Federalists and Republican-Democrats Compared

Differences Between Hamilton and Jefferson over the Constitution

Oct 30, 2009 Michael Streich

In the early years of the Republic, factionalism over Constitutional interpretation divided Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson resulting in the birth of parties.

When George Washington returned to Mount Vernon in 1797 after two terms as U.S. president, he left a political last will known as his Farewell Address. Washington warned against party factionalism which he believed led to “frightful despotism.” By this time, however, two distinct factions had already formed. The Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, had a radically different interpretation of the Constitution than Thomas Jefferson’s Republicans or Republican-Democrats. Both early parties also diverged on their future vision for the new Republic.

Interpreting the New Constitution

Federalists followed an interpretation based on loose construction. In essence, they rejected the literalist approach held by the Republicans*, strict construction. The best illustration of this is seen in the dispute over the creation of the Bank of the United States. No clause in the Constitution authorized Congress to charter a national bank.

Over the protests of Jefferson and his fellow Republicans, Hamilton developed the Constitutional doctrine of implied powers. He based his reasoning on the final clause in Section 8 or Article I of the Constitution: Congress had the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers…”

These “foregoing powers” included authorization to coin money, raise taxes, and borrow money. Hamilton concluded that the national bank, based on the “necessary and proper” clause, was a logical extension of Congressional direct powers. In 1819, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court John Marshall would reread Hamilton’s logical arguments in deciding the landmark case, McCulloch v. Maryland, as a basis for holding the national bank constitutional.

Differing Visions of the Future United States

Thomas Jefferson envisioned an agricultural society, dominated by a pastoral mission closely tied to the land. Jefferson even extended this vision to Native American cultures, believing that the Indian problem would be resolved if Native Americans turned to agriculture. Jefferson himself owned a large Virginia plantation with 600 slaves.

Hamilton saw the future of America in terms of manufacturing and industrialization. Unlike Jefferson, Hamilton was more familiar with the British model, already in the throes of early industrialization which was promoting national prosperity through growing consumerism. Hamilton’s vision reflected the needs of the fledgling industries of the Northeast, infant enterprises that pointed to future prosperity and national growth.

The Role of the Central Government in Relation to the States

Federalists believed in a strong central government. They based their view on the conviction that the Constitution represented the supreme law of the land and represented the will and consent of the people. Republicans disputed this interpretation, placing greater emphasis on the individual states. According to their interpretation, the Constitution represented an agreement or contract between sovereign states and existed in a subordinate role to states’ rights.

As confrontation between the United States and France appeared imminent during the John Adams’ administration, Federalists in the Congress increased defense spending and enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts, measures deplored by Republicans. Jefferson believed that the Federalists were bending the Constitution to suit their own political future at the expense of the common man.

Demise of the Federalists

The proverbial death knell of the Federalists occurred when in 1800 Jefferson became president and the Federalists lost control of Congress. By the end of the War of 1812, Federalists had ceased to exist as a party, although their Constitutional interpretations would be carried on by subsequent smaller parties and ultimately the Whig Party.

Sources:

• Samuel H. Beer, To Make A Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1993)
• Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992)
• United States Constitution

* Jefferson’s “Republicans” should not be confused with today’s Republican Party, which was formed in the early 1850s.

The copyright of this article is owned by Michael Streich. Republishing in any form requires written permission by Michael Streich.

 

The Battle of Trenton December 26, 1776

Washington's Surprise Attack Invigorates the Patriot Cause

Dec 23, 2009 Michael Streich

A combination of brilliant strategy, gamble, & British blunders enabled Washington's deteriorating army to cross the Delaware in adverse conditions and secure a victory.

The December 26, 1776 battle of Trenton was the first Patriot victory of any consequence since the shots fired at Lexington and Concord had begun the struggle against Great Britain. Although not a turning point in the Revolutionary War, it was, according to one historian, “an eleventh hour reprieve” that gave the Patriot cause a “new spirit of hope and confidence.” Trenton demonstrated George Washington’s brilliant leadership and skill and probably saved him from recall as overall commander by the Continental Congress. The Trenton victory proved that Britain was not invincible, boosted morale among troops and civilian supporters, and increased enlistments sorely needed for the campaigns of 1777.

British Blunders Contribute to the Loss at Trenton

After the American withdrawal from New York and Washington’s retreat into Pennsylvania, British commanding general William Howe took his army back to New York following the pursuit of Washington. Wintering in New York, the British relied on 2,000 Hessian mercenaries to garrison the New Jersey front line. Although there was some local guerilla resistance, forcing the troops to confine themselves to cities and towns, the assumption was that with Washington’s army safely across the Delaware River, no immediate threat existed.

The Hessians at Trenton were commanded by Colonel Johaan Gottlieb Rall. Rall, who once referred to the patriot soldiers as “country clowns,” never bothered to fortify the town. No defensive redoubts were constructed. Rall also received conflicting reports from the British prior to Washington’s attack. On December 21st, British General Grant wrote Rall, stating that that the American army was, “almost naked, dying of cold, without blankets, and very ill supplied with provisions.” But Rall also received word from General Thomas Leslie in Princeton that Washington was preparing a Delaware crossing aimed at attacking Trenton.

Washington’s Victory at Trenton

Washington divided his army, intending a diversionary attack against Colonel Carl von Donop’s headquarters at Bordentown, south of Trenton. This group, however, never made it across the icy Delaware. The main force, ferried across the river amidst rain and sleet on cargo barges, was assembled on the Jersey side by 3:00 AM January 26th. The success of the attack depended upon absolute surprise.

Washington’s gamble paid off. The Hessians, still sleeping off their Christmas revelries, barely had time to form ranks. This was an army used to fighting European style battles. The streets of Trenton, however, made for a very different battle order. By the time artillery had been brought forward and officers connected with their units, the battle was all but over. Writing to his wife on December 28th, Henry Knox related that, “Providence seemed to have smiled upon every part of this enterprise.

Effects of the Battle of Trenton

News of the Trenton fiasco forced General Howe to dispatch Lord Cornwallis to Princeton to lead a force of 7,000 against Washington’s tattered army. But Washington escaped, recrossing the Delaware and moving north to eventually attack Princeton. The battle of Trenton had taken one hour and resulted in a thousand prisoners. General Gates, who had voiced public disapproval of the plan, was proven wrong.

According to historian Christopher Hibbert, Washington’s victory at Trenton, “encouraged a fresh revolutionary spirit amongst a people becoming disillusioned by…war…” Although “Washington had hardly turned the tables,” according to writer Robert Harvey, the propaganda value of the victory was immense. Enlistments increased in early 1777, a crucial need since many of Washington’s enlistments were due to expire January 1st.

Trenton also demonstrated that George Washington was not only a competent field commander (he personally commanded the main force attacking Trenton) but a brilliant strategist. Victory of Trenton restored confidence in both the Revolutionary cause and the leadership of Washington.

Sources:

• Robert Harvey, “A Few Bloody Noses:” The Realities and Mythologies of the American Revolution (New York: The Overlook Press, 2001)
• Christopher Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes (New York: Avon Books, 1990)
• Page Smith, A New Age Now Begins: A People’s History of the American Revolution Volume One (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976)
• The Spirit of Seventy-Six: The Story of the American Revolution as told by its Participants (New York: Castle Books, 2002) [original source documents on the American Revolution]

The copyright of this article is owned by Michael Streich. Republishing in any form must be granted permission by Michael Streich in writing.

 

USS Maine in Havana Harbor 1898

The German Connection with the Spanish American War

Oct 28, 2009 Michael Streich

In the months before the outbreak of war with Spain in April 1898, German warships prowled the Caribbean, meddling in affairs & hoping to benefit from a weakening Spain.

In 1897 Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany was twenty-nine years old; Theodore Roosevelt, the American Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was thirty-nine. Events in the Caribbean in late 1897 would test the resolve of both men and ultimately serve as a cause of the 1898 Spanish-American War.

Kaiser Wilhelm and German Imperialism

Following the dismissal of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1890, the Kaiser embarked on a series of reckless foreign policies adventures that led other European leaders to see him as an arch meddler, eager to benefit from the misfortunes of others or to exacerbate international crises in the hopes of securing either land or long term influence. This occurred in Morocco and later during the Boer War in South Africa.

Kaiser Wilhelm, against the advice of Bismarck, wanted his “place in the sun.” He had also read Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s wildly popular book, The Influence of Sea Power on History: 1660-1783 and had it translated into German. Mahan’s blueprint, which included colonies, a strong fleet, and island coaling stations, provided the Kaiser with a rationale for imperial adventures.

Germany came late to the imperialistic table. Although not too late to participate in the “scramble for Africa,” most desirable world properties were already under the control of Britain, France, and Russia. Germany had acquired joint custodianship of Samoa with the United States, but the Caribbean offered new opportunities in the wake of Spain’s growing inability to maintain her last remaining colonial possessions.

Cuba and the Coming of War with the United States

In November 1897 Teddy Roosevelt learned from intelligence sources that two imperial warships had left Germany for the Caribbean. His superior was on vacation, so Roosevelt, on his own initiative, ordered the USS Maine to set sail for the Florida Keys. The Maine was one of America’s newest warships, part of a fleet of over 110 vessels.

In early December a German warship sailed into Port-au-Prince and humiliated the government, threatening to bombard the city. Although Haiti appealed for US help, no American warships were close enough to assist. In Cuba, tensions were mounting and in January 1898 the American press reported rioting in Havana. The decision to send the Maine to Havana was based on reports of rioting but also to counter the potential threat of four German ships in Havana’s harbor. The last thing President McKinley wanted was for the Germans to provoke an incident giving them an opportunity to intervene and perhaps transfer ownership of the colony from an increasingly weak Spain.

When the Maine arrived in Havana on January 25th, there was no rioting. The ship had not been expected. American lives, interests, and property were in no danger. Historians like G.J.A. O’Toole believe that the presence of Gneisenenau, the Charlotte, and the Geier, in Havana – all German warships, played some role in the decision to send the Maine. German ships had also been reported off Manila Bay in the Philippines, further suggesting that the Kaiser hoped to benefit from Spain’s deteriorating position as a colonial power.

The Drift toward War in 1898

Diplomatic solutions, either with the overt meddling of Kaiser Wilhelm or with Spain’s queen regent, were not forcefully attempted. McKinley’s Secretary of State was Ohio’s John Sherman, a venerable member of the US Senate and a founder of the Republican Party but who, in 1898, was senile.

The Maine exploded on February 16th, an action many Americans blamed on Spain despite evidence to the contrary. Americans had already been predisposed to war through the rabid yellow journalism that portrayed Spain as a brutal colonial master. By mid-April, Congress approved a resolution that authorized what John Hay dubbed “the splendid little war.”

As to Germany, the Kaiser’s meddling continued in Central and South America. During TR’s term as president, he averted a naval standoff with the Kaiser over the Venezuelan dispute.

Sources:

• Ivan Musicant, Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century (Henry Holt & Co., 1998)
• G.J.A. O’Toole, The Spanish War (W.W. Norton & Co., 1984)
• Page Smith, The Rise of Industrial America (Penguin, 1984)

*The copyright of this article is owned by Michael Streich. Any reprint or republishing in any form must ge granted permission in writing by Michael Streich

 

The Mexican American War Congressional Debate

A Gag on Debating the Resolution Forced a Vote in One Afternoon

Nov 1, 2009 Michael Streich

The Polk administration was determined to navigate a declaration of war against Mexico through the Congress even if it meant withholding crucial evidence.

On May 11, 1846, President James K. Polk sent a war message to the Congress declaring that “war exists…by the act of Mexico herself.” After one afternoon of “debate” in the House, during which opposition was silenced by a gag on meaningful debate, a war resolution was swiftly passed. Although the Senate took longer to approve the measure, South Carolina’s John C. Calhoun would later say that had the documents relevant to the president’s message been given proper scrutiny, less than 10% of the Congress would have voted for war.

“Hostilities May Now be considered as Commenced”

President Polk’s desire to annex Mexico’s North American provinces began with a diplomatic mission to Mexico City led by John Slidell. The Mexican leadership, however, refused to meet with Slidell. At the same time, Polk ordered Brigadier General Zachary Taylor to move his army, then stationed in Texas, across the Nueces River in January 1846.

Taylor’s troops crossed into the disputed territory, arriving at the Rio Grande. Mexicans regarded the disputed territory as theirs. Even the 1845 Annexation Resolution bringing Texas into the Union accepted the Nueces River as the proper boundary. When debate began on the war resolution, this would be a key factor for many Congressmen, including Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton who expressed his concerns to Polk at the White House hours before the crucial vote.

American troops constructed a fort on the hills overlooking the Mexican port city of Matamoros and aimed cannons at the city. At the same time, American warships were ordered to the Mexican coast off Vera Cruz. On April 24th, Mexican troops crossed the Rio Grande and engaged American dragoons, killing three.

John Slidell returned to Washington one day before news of the military encounter reached Polk. Even before this news, Polk and the majority of his Cabinet were willing to send a war message to Congress. Zachary Taylor’s skirmish with the Mexican army made a war message all the easier.

“Forced into a Conflict with a Semi-Barbarous People”

Thus stated a passage in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Yet House Whigs, in the minority, and supported by a handful of dissident Democrats, rejected the president’s claims. 114 pages of documents sat on the Speaker’s desk yet only a select few were read in the chamber. Neither the House nor the Senate were allowed adequate time to fully review the documents. Once a gag on debate was imposed in the House, Whigs used Parliamentary Procedure to voice their arguments, most notably regarding the preamble of the war bill which made Mexico the aggressor.

Members were recognized with a “point of personal privilege” which takes parliamentary precedence in debate and is usually used to receive permission to leave the chamber. Once recognized, however, these members used their time to berate the war message and demand scrutiny of all the accompanying documents.

The Senate debate was just as short, spending only one day on the measure. As in the House, senators were not afforded the time to hold committee hearings or read all of the documents. Senator Calhoun abstained from voting while others voted taking exception to the preamble.

War Divides the Nation

The lack of public debate affected public perceptions. Writers like Emerson and Whitman supported the war while Thoreau refused to pay taxes in protest. Some Americans, agreeing with Polk, favored annexing Mexico while others were content to own “uninhabited” land ripe for expansion.

The lack of proper debate led the United States down a slippery path that still causes ill feelings between Mexico and America. Yet the past has been repeated too often in history, as Congress responded emotionally without consulting all relevant facts.

Sources:

• Polk: The Diary of a President, Allan Nevins, editor (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952)
• Seymour A. Connor and Odie B. Faulk, North America Divided: The Mexican War, 1846-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971)
• Frederick Merk, History of the Westward Movement (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978)
• John Edward Weems, To Conquer a Peace (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974)
• Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1958)

*The copyright of this article is owned by Michael Streich. Reprinting or republishing in any for must be granted in writing by Michael Streich

 Why Germans Supported Hitler in 1933

The Overlooked Factor of Hyper-Nationalism and Appeal to Glory

© Michael Streich

 Nov 8, 2009

The appeal of Hitler and the Nazi Party may have had more to do with addressing the national malaise and humiliation than unemployment and Depression.

The Treaty of Versailles ending World War I is often used to explain long term German animosity to the peace and a chief reason for the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party. Hitler skillfully reminded the German people that the uneven treaty had cost Germany much. The resultant social, political, and economic problems faced by post-war Germany contributed to the national humiliation, a prime factor in the rise of the Nazis, according to many historians. But are these conclusions truly reliable, or are there other factors that must be considered.

Dismal Conditions Exacerbate Deeper Humiliations

The Versailles Treaty demanded billions of dollars in war reparations. French troops occupied the Rhineland area of Germany to ensure compliance with the treaty. Imperial Germany was broken apart, its colonies distributed to the victors. Millions of ethnic Germans in areas like Silesia and the Sudentenland suddenly found themselves under the political jurisdictions of non-German regimes.

The German military was severely down-sized, an air force was forbidden, and the navy – the pride of Kaiser Wilhelm II, was used for target practice. Politically, Germany was torn by revolution as various factions sought control of state governments from Hamburg to Bavaria. Eventually, the Weimar constitution provided a feeble framework that would never lead to any semblance of democracy.

Lack of food and starvation, followed by Depression and high unemployment, ultimately dictated the need for decisive change. Yet the question remains as to whether the German people supported the Nazis and helped elevate Hitler to power solely on the basis of the Nazi promises and programs.

What the Nazis Provided Humiliated Germans With

Perhaps the most potent appeal of the NASDP was the focus on hyper-nationalism resurrecting the notion of Das Volk. Hitler’s speeches emphasized a greater Germany, the promise of a 1,000 year Reich. The very image of the term Reich recalled the heady days of the Second Reich when Bismarck unified Germany as well as the first Reich, identified with the formation of the Holy Roman Empire.

In one speech at Nuremberg, Hitler told the masses “German lies before us, Germany marches within us, and Germany comes after us (follows).” Hitler not only appealed to the working masses, the same group of people targeted by Social Democrats and the Communists (KPD), but received the support of the Catholic Church and, though reluctantly, the military. In many newsreels, Hitler is surrounded by generals and party cronies as well as the occasional Catholic bishop. In the jubilant crowds, nuns are seen waving.

Catholics, of course, supported Hitler because of the Nazi aversion to Communism. But beyond the many factors that propelled Hitler into power in 1933, it was the patriotic appeal to the restoration of Germany’s former glory that won the hearts and minds of Germans. This also helps to explain why non-party members enlisted in the military services once the war began in 1939.

Anti-Semitism is also used as a factor and it is true that many Germans, most notably in the south, were anti-Semitic. But Anti-Semitism was also strong in France and Poland, two countries that bore the brunt of Blitzkrieg and brutal occupation. To be sure, the Nazis used the Jews as a scapegoat, blaming them for the nation’s post-war ills and equating them with Communist tendencies (several prominent Communist leaders were Jews).

Isolating the Many Factors Attributed to Hitler’s Political Success

It may be too simplistic to attribute Hitler’s success to any one cause or even a series of causes. The Nazi Party, though making impressive gains, never captured a solid parliamentary majority. Why so many Germans ultimately cast their support for the Nazis up to and through 1933 may be far more difficult to assess.

Sources:

• Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany: A New History (New York: Continuum, 1995)
• Unpublished memoirs of Hans Guenther Streich who served in the Luftwaffe, came from a staunch Communist family, and was in the last group of POWs to be repatriated because of his extreme views.

The copyright of the article Why Germans Supported Hitler in 1933 in German History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Why Germans Supported Hitler in 1933 in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

Nazis Appealed to Glory and Power

 Lyndon Johnson's Acceptance Speech

Would the Great Society ever be Achieved?

Michael Streich, November 9, 2009

When Lyndon Johnson accepted his party’s nomination for the presidency on August 27^th, 1964, the United States was growing economically while confronting serious domestic problems that included the Civil Rights Movement and poverty. Johnson highlighted this when he said that the nation was “in the midst of the largest and the longest period of peace time prosperity in our history.”

 

But he also asserted that the needs of all could never be met by a “Southern Party or a Northern Party,” alluding to the Civil Rights Movement although never mentioning it by name. His speech was an affirmation of goals associated with the “Great Society” and directly addressed basic needs. Foreign policy was never mentioned in the speech as a specific. Ironically, the war in Vietnam was not even alluded to, although this would consume Johnson’s entire term as president.

 

Address the Basic Needs of All Americans

 

American novelist John Steinbeck helped Lyndon Johnson to draft the acceptance speech. Perhaps Steinbeck’s recollections of earlier poverty during the Great Depression, which inspired the 1939 Grapes of Wrath, helped to formulate the emphasis on Johnson’s “war on poverty” in the speech.

 

After citing the Old Testament passage “Thou shalt open thine hands unto thy brother, to thy poor, and to thy needy in thy land” (Deuteronomy 15:11), Johnson enumerated what he believed were the “needs and hopes” of many Americans. Significantly, he began with medical care for older citizens. No health care reform had been attempted since the administration of Harry Truman. Truman’s efforts were thwarted by a Republican Congress strongly tied to the health care industry.

 

Johnson’s other priorities included fair prices for farm products that would provide “decent incomes” for farmers. He addressed “decent” housing for all Americans and educational opportunities for all children. Johnson stated that every “man” who wants a job should have one. His other priorities were more general in nature.

 

General Goals of the Democratic Platform in Johnson’s Speech

 

Johnson declared that “Americans want victory in our war against poverty.” Although a lofty goal, such general statements are made without the expectation of fulfillment. Poverty might have been diminished, but the expectation referred more to a national mindset. It was an attempt to answer critics that deplored the growing gulf between the rich and the poor, the “haves” and the “have nots.”

 

Finally, Johnson referred to the “expanding and growing prosperity” of Americans. Consumerism had been growing along with average wages. More Americans were becoming first time homeowners in the burgeoning suburbs than ever before. A one-time “urban nation” was not a suburban nation. Yet this left many Americans, notably minorities and poor whites, unable to achieve the American Dream.

 

Civil Rights and Equal Justice

 

The Civil Rights Movement directly confronted the Democratic Convention in Atlantic City, NJ after the party’s credentials committee refused to seat a southern black delegation. Throughout the South, communities were torn by violence as segregationists resisted federal intervention in public school desegregation. Johnson promised to “carry out what the Constitution demands and justice requires – equal justice under law for all Americans.” He decried those who “create disorder” and vowed to bring to justice the offenders.

 

Foreign Affairs and the Arms Build-Up

 

Johnson’s only direct reference to foreign affairs referred to defense appropriations, begun early in the Kennedy Administration. Although later historians would criticize the massive increase in nuclear weapons, including Polaris submarines, it was important to counter the build-up of Soviet arms and to appear militarily strong in the face of Republican Party criticisms.

 

Was the Great Society a Utopia?

 

All of Johnson’s specific recommendations were achievable although costly. Had the Vietnam War been avoided, the Great Society might have had a greater, more universal impact on Americans. But by 1968, Lyndon Johnson chose not to seek reelection in the face of a nation increasingly polarized by the conflict in Southeast Asia.

 

Sources:

 

Acceptance speech of Lyndon Johnson, 1964

Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism (Penguin, 1997)

Jon Margolis, The Last Innocent Year: America in 1964 (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1999)

*The copyright of this article is owned by Michael Streich. Any republishing in any form must be granted permission in writing by Michael Streich.

 

Stalingrad 1942-1943

Turning Point of the German Soviet War and World War II

Nov 14, 2009 Michael Streich

German defeat at Stalingrad resulted from irrational strategy devised by Adolf Hitler as well as numerous other factors including supply problems and weather.

The Battle of Stalingrad is often referred to as the “Verdun of World War II.” Historian Martin Middlebrook calls it the “decisive battle of the Second World War.” Stalingrad turned the Russian army from defensive operations to an offensive stance and after the surrender of Field Marshal Paulus’ 6th Army, the Germans began a long and bloody withdrawal all along the lines of battle. Russian expert David MacKenzie writes that Stalingrad was “the psychological and…military turning point of the German-Soviet War.”

The Russian Winter of 1942-1943

Adolf Hitler, having failed to take Leningrad and Moscow, was determined to conquer the city on the Volga River that bore the name of his nemesis. Possession of Stalingrad was key to controlling the Caucasus oil fields. The deployment of 6th Army to Stalingrad coincided with two army groups ordered into the region of Baku. Control of Stalingrad meant control of the wheat crop, manganese ore, and oil. Additionally, Russia’s largest tank factory was located in Stalingrad.

The attack on Stalingrad, however, came with the onset of a bitter winter. The 6th Army and its support troops made up of Romanian and Hungarian units deployed north of the city, was not prepared for the harsh conditions nor the arrival of fresh Russian troops from Siberia. Commanded by Marshal Zhukov, Stalin’s most brilliant general, the Soviets were able to ultimately complete a double-encirclement of the 6th Army, which was reduced to house-to-house fighting in the pursuit of conquering “Fortress Stalingrad.”

Hitler’s Irrational Decisions Sacrificed the Sixth Army

Adamantly refusing to accept the recommendations of the most senior members of the German High Command, Hitler replaced the dissenters with generals willing to accept his blundering decisions. Among those dismissed was Colonel-General Franz Halder, a talented officer who foresaw the coming German disaster in Russia due to over-extended supply lines, faltering strategy, and the growing inability to adequate resupply troops.

Some historians question Hitler’s choice of Friedrich Paulus as commander of the 6th Army, an able “thinker” who had helped design and plan Operation Barbarossa, but had never held a major command post. Paulus would follow Hitler’s orders to the letter, even after it became evident that by not breaking out of the Stalingrad ring, the army would be doomed.

Although the Battle of Stalingrad took place in November 1942, the 6th Army continued to defend their positions until February 2nd, 1943 when Paulus, sickly and worn, finally agreed to the Soviet surrender ultimatum. Hitler had promoted him to Field Marshal during the final weeks of the battle, knowing that no German Field Marshal had ever surrendered. Paulus was expected to commit suicide, but instead lived for many years afterward as a Soviet prisoner.

Final Promises and Efforts Fail to Relieve the 6th Army

There is some evidence that Hitler was finally persuaded to allow Paulus to extricate himself from Stalingrad through a northern corridor still open before the final encirclement. Additionally, Field Marshal Eric von Manstein had been ordered to create Army Group Don which was to rapidly move south to Stalingrad and relieve Paulus. But Hitler’s decision changed after Herman Goring convinced him that the Luftwaffe could keep the 6th Army supplied. As in Dunkirk in 1940, Goring’s boasts proved ineffectual.

When Paulus surrendered his army, 90,000 surviving soldiers and officers were marched to Siberia; only 6,000 ever returned to Germany after the war. Paulus was kept under house arrest in Moscow before being allowed to move to Communist Eastern Germany where he eventually died in Dresden. Military historian Walter Goerlitz referred to Stalingrad as “the second Jena,” drawing a parallel to the Prussian defeat by Napoleon. This was the turning point in Europe that turned the tide of battle for the Russians.

Sources:

• Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff (London: Westview Press, 1985)
• Martin Middlebrook, “Paulus,” Hitler’s Generals, Correlli Barnett, Ed. (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989)
• Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages, 3rd Ed (New York: Harper and Row, 1960)
• Theodor Plievier, Stalingrad(Vienna: Verlag Kurt Desch, 1958)

© 2009 Michael Streich

December 2020

My maternal grandfather, Karl Piehl, was a soldier at Stalingrad. He had been drafted early in 1940 and was transferred to the Eastern Front once Germany invaded Russia. Although a very peaceful man who carried a copy of the Torah and the Bible in his Rucksak, what he saw and experienced at Stalingrad stayed with him until he died. His best friend died right next to him, making the mistake of peering over a snow bank and being shot by a Russian sniper right between the eyes. Until my grandfather passed on, he took on the role of uncle to the four children of his friend. He was shot in the leg and managed to be returned to Germany on one of the last Luftwaffe flights out of the Stalingrad area. He limped until he died.

Stalingrad was a terrible battle for all involved, especially the civilians. On my paternal side, my father's older brother, drafted and unable to complete his university studies, never returned home. War causes terrible pain to all involved and is usually the result of crazed leaders who demand ultimate loyalty. May God save us from such hell in the future.