, the Red Army relentlessly pushed back the Germans. Millions died in the process. Operation Barbarossa also made Russia an ally of Britain. Both nations sent troops into Iran, which had supported Germany. After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. found itself a partner with Soviet Russia. By 1945, the Red Army was on the borders of Germany, occupying conquered lands that would come to be called “Eastern Europe.” Berlin itself was taken by the Red Army per agreements made at the Yalta Conference. Operation Barbarossa had many long term consequences that ultimately included the on-set of the Cold War.

References:

• Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany: A New History (NY: Continuum Publishing Co., 1995)
• Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff (Westview Press, 1985)
• David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran, A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond (Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993)

Copyright Michael Streich. Contact the author to obtain permission for republication.

 

Eisenhower and the Drive to Berlin in 1945

Why the Allies Allowed the Russians to Take the Capital of the Reich

Aug 3, 2009 Michael Streich

In early April 1945, the American 9th Army was within 24 hours of reaching Berlin, yet three days later General Eisenhower ordered the Allied halt at the Elbe River.

In 1949, General Dwight Eisenhower was asked about one of the most controversial decisions made in 1945, the taking of Berlin. Eisenhower’s answer was based on military considerations, yet he conceded that political issues – already agreed to at the earlier Yalta Conference, influenced the decision. Eisenhower’s decision to halt the Allied advance at the Elbe River ultimately supported Soviet domination of what would come to be called “Eastern Europe,” a region separated by what Winston Churchill labeled an “Iron Curtain.” Would the taking of Berlin have changed that?

The Allied Invasion of Nazi Germany 1944-1945

By the fall of 1944, it had become obvious that German resistance was weakening. Aachen became the first German city occupied by allied troops on October 21. Subsequent strategy called for smashing through the Siegfried Line and crossing the Rhine River for the final push to Berlin. Even as allied troops were accomplishing these goals in early 1945, the Soviet army under Marshall Zhukov was closing in on Berlin.

Beginning with Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group Rhine River crossing on March 7th, the allies spectacularly advanced into the heart of Germany through March and into April 1945. Field Marshall Montgomery’s “Market Garden” operation, though not entirely successful, ultimately resulted in the encirclement of Field Marshall Model’s army group, the last field army to stand between Eisenhower and Berlin.

But on March 28th, Eisenhower changed the plan. Although nothing stood between the Allies and Berlin, army groups were ordered to secured the Baltic port cities like Lubeck, as well as moving into the Leipzig-Dresden area where German war industrialization was still in progress. The British were outraged; Field Marshall Montgomery stated afterward that he could have taken Berlin before the Russians.

Effects of Eisenhower’s Decision

Eisenhower reasoned that the Russians were only 35 miles from Berlin while the bulk of his forces were 285 miles from the German capital. Additionally, taking Berlin might have cost 100,000 lives. Finally, Eisenhower was under pressure to end the European war quickly so that resources could be diverted to the Pacific theater.

It is also a fact, however, that American advance units were already in Potsdam and General William Simpson’s 9th US Army had crossed the Elbe River. Simpson later wrote that, using the German autobahn, his army could have been in Berlin in 24 hours. The Russians, in contrast, had not yet crossed the Oder River. In essence, American units were only 53 miles from Berlin on April 11th.

On April 12, however, Franklin Roosevelt collapsed and died. This act of destiny neutralized the vigorous efforts of Prime Minister Churchill and British military planners. On April 14, General Eisenhower ordered a halt at the Elbe River and called back American units that had already crossed. In 1949, Eisenhower stated, “The political heads of our government had already agreed that our line of occupation would be way back, starting at the north at Denmark, with Linz on the south, so what good would it have done us to capture Berlin?”

Both the political and military consequences would be played out after Germany surrendered. Soviet troops occupied large areas of middle Europe, establishing pro-Russian governments. Stalin looted these countries, dismantling factories and deporting populations to Siberia. He excused these actions as reparations of war.

Could Taking Berlin have Limited Stalin’s Gains?

If the allied leaders at Potsdam followed the agreements and protocols of the Yalta Agreements (February 4-11, 1945), it would not have made a difference which country actually “took” Berlin. But as Churchill had shown early in 1945 with the bombing of Dresden, the Soviets responded to a show of force and respected power. The new American President, Harry Truman, might have been able to call Stalin’s bluff, particularly with the success of the atomic bomb test in New Mexico.

Sources:

• Douglas Botting, From the Ruins of the Reich: Germany 1945-1949 (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1985)
• Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany: A New History (New York: Continuum, 1995)
• Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, Volume II: Since 1914, Edited by Thomas G. Paterson, Second Edition (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1984)

Copyright Michael Streich. Contact the author to obtain permission for republication.

 

Blood Libel and Saint Simon of Trent 1475

Jan 13, 2011 Michael Streich

St Simon of Trent Allegedly Murdered by Jews - AndresPraefcke Wikimedia Commons Image

The case of Simon of Trent highlights Catholic Europe's erroneous belief in blood libel that asserts the use of Christian blood in Jewish religious rituals.

The Catholic Church celebrates the feast day of Saint Simon of Trent every March 24th. Simon was two and a half years old when his body was discovered in a ditch near the homes of Trent’s small Jewish population. The “martyrdom” of Simon is one of the best examples of blood libel, the belief that Jews kidnapped children in order to use their blood during important religious rituals.

Although stories of blood libel had circulated throughout Europe in the Middle Ages for centuries, the case of the Trent murder was highly pursued at the top levels of Church leadership and served to rekindle virulent anti-Semitism throughout Europe.

Jews Considered Enemies of the Church

The story of Simon’s disappearance and death took place in 1475 in Trent, a city in the Holy Roman Empire linking Italy with Southern Germany. The events took place at a time the Catholic Church was reasserting power and social control, following a long period of internal schism and leadership turmoil that began in the 14th Century with the Avignon papacy. The Council of Constance, which resulted in the restoration of papal authority under Pope Martin V, was still a vivid memory in 1475.

Within this climate, the events in Trent permitted the Church to renew more vigorously persecution of non-Catholic groups such as the Hussites in Bohemia and other heretics that dared to challenge the official positions of Catholic beliefs.

These enemies of the faith included the Jews, often labeled infidels. This was not a new development. Historian R. Po-chia Hsia, in his book Trent 1475, writes that, “The blood libel against the Jews of Trent…was neither the first nor the last in a long series of anti-Jewish charges in European history.”

During the outbreak of Bubonic Plague in the 14th Century, for example, Christians blamed the Jews, setting off another round of charges involving blood libel. Nachum T. Gidal, formerly a professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, states, “Once again Jews were the scapegoat…”

Confession of the Jews at Trent Obtained by Torture

When thorough investigations were made, the Jews were exonerated. During the Crusades, the Church opposed the persecution of Jews. In an early 13th Century case of blood libel, the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II declared that the accusations were lies. R. Po-chia Hsia draws an analogy to the persecution of witches. The Malleus Maleficarum, for example, was published in 1486 and began an extended period of witch hunting and persecution.

This persecution, like the one against the Jews, was also built on the false assumption that actual covens existed that practiced diabolical rites. In his study of the benandanti, Carlo Ginzburg demonstrates that the presumptions drawn by the Church in the late Middle Ages regarding witchcraft were based on rumor and popular fears. Witches that confessed did so under torture. There was no organized, under-ground society of witches.

It was also torture that led to the confessions in Trent in 1475. The Trent Jews testified that they had found the body but they were arrested nonetheless and subjected to torture. This eliminated any prospects of due process. The confessions further consolidated the power of Trent’s prince-bishop Johannes Hinderbach, who would spend the rest of his life pursuing the canonization of young Simon.

Impact of the Term Blood Libel on Jews and Historians

The term “blood libel” has found its way back into the American vernacular in large part because of former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin’s use of the term on January 12, 2011. In a video and on her Facebook Notes, Palin referred to “journalists and pundits” manufacturing a blood libel. Members of the Jewish community were outraged. Blood libel is a cogent reminder of centuries of rabid persecution, culminating in the Holocaust.

Beyond the insensitivity of using such a term inappropriately, there is the danger of revisionism. In this case, redirecting the meaning and focus of “blood libel” detracts from the historical record and runs the risk of trivializing the horrific acts of the past. The same can be said, for example, of terms like “survivor,” when discussing World War II.

Understanding Jewish Rituals and Practices

Few members of Europe’s intelligentsia made efforts to understand Jewish beliefs and practices. The common notion that Jews were the killers of Christ and that their rituals were conducted behind closed doors gave rise to blood libel as well as other accusations. But it was Christians who ostracized Jews, forcing them to live apart from Christians. Additionally, the Church made every effort to forcibly convert Jews. The Reformer Martin Luther urged that Jewish children be taken from their homes, placed with Christian families, and raised as Christians. One of his final works was Against the Jews and Their Lies (1543).

The 1475 Trent case centering on young Simon was only one example of the application of blood libel against the Jews. But its notoriety produced a plethora of stories, some shared under oath at the trial in 1475, of secret Jewish blood rituals tied to missing Christian children. Blood libel is a painful term and using it outside of the historical context is like scratching an old wound.

Sources:

• Nachum T. Gidal, Jews in Germany: From Roman Times to the Weimar Republic (Konemann, 1998)
• Carlo Ginzburg, Night Battles: Witchcraft & Agrarian Cults in the Sixteenth & Seventeenth Centuries (Penguin Books, 1985)
• R. Po-Chia Hsia, Trent 1475: Stories Of A Ritual Murder Trial (Yale University Press, 1992)
• Brian Tierney and Sidney Painter, Western Europe in the Middle Ages 300-1475, Fifth Edition (McGraw-Hill Inc., 1992)

Copyright Michael Streich. Contact the author to obtain permission for republication.