Thursday, December 3, 2020

 

Austrian Anschluss and the Catholic Church

Nationalism and Fear of Marxism Motivated Catholic Support

Cardinal Innitzer Trusted the Nazis - Public Domain. No copyright
Cardinal Innitzer Trusted the Nazis - Public Domain. No copyright
In a nation where 91% of the population was officially Catholic, over 99% voted in favor of joining Austria with Nazi Germany due in part to official church support.

One month after the Austrian Anschluss of March 12, 1938, Austrians went to the polls in a national plebiscite to ratify the joining of Austria with the Nazi Reich. Over 99% of Austrians voted “yes,” having been swayed by unending propaganda in the presses, pressure from the Austrian Nazis, and in some cases, the blessings of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, notably Theodor Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna. The motivation of the Catholic hierarchy is still debated today, but several apparent reasons are well documented.

Cardinal Innitzer and the Plebiscite Vote to Join Austria with Nazi Germany

Cardinal Innitzer was both a German nationalist and an opponent of Marxism. In this, the leader of the Austrian Catholics embodied the two greatest arguments for union with the German Reich, shared by other German bishops and much of the population. The April 10th, 1938 ballot asked the Austrian people a simple question: “Do you pledge yourself to our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler and therewith to the reunification of Austria with the German Reich carried out on March 13th?” [1 Appeasement and Adolf Hitler in 1938

The statement appealed to the nationalist sentiment felt by many Austrians. One Catholic newspaper, the Passauer Bistumsblatt, stated that “it corresponds to the natural order set by God if…men speaking the same language and of common blood and ancestry are joined in a great Reich of the Germans.” [2] Although many Catholic newspapers by this time supported Hitler’s Reich, even over objections by some bishops, the Bishop of Passau enthusiastically supported “the Great German Fatherland.”

Catholic Fears of Communism

Cardinal Innitzer’s other worries concerned Marxism. The Catholic Church had long feared this movement and historians note that many church leaders, if given the choice, preferred National Socialism to Communism. According to Evan Bukey, the “Catholic hierarchy concluded that only the restoration of an authoritarian order could reverse the secular trends of the age…” [3] National Socialism’s fierce opposition to Communism made it easier to accept this new authoritarianism as long as the church was permitted to keep its prerogatives.

The Catholic Church Betrayed by Hitler and the Nazis

Following the plebiscite vote in April, the church continued to negotiate with the Nazis although the new regime had already closed parish schools, confiscated church lands, and silenced Catholic opposition. The attack on Cardinal Innitzer’s Episcopal residence following his leadership in what the Nazis perceived as an anti-government demonstration at St. Stephen’s Square, was one of the final acts demonstrating Hitler’s ultimate desires in emasculating the Austrian Catholic Church.

In retrospect, Innitzer’s naïve belief that he could maintain the Concordat of 1933 and seriously negotiate with the Nazis undermined the ability of the church to speak with one voice. Playing into the hands of duplicitous Nazi negotiators, the church urged a “yes” voted at the plebiscite, realizing afterward the folly of their actions. For its part, the Vatican severely critized Innitzer and other bishops for not taking a stronger stand against National Socialism and the protection church prerogatives such as marriage and education.

Sources:

[1] quoted in The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany by Guenter Lewy, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964) p. 217.

[2] IBID p. 216.

[3] Evan Burr Bukey, Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era 1838-1945 (University of North Carolina Press, 2000) p. 93.

See Also:

Gordon Zahn, German Catholics and Hitler’s Wars (Sheed and Ward, 1962).

Holland, Tport

Michael Streich -

Retired History Adjunct Instructor




 


Bataan Death March of April 1942

Americans didn’t learn of the Bataan Death March and the atrocities associated with the Japanese 1942 conquest of Luzon until January 28, 1944 when newspapers publicized the tragic events. This fact alone may help to explain the ferocity of revenge advocated by Americans and their overwhelming support of President Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb later that summer. The Bataan Death March of April 1942 was, according to Air Force Historian Stanley L. Falk, a “tragic nightmare without form, reason, or mercy.”

American Forces Surrender at Bataan to the Japanese in 1942

The Japanese invasion force under General Masaharu Homma began brilliantly, duplicating Imperial Japanese victories in China, Southeast Asia, and Singapore. After reaching Manila, however, Homma was confronted with the American and Filipino withdrawal to Bataan on the southern tip of the island. General Douglas MacArthur was determined to hold out until reinforcements could be sent.

Underestimating American strength, Homma dispatched untested troops, relieving a more veteran corps that was needed elsewhere. As the battle continued, it became obvious that the American and Filipino forces, numbering 80,000, would not easily be subdued. MacArthur was ordered to Australia on March 11th, leaving General Jonathan Wainwright in command.

By early April the American position had become untenable. Heavy air bombardment and Japanese encirclement tore long holes into the American and Filipino defensive perimeters. On April 9, 1942, forward commander General King, against orders, agreed to unconditional surrender. It was the anniversary of Robert E Lee’s surrender at Appomattox. Some 76,000 prisoners would begin the long march to Camp O’Donnell in the North.

The Bataan Death March to Camp O’Donnell Results in Many American Deaths

Historians have never been able to confirm whether Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo actually issued the order, but Japanese ground commanders at Bataan were given verbal orders over the telephone to kill all prisoners. Absent clearly written orders, the commanders refused. Instead, prisoners were marched in small groups to the distant POW camp. 7-10,000 would die on the march, beaten to death, bayoneted, beheaded, and starved.

Blair Robinett, a private in Company C, 803d Engineers, described a Japanese soldier grabbing a sick prisoner and hurling the unfortunate man in front of an on-coming Japanese tank. “When the last tank left there was no way you could tell there’d ever been a man there. But his uniform was embedded in the cobblestone.” Captain Marion Lawton, with the 1st Battalion, 31st Regiment, recounted the fate of a Colonel Erwin who was first bayoneted by a Japanese guard and then pushed to the side of the road into a ditch where the guard “put his rifle muzzle to his back and pulled the trigger.”

The majority of American and Filipino prisoners suffered unrelenting cruelties on the march while being denied adequate medical treatment, food, or water. After reaching Camp O’Donnell, thousands more would die of malaria and malnutrition. Thousands were put on ships and transferred to China to work as forced laborers in Japanese camps.

Explanations for the Bataan Death March

Western historians point to the militaristic traditions of Japan and the emphasis on personal strength. Surrender was a sign of weakness. A Japanese field manual advised soldiers to leave their last round of ammunition for themselves; surrender was not an option. The April 24, 1942 edition of the Japan Times & Advertiser commented that, “The Japanese forces are crusaders in a holy war.”

Hiding the Death March from the American Public

In addition to the Samurai tradition, Stanley Falk cites “failures in Japanese leadership,” demonstrating that a humane prisoner process had been put into place by General Homma but that these policies were largely ignored by on-site commanders. American military leadership, for its part, kept the truth of the atrocities away from the public out of fear that such disclosures might adversely affect American POWs.

Sources:

Donald Knox, Death March: The Survivors of Bataan, Introduction by Stanley L. Falk (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1981).

John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire Volume I (Random House, 1970).

 

Burning Louvain in 1914 an Example of German War Time Atrocities



The medieval Belgian town of Louvain was destroyed by occupying German troops that ignored Belgian neutrality and brutalized the inhabitants.

World War I was barely one month old when the German forces, fighting their way through neutral Belgium, committed one of the worst atrocities of the war. A crime against humanity, the burning of Louvain on August 25, 1914 was also a crime against history. Louvain was a medieval city on the road to Brussels with a famous university and a library that held priceless medieval works. According to historians John Horne and Alan Kramer, “Louvain was a genteel city, inhabited by wealthy retired people, academics, priests, monks, and nuns.” German troops, however, destroyed the city, skillfully placing the blame on the Belgians, accused of attacking and killing German soldiers and officers.

Belgium Invaded by German Troops in 1914

Neutral Belgium, established in 1830 by Europe’s great powers, was invaded in 1914 by one million German men comprising five separate armies with orders to rapidly reach the French frontier in fulfillment of the von Schlieffen Plan. Success of encirclement depended upon a rigid timetable which mandated a schedule dependent upon speed. From the very beginning, however, resisting Belgians hindered the time frame, forcing the Germans to take brutal action.

Commanding generals ordered the destruction of towns and villages and sanctioned the massacres of hundreds of innocent civilians including women and children. In the case of Liege, German forces used human shields to break the resistance. Germans blamed the often imaginary actions against its troops on franc-tireurs, a term first used in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War to denote civilians acting as combatants. Ignoring many instances of “friendly fire” and poor troop discipline, any mishaps were blamed on the bitter population.

What Really Happened at Louvain?

The destruction of Louvain was attested to by observers representing the neutral legations in Brussels, including the United States diplomatic mission. Subsequent German investigations ignored lapses in troop discipline and helped to fan the flames of propaganda. American and British newspapers reported that the old St. Peter’s church had been burned along with artworks of old masters.

A September 28, 1914 London Times article, however, relying upon comments given by an unnamed “Belgian nobleman,” stated that the artworks had been saved for transport to Germany. The destruction of the medieval library, on the other hand, elicited the greatest horror. Historian Barbara Tuchman quotes the young Belgian King Albert telling the French Minister, “…They burned the Library of Louvain simply because it was unique and universally admired.”

German Propaganda Blames Reprisals on the Belgian Resistance

Based on memoirs, eye-witness accounts, and official diplomatic reports, historians appear convinced that the destruction of Louvain began after shots were fired in the city, attributed to the German troops themselves. Given the level of fear and lack of discipline on the part of some army units, reprisals began immediately, culminating in the systematic burning of the city. A September 18, 1914 item in the German Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung claims that the medieval city hall was not damaged; coincidentally, this was also the site of German headquarters and housed many officers.

The German response by Adolf von Bruning, dated August 30, 1914 and reported in the New York Times one month later, blamed the local population as well as Belgian rulers. German reprisals, according to the report, came in response to a “spontaneous uprising” of local citizens in tandem with an expected Belgian military sortie from Antwerp. The burning commenced on August 28th. German dates and times conflict with reports of neutral observers and eye-witness accounts in order to give the impression of an orderly, balanced response.

The Brutalization of the Belgian Population

Belgians that were not shot or bayoneted were deported to Germany as laborers and later to occupied France. Tuchman blames much of the violence perpetrated by the Germans on fear. Other historians cite troop discipline and German disdain for non-Germans. German war goals in 1914 had not yet developed a firm future for Belgium based on German victory. One aspect that must also be considered is the rigid timetable reflected in the Schlieffen Plan.

German Planning Hindered by Belgian Resistance

The extent of Belgian resistance had not been factored into the plan. The German war machine was based on absolute precision. Every train car was accounted for and every military company had its place in the cog of that machine. Mobilization began a process that was intricate and fast. France had to be defeated before Russia was militarily capable of entering the conflict. Mobilization was only the first phase of an operation that assumed sleepy Belgium would cooperate with invasion and occupation.

The burning of Louvain seemed to contradict the characteristics of a civilized nation that gave the world Beethoven and Goethe. The city’s destruction was a reminder that war did not respect history. The lessons of Louvain would be revisited in the next generation with the bombing of German cities. In August 1914, however, the ashes of the Louvain medieval library served as a reminder of human ignorance and brutality.

Sources:

  • Philip J. Haythornthwaite, The World War One Source Book (Brockhampton Press, 1992)
  • John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial (Yale University Press, 2001)
  • Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (The Macmillan Company, 1962)
  • Various news articles noted above

Holland, Tport

Michael Streich -

Retired History Adjunct Instructor


Tuesday, December 1, 2020

 

Anarchism and the Beliefs of Mikhail Bakunin

The Apostle of Anarchy Promoted an Activist Approach to Revolution

Nov 18, 2009 Michael Streich

Of all movements emerging from 19th Century radicalism, Bakunin's anarchism was the most effective and continued to influence 20th Century revolutionary activities.

In 1965 Ernesto “Che” Guevara arrived in Bolivia to begin a Cuba-style revolution. Guevara, who was killed by the Bolivian army two years later, had been a disciple of the 19th Century Russian radical, Mikhail Bakunin. Part of Guevara’s inspiration came from The Catechism of the Revolutionary, a guide-book of sorts written by Bakunin and his younger protégé Sergei Nachaev. Bakunin was the founder of anarchism, a revolutionary movement that included Peter Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, and Alexander Berkman.

The Roots of Anarchism and Russian Radicalism

Guevara’s Bolivian Indians fit well with Bakunin’s model of revolution. These were the very poor, impoverished peasants, who had everything to gain by rising up in popular revolution. This had worked for Lenin in Russia and Mao in China. Anarchism targeted the lowest members of society. Referring to the Revolutions of 1848, historian Paul Avrich writes that Bakunin “threw himself into the uprisings of 1848 with irrepressible exuberance…moving with the tide of revolt from Paris to the barricades of Austria and Germany.”


Bakunin was an adolescent when the Decembrist Revolt took place in St. Petersburg, yet it had a profound affect on his thinking. Russia had a long history of peasant uprisings, the most recent one under Catherine the Great. The Pugachev Revolt involved tens of thousands of peasants – serfs that rose against imperial rule leaving a bloody trail as they marched on Moscow. Before Pugachev were the revolts of Razin and Bulavin.


Although Bakunin studied the philosophies of the German realists, thinkers like Hegel and Fichte, he was not a theorist like Karl Marx and other radicals of the 19th Century. Bakunin was an activist. Anarchism advocated the total destruction of the social and political order. Out of this conflagration would arise a new and more equitable state and society. Bakunin was a man of action who personally rolled up his sleeves to show the peasants how real revolutions are fought.

19th Century Anarchism in Action

According to the Catechism of the Revolutionary, an anarchist “knows only one science, the science of destruction.” This conflagration of the existing society began with a “spark,” or “the bunt.” 19th Century anarchism focused, in part, on political assassination. Both the popular Empress Elizabeth of Austria and the American President William McKinley were assassinated by anarchists. Alexander Berkman, a key figure in the violent strike against Carnegie Steel in Homestead, Pennsylvania, was an anarchist. During a rally of angry workers in New York City, Emma Goldman told the crowd to break the windows of shops and take what they needed. She was deported back to Europe.



Bakunin’s message to the activist was that everything which “promotes the success of the revolution is moral and everything which hinders it is immoral.” Thus, any actions taken in the name of revolution were condoned and even glorified. Bakunin, however, was not the stereotype of a cold-blooded killer with mass murder in his eyes. Historian E. H. Carr’s biography anecdotes Bakunin’s attendance at a performance of Beethoven’s 9th Symphony in Leipzig. At the conclusion of the Ode to Joy, Bakunin rushed to the front of the stage proclaiming, “Everything must be destroyed except this symphony!”

Legacy of Bakunin and Anarchism

Bakunin’s call to revolution as an immediate uprising by the poorest members of society was most keenly seen in the various 20th Century revolutions that utilized peasant masses, achieving radical change from “the bottom up.” His radicalism affected such modern groups as the American Black Panthers as well as movements in South America and Africa. Anarchism continues to be an active force even though other 19th Century revolutionary ideals, like Marxism, have been discredited.

Sources:

  • Paul Avrich, Anarchist Portraits (Princeton University Press, 1988)
  • E. H. Carr, Mikhail Bakunin (Vintage Books, 1961)
  • Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917, Basil Dmytryshyn, editor (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1967)
  • Aileen Kelly, Mikhail Bakunin: A Study in the Psychology and Politics of Utopianism (Yale University Press, 1987)

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 The Game of Life Prepared Families to Play the Achievement of the Great American Dream Through Capitalism

Michael Streich February 23, 2009

The Milton Bradley Company launched The Game of Life in 1960. More than any other board game, Life taught the benefits of capitalism and challenged players to pursue the “American Dream.” On the heels of the 1950s, which featured what Elaine May refers to as “domestic containment” in the conformist society, Life contrasted, indirectly, American society with Communism. Successful players were encouraged to take risks in order to increase prosperity and ultimately winning the game.

 

Starting the Game

 

Each player started the game with a car and $2,000. As the instructions declared, “You may become a Millionaire and retire in luxury, or wind up broke at the Poor Farm.” The Poor Farm is no longer part of contemporary versions of the game. The first spins on the numbered wheel forced players to make the first real “life” choices: whether to follow the shorter path, equated with “business,” or whether to “take the ‘College’ route” and become a doctor, teacher, or another profession. Taking the longer route paid bigger salaries collected throughout the game.

 

The implications were clear: a fast track through business might give a person a head start in life, but the longer path usually pays off better financially. Such choices were common in the original game, educating players to the long term benefits of stock investing, life insurance, auto and fire. At some point in the game, each of these items could help stave off financial disaster. At the end of the game, those with stock certificates or life insurance policies added to their “life” winnings.

 

Marriage and the Family

 

Everyone playing the game had to stop at the church and get married. This also required other players to give “presents” in the form of money. As the game continued, players also added children. Each car had enough room for four children. This was a time in American history when marriage and tight family relationships were encouraged. Life reinforced social norms and expectations. 1960 was also the year of the Kennedy-Nixon presidential election. John F. Kennedy won, bringing to the White House a beautiful young wife and small children.

 

Perhaps in true Adam Smith fashion, Life included “share the wealth” cards that either took money from an opponent or paid out money to an opponent. While there is no hint of charity on the board (excepting the one space telling the player to give $5,000 to a favorite charity), every player could end at Millionaire Acres. Finishing at the Poor Farm meant that the player made bad choices, took too many risks, and overextended their credit with the bank. The game highlighted individualism while adding the risks of speculation.

 

The Game of Life and the American Dream

 

“You too can be a Millionaire in this game of Life. That’s the object of the game.” So begins the list of instructions for what Milton Bradley called “A True to Life Game.” Success in life depended upon sound decisions – good choices, from the first day of adulthood to retirement. Both caution and risk promoted free market ideals.

 

Children playing the game learned why stocks splitting meant more money or why paying off a promissory note quickly decreased interest paid. Board games like Life brought suburban families together on Sunday afternoons, allowing parents to use such games to further educate children about pursuing the American Dream. Although other games like Monopoly also taught the values of property ownership, Life took all specific elements of capitalist success and incorporated them into a potential life time table.

 

Source:

 

Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1998).

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The Potsdam Conference and the Cold War

The Final Meeting of Allied Leaders in WW II Began a New Era of Wars

Dec 13, 2009 Michael Streich

Although elements of the Cold War may have originated at Yalta, the Potsdam Conference validated Soviet European occupation and produced new global conflicts.
Photograph credit:
Michael Streich
Potsdam

July 17, 1945 would be the last time the “Big Three” – Winston Churchill, Josef Stalin, and Harry Truman, would ever meet. Truman had replaced Franklin Roosevelt earlier that year when FDR died. Churchill himself would be replaced before the conference ended, having lost parliamentary elections in Britain. The new PM, Clement Attlee, would be inconsequential, symbolic perhaps of the British Empire itself. The Potsdam Conference would represent the first crucial step in the origins of the Cold War.


The Symbol of Soviet Military Might in Ruined Berlin


The Berlin or Potsdam Conference was held in the Cecilienhof Palace, built in 1917. The surrounding suburb had emerged unscathed from the bombing during the war and from the Soviet attack and occupation of the Reich’s capital city. It would be Berlin, surrounded by what would become East Germany that symbolized more than anything else the Soviet resolve in Eastern Europe during the Cold War


Although the city had been taken by the Russians, agreements called for three separate zones administered by the Soviets, the Americans, and the British. A fourth French zone was later added. In Berlin, Soviet troops where everywhere and large posters of Stalin and Marshal Zhukov hung from buildings. Stalin’s immense army was his trump card in the days of negotiations that resulted in the permanent occupation of Eastern Europe by Russia, referred to as an “Iron Curtain” by Churchill less than a year later.

First Signs of the Pending Cold War

History writer Douglas Botting writes that, “The conference was destined to be…not so much the finale to a past conflict as the overture to a new one – the worldwide tremor of the Cold War…” Although reparations issues were settled at the conference, more ominous results involved a Soviet-led Poland, recreated at the expense of Germany’s eastern frontier. After his election as chancellor in 1969 by the SPD, Willy Brandt formally acknowledged the contentious Oder-Neisse line.



The American atomic bomb test in New Mexico took place the day before the Potsdam Conference began. It would be the subtle bargaining chip Truman would hold over Stalin, not knowing that the Soviets were already working on their own bomb, a feat that ended with a successful test four years later. The bomb, though used to end the war with Japan, would ultimately be deemed a sterile weapon in the face of Soviet divisions parked across the European divide. Yet atomic bomb production would lead to the hydrogen bomb, ICBMs, and a deadly arms race characteristic of the Cold War and producing such policies as “mutually assured destruction.”


The departure of Churchill was more than symbolic. Britain, bankrupt and war weary, would witness the final end of empire, a process Attlee presided over. Although there were attempts to revive imperial notions, such as the French debacle in Vietnam and Algeria, there would be no return to colonialism. This was firmly reinforced during the 1956 Suez Crisis when the two superpowers threatened drastic action against Britain and France.


Potsdam and the Cold War


The final World War II conference between allied leaders transitioned the victors into a new more deadly era that was called the Cold War. Wartime alliances were replaced with suspicion and animosity as the nations of the world witnessed a competition for proxy states and satellites in the global conflict between democracy and Communism.

Sources:

  • Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Penguin, 1997)
  • Douglas Botting, From the Ruins of the Reich: Germany 1945-1949 (Crown Publishers, 1985)
  • Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill: The Years of Achievement (Hawthorne Books, 1963)
  • “Protocol of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, August 1, 1945,” Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Greenwood Press, 1968.
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 Nanking and the 2nd Sino-Japanese War 1937

Taking the Chinese Capital Led to Full-Scale Atrocities

Michael Streich

March 7, 2009

The second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937 after the Japanese, jointly occupying Tientsin, provoked the Chinese into confrontation. Japanese aircraft bombed Shanghai and began an invasion of the city. To their surprise, soldiers of the Nationalist government under General Chiang Kai-shek defended bravely and with a stubborn will. Despite their heroic attempts, however, Shanghai fell on November 37 and the Japanese army, under the command of General Matsui Iwane, began its march to Nanking, the Chinese capital. What happened at Nanking would be called “the forgotten holocaust,” a public massacre of hundreds of thousands.

 

Expansionism and Bushido

 

With an expanding population following the decades after World War I, Japan looked to China as a solution to feed her people. Additionally, the lure of dominance, an Asian sort of Manifest Destiny, according to Iris Chang, fit into the determination that Japan was destined to rule Asia. Ever since the Meiji Restoration, Japan “adopted the Samurai ethic of bushido as the moral code for all citizens.”

 

Japanese successes were already a source of historical pride. The First Sino-Japanese War yielded land gains from China including Formosa (today Taiwan). The 1905 Russo-Japanese War showed that an Asian nation could obliterate a Western power, Admiral Togo’s sinking of the second Russian fleet at Tsushima a clear example.

 

Every facet of Japanese culture and society focused on a military orientation that stressed the superiority of Japan, preached a hatred of the Chinese, and subsumed any individuality into the national cult, much like Hitler would do in Nazi Germany. Japanese boys were taught early in life the importance of total obedience. Personal weakness was never tolerated. All of this was reinforced by Shinto, the state religion.

 

The Nightmare of Nanking

 

H. J. Timperley, writing in the July 19, 1938 Times, points out two significant facts in his report on the Japanese massacres in Nanking. The first fact quotes informants stating that Japanese generals “were angry at having to complete their occupation under the eyes of neutral observers…” These observers included foreign diplomats, including those of Nazi Germany, who were repulsed and appalled by the extent of the slaughter. This large-scale massacre was completed openly, in front of the world.

 

Secondly, Timperley targets Japanese officers: “The most damning point in this ghastly story is…that such outrages were allowed to continue beneath the eyes of the responsible officers for a period of months.” These outrages included mass killings, 57,000 alone on the slopes of Mufu Mountain. POWs were used for bayonet practice, were decapitated, machine-gunned, and burned alive. Thousands of women were raped and then murdered.

 

After the Japanese took Shanghai, they marched toward Nanking, killing anyone along the path. The Chinese city of Suchow was reduced from a population of 350,000 to less than 500. A three-pronged maneuver encircled Nanking, protected on two sides by the Yangtze River. Although they outnumbered the Japanese, most of the Nationist troops surrendered.

 

At this moment, Lt. General Asaka Yasuhiko, a member of the Imperial family, arrived from Tokyo to take command from the ailing Iwane. One of his first orders was to kill all POWs. Although there may be some question as to whether he himself issued the order, he did not rescind it once troops began to systematically kill the Chinese soldiers.

 

At the time the massacres were being carried out, Prince Konoe, the Japanese Prime Minister, stated that his government hoped that China would “…extend a hand of cooperation with Japan. (The Times, December 15th, 1937) The Japanese government did its best to erase Nanking from the historical record. According to Iris Chang, writing in 1997, Japan has never apologized for the atrocities committed in Nanking in late 1937 and into 1938. Memories of the event continue to plague Sino-Japanese relations in the post modern era.

 

Sources:

 

Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (Basic Books, 1997).

“Nanking Only A Beginning,” The Times, London, December 15, 1937.

H. J. Timperley, “The Terror in China: Japanese Outrages,” The Times, London, July 19, 1938.


The copyright of this article is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to reprint in print or on line must be given by Michael Streich in writing.

 The Gallipoli Campaign 1915-1916

The Strategy to Remove Turkey From Participation in World War I

© Michael Streich

 Mar 18, 2009

The Allied endeavor to secure the Dardanelles and capture Constantinople resulted in huge casualty counts and the ultimate withdrawal from the Gallipoli peninsula.

Throughout 1915, British and French efforts to remove Turkey from World War I were centered on the Gallipoli campaign. Strong Turkish defenses guarded the Dardanelles approaches to Constantinople. Conceived in part by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, the endeavor would ultimately fail, representing, according to one historian, a “useless, futile waste.” Opinions differ on the soundness of the operation, yet the end result was an appalling loss of life.

Gallipoli as Grand Strategy or Grand Folly

The Gallipoli campaign was designed to remove Turkey from the war and open a southern line of supply to a beleaguered Russia. Unfettered access to the Dardanelles meant the possibility of a swift victory at Constantinople, the effect of which would have been the fall of the Turkish government. The Turks, however, under the command of Mustafa Kemel, forced a campaign of attrition, resulting in British evacuation by January 1916.


Philip Haythornthwaite, historian and author of forty books on military history, assesses Gallipoli as, “the one strategic idea of the war; yet it was also one of the most ill-managed in history.” (23) The naval campaign began in February 1915 under Admiral John de Robeck. Relentless bombarding of Turkish shore defenses failed to produce victory. Additionally, Turkish mines successfully disabled several British and French warships. De Robeck ended the naval campaign at the very moment the Turks were considering withdrawing, but the British did not know this at the time.


The interim period between the end of the naval campaign and the start of the land assault creating several bridgeheads enabled the Turks to strengthen their defenses. Allied troops consisted of British regular units, a small French contingent, and ANZAC units, the most famous of which was the Australian Light Horse. Under the overall command of Sir Ian Hamilton, the largely summer landing operation was poorly coordinated. Allied troops, for the most part, were held to their trenches and had difficulty breaking out of the initial beachhead. Even a second landing of British forces at Suvla Bay, north of the ANZAC bridgehead on August 6-7 failed to break the stalemate.

Exposing the Gallipoli Debacle and Evacuation

Sir Ian Hamilton continued to downplay the enormity of the disaster until several war correspondents managed to bypass military censors and present a true picture of the on-going carnage. Keith Murdoch (father of Rupert Murdoch) visited Gallipoli and, with the assistance of other correspondents who had been there longer, delivered to London and the British political and military leaders an account of the mismanaged campaign. Hamilton was recalled, replaced by Sir Charles Monro, whose task, ultimately, was to evacuate the troops from the peninsula. Ironically, this was the only part of the campaign to succeed brilliantly.



Harvard University historian Niall Ferguson assesses Gallipoli differently. In his estimation, a British victory at Gallipoli would have only benefited Russia and allowed that nation to “come a step closer to realizing her long-cherished aim of controlling Constantinople.” (291) Ferguson also argues that Britain should have used troops spent on the various ancillary campaigns on the Western Front and that these other deployments – Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, and Palestine, were more concerned with post-war Imperial strategy.

The Gallipoli failure cost Winston Churchill his position in the government. As to the Anzacs, the anniversary of the first landing at the Dardanelles became “ANZAC Day,” the national day celebrated by Australians in commemoration of the many young lives lost at Gallipoli.


Sources:

Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (Basic Books, 1999).

Philip J. Haythornthwaite, The World War One Source Book (London: Brockhampton Press, 1994).

Phillip Knightly, The First Casualty (Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1975).


The copyright of the article The Gallipoli Campaign 1915-1916 in WW I History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish The Gallipoli Campaign 1915-1916 in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.



Welcome to Gallipoli, Mike Streich
  Picture credit: Michael Streich when he visited the battle site.