Soviet Security Concerns After World War II

 Michael Streich

Stalin's Demands at Yalta and Potsdam - National Archives Image

Stalin's motives for occupying Eastern Europe in 1945 were driven by fears of another invasion from the West, reparations, & the desire to spread communism.

In the aftermath of World War II and the allied agreements made at Yalta and Potsdam, half of Europe was occupied by the Red Army. Those nations would shortly be identified by the Iron Curtain, a phrase Winston Churchill used to describe the borders between the Soviet-controlled “East” and the free democracies of the “West.” Josef Stalin’s motives are usually explained by defining traditional Russian security concerns that paralleled Tsarist diplomacy before the October 1917 Revolution. Stalin’s motives, however, may have been more complex.

Soviet Goals Before the Nazi Invasion of 1941

The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 contained secret protocols that allowed Stalin to occupy large areas of “Eastern Europe,” including parts of Poland, once the Germans began their advance into Polish territory. The lands subsequently occupied by Russia would never be freed, even after Hitler invaded Russia in 1941 and Stalin became, by default, an ally of Britain and the United States.

Soviet Claims to Eastern Europe During the War

According to historian and diplomat George F. Kennan [1], Churchill never challenged the Soviet position in the early years of the war while President Franklin D. Roosevelt by 1942 opted to relegate any such questions to post-war negotiations. The primary goal was to defeat Germany. But until the pivotal battle of Stalingrad, Stalin demanded that the allies open a second front in Western Europe.

The opening of a second front would draw German forces from Russia, where initially, spectacular military successes seriously threatened Stalin’s position. The Soviets long maintained that, “the defeat of fascism in the Second World War [occurred because of]…the decisive part…played by the Soviet Union.” [2] In many ways this was true. The war cost twenty million Russian lives.

Stalin’s Motives for Soviet Expansion and Occupation

Western Russian historians cite traditional Russian fears of encirclement and invasion from the West, notably Germany [3]. Imperial Germany invaded Russia during World War I, occupying large areas of “European Russia.” Russian history mythologizes Alexander Nevskii – a saint in the Orthodox Church, for defeating the Germanic Teutonic Knights in the 13th century. A 1938 Soviet film by Sergei Eisenstein about the event popularized anti-German sentiment in Russia.

The occupation and control of “buffer” states on Russia’s borders was partial assurance that the Soviet Union would not again be invaded from the West. Additionally, as Stalin himself stated at Yalta and Potsdam, Russia had suffered the greatest in the war and deserved these lands as reparations. Thus, Poland’s borders were moved west and Germany was kept weak, divided by the allied occupation.

Soviet apologists after the war, however, had other motives. A 1964 commentary on Soviet aims [4] states that, “The Soviets view their foreign policy as a means to spread proletarian revolution. The neo-Czarist interpretation sees it as a means to expand Russian power and influence and to enhance the national security.”

Exporting Revolution and Creating the Socialist Commonwealth

In 1964 Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin gave a speech in which he said, “I can assure you, comrades, that our party and the Soviet government consider it their primary task to do everything to strengthen the unity and solidarity of the socialist commonwealth…”[5] This goal, as Kennan also addresses, goes back to 1945.

The Allies may have never fully understood the tenacity of Soviet goals and aims. These were played out in the Cold War and the numerous proxy wars fought between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, led by the U.S. Capitalism was not only economic imperialism, but contributed to western decadence. Stalin knew this in 1945, maneuvering the best deal for Soviet Russia and, according to Kennan, playing a superb hand of cards.

Stalin’s Motives After the Defeat of Hitler

Encirclement may have been a dominant aspect of Stalin’s demands, yet he opposed a Chinese invasion of India, preferring a democratic state rather than one tied to Communist China. (See Kennan) Reparations were also on his agenda: the Soviets dismantled factories and carried them east to be reassembled in Russia; local populations in countries like Romania were forcibly deported to Siberia to work.

[1] George F. Kennan, Russia and the West (NY: New American Library, 1960)

[2] A. Sovetov, “Leninist Foreign Policy and International Relations,” International Affairs, No. 4, April 1960

[3] David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran, A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond, 4^th Ed. (Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1993)

[4] Current Digest of the Soviet Press, December 23, 1964, Columbia University

[5] Pravda, December 10, 1964

After the end of World War II in 1945, Republicans and Democrats attempted to paint each other as being stronger when dealing with Communists. "Who lost China?" was one political balloon designed to show the nation and the world that Republicans (or Democrats) were stronger against the adversaries of the free world. America's "Cold Warriors" tried to out-do each other proving they could stand up to the USSR or Red China. 

Today, a balloon floats over Montana and the same debate errupts in an almost totally inempt Congress. Even conspiracy theorist and QANON Queen Rep. Margorie Taylor Greene wants the balloon shot down while Secretary of State Blinken, who just returned from the Middle East after a blundering attempt at peace, has cancelled a trip to meet the Chinese President  Xi Jinping. The Chinese, however, state that the balloon is non-government and non-military.

Republicans are quick to say Biden is weak. As in the Cold War, that kind of partisan nonsense got America hopelessly entangled in Vietnam, earlier, in Korea, and consistently fed the Eisenhower years with one potential conflict after another.

I can't get the Nena ditty, "99 Redballoons," out of my head. But this one balloon is white.

 Stalingrad Remembered - m.streich

The Battle of Stalingrad is often referred to as the “Verdun of World War II.” Historian Martin Middlebrook calls it the “decisive battle of the Second World War.” Stalingrad turned the Russian army from defensive operations to an offensive stance and after the surrender of Field Marshal Paulus’ 6^th Army, the Germans began a long and bloody withdrawal all along the lines of battle. Russian expert David MacKenzie writes that Stalingrad was “the psychological and…military turning point of the German-Soviet War.”

 

The Russian Winter of 1942-1943

 

Adolf Hitler, having failed to take Leningrad and Moscow, was determined to conquer the city on the Volga River that bore the name of his nemesis. Possession of Stalingrad was key to controlling the Caucasus oil fields. The deployment of 6^th Army to Stalingrad coincided with two army groups ordered into the region of Baku. Control of Stalingrad meant control of the wheat crop, manganese ore, and oil. Additionally, Russia’s largest tank factory was located in Stalingrad.

 

The attack on Stalingrad, however, came with the onset of a bitter winter. The 6^th Army and its support troops made up of Romanian and Hungarian units deployed north of the city, was not prepared for the harsh conditions nor the arrival of fresh Russian troops from Siberia. Commanded by Marshal Zhukov, Stalin’s most brilliant general, the Soviets were able to ultimately complete a double-encirclement of the 6^th Army, which was reduced to house-to-house fighting in the pursuit of conquering “Fortress Stalingrad.”

 

Hitler’s Irrational Decisions Sacrificed the Sixth Army

 

Adamantly refusing to accept the recommendations of the most senior members of the German High Command, Hitler replaced the dissenters with generals willing to accept his blundering decisions. Among those dismissed was Colonel-General Franz Halder, a talented officer who foresaw the coming German disaster in Russia due to over-extended supply lines, faltering strategy, and the growing inability to adequate resupply troops.

 

Some historians question Hitler’s choice of Friedrich Paulus as commander of the 6^th Army, an able “thinker” who had helped design and plan Operation Barbarossa, but had never held a major command post. Paulus would follow Hitler’s orders to the letter, even after it became evident that by not breaking out of the Stalingrad ring, the army would be doomed.

 

Although the Battle of Stalingrad took place in November 1942, the 6^th Army continued to defend their positions until February 2^nd 1943 when Paulus, sickly and worn, finally agreed to the Soviet surrender ultimatum. Hitler had promoted him to Field Marshal during the final weeks of the battle, knowing that no German Field Marshal had ever surrendered. Paulus was expected to commit suicide, but instead lived for many years afterward as a Soviet prisoner.

 

Final Promises and Efforts Fail to Relieve the 6^th Army

 

There is some evidence that Hitler was finally persuaded to allow Paulus to extricate himself from Stalingrad through a northern corridor still open before the final encirclement. Additionally, Field Marshal Eric von Manstein had been ordered to create Army Group Don which was to rapidly move south to Stalingrad and relieve Paulus. But Hitler’s decision changed after Herman Goring convinced him that the Luftwaffe could keep the 6^th Army supplied. As in Dunkirk in 1940, Goring’s boasts proved ineffectual.

 

When Paulus surrendered his army, 90,000 surviving soldiers and officers were marched to Siberia; only 6,000 ever returned to Germany after the war. Paulus was kept under house arrest in Moscow before being allowed to move to Communist Eastern Germany where he eventually died in Dresden. Military historian Walter Goerlitz referred to Stalingrad as “the second Jena,” drawing a parallel to the Prussian defeat by Napoleon. This was the turning point in Europe that turned the tide of battle for the Russians.

 

Sources:

 

Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff (London: Westview Press, 1985)

Martin Middlebrook, “Paulus,” Hitler’s Generals, Correlli Barnett, Ed. (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989)

Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages, 3^rd Ed (New York: Harper and Row, 1960)

Theodor Plievier, Stalingrad (Vienna: Verlag Kurt Desch, 1958)

Note: My grandfather, Karl Piehl, fought and was wounded at Stalingrad. He survived to return home to his family.

 Black History Month Classroom Ideas

Celebrating Black History Month should be a priority in every American school during February. Black History Month 2009 will be even more significant due to the election of Barack Obama to the Presidency. The 2009 theme for February should be “From Slavery and Struggle to Freedom and Leadership.” There are many ways individual classes and schools as a

community can vitalize this theme.

 

From Classroom to Community

 

In History classrooms, teachers can assign a “poster project” in conjunction with Black History Month. To avoid duplication, each participating class can be given separate areas of American history to draw from”

 

Colonial Period

Pre-Civil War South

Reconstruction

“Separate But Equal”

Brown v. Board of Education

Civil Rights Movement

Post Civil Rights Movement

 

Students should create posters specific to the assigned period of history. For continuity, require a specific size poster. As a caveat, limit the number of computer generated pictures students may use. Establish as criteria a very specific focus or message to be contained in each poster and encourage creativity.

 

Allow students to present their posters in an oral presentation in which they share with the class why they chose the topic and how it relates to Black History Month. After all students have presented, allow them to display the posters as a narrative, chronological collage in the common areas of the school (assuming the teacher has administrative authority to do this). This activity should take place the last week of January or the first week of February to ensure maximum impact.

 

Contact community leaders and arrange for them to judge the collages. Reward the winning class with a special privilege or a pizza party. These kinds of rewards, if part of the initial instruction, go far in providing the kind of incentive students often need to surpass expectations. Through parent-school communications (newsletters, web pages) invite parents to visit the school and “tour the gallery.”

 

Using the Public Address System

 

Each morning in February, have a student read one significant achievement of African Americans in American History over the school’s PA system. Preparing these factoids can be turned into a January assignment or function as extra credit. Allow students to submit facts from their own research and then select those that conform to a pre-assignment criterion.

 

Other Black History Month Suggestions

 

There are many creative ways to emphasize the contributions of African Americans in our history. These include:

 

Facilitating a school-wide assembly program

Inviting guest speakers from the local community

Hanging banners throughout the school

Preparing classroom bulletin boards with a Black History theme

 

Overall Student Emphasis

 

Celebrating African American achievements should never end once February turns to March. Black History Month, like Native American History Month (November) and Woman’s History Month (March), is a unique opportunity to highlight the role played by African Americans in our national history. As a people “out of many,” African American achievements were too often glossed over or forgotten in history books and classroom lesson plans. From Crispus Attucks to Rosa Parks, from Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to Barack Obama, African Americans have contributed their talents and even given their lives in the march of freedom for all people. This truth must be a part of the history we teach well beyond Black History Month.

 Teddy Roosevelt in 1912: You Can't Put Down a Bull Moose! - Mike Streich MA

The presidential campaign of 1912 was drawing to a close as Theodore Roosevelt, the only living ex-president and candidate of the Progressive Party, arrived in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on October 14. Before traveling to the auditorium where he was to give a speech, Roosevelt dined at the Hotel Gilpatrick. Leaving the hotel and standing up in his car to greet adoring well-wishers, Roosevelt heard the sound of a handgun. John Flammang Schrank had walked up and shot the Rough Rider. During the next tense hours, it seemed that the McKinley assassination of eleven years earlier was about to be repeated.

 

Roosevelt’s Would-Be Assassin

 

John Schrank had stalked Roosevelt as the former president traveled across the Northeast delivering speeches. Newspapers later reported that Schrank was a Socialist, but his attack on Roosevelt was motivated more by his insanity. Henry F. Cochems, in his first-hand account of the assassination attempt [1], referred to Schrank as a “paranoiac.” An October 16, 1912 New York Times commentary also placed the blame on Schrank’s insanity, discounting ties to Socialism. [2]

 

During the ensuing investigation and trial, Schrank claimed to have been influenced by a dream in which the ghost of William McKinley prompted his actions. According to historian James Chace [3], Schrank was also obsessed with Roosevelt’s intention to seek a third term as President. Although charged with assault and intent to kill, Schrank was consigned to an asylum for the rest of his life.

 

The Defiant Bull Moose

 

Schrank was tackled by security men and brought before Roosevelt who asked him why he did it. Schrank, however, was mute and taken away. Roosevelt, though wounded, insisted on going to the auditorium to deliver his speech. The 38 caliber bullet had entered his chest and his white shirt was bloody. His speech, tightly folded in his left jacket pocket, had lessened the effect of the bullet.

 

Teddy Roosevelt began his address, telling the audience, “I don’t know whether you fully understand that I have just been shot; but it takes more than that to kill a Bull Moose.” Roosevelt spoke for an hour to the 9,000 people in the auditorium. After concluding, he was rushed to the hospital. But the bullet, which missed his heart by an inch, was not removed. Cochems wrote that Roosevelt recalled both Garfield and McKinley had died after surgery to find and remove a bullet. He spent the next few days in Chicago, recovering at Mercy Hospital where he was joined by his wife Edith as well as other family members. The New York Times called the assassination attempt “…the narrowest of escapes.” [4]

 

Progressives Blame the Press

 

In an October 15, 1912 New York Times article, Montana Senator Joseph Dixon blamed the press. “For months the enemies of Colonel Roosevelt…in public speech have combined to assassinate the public and private character of the greatest living American.” [5] The implication in Dixon’s complete quote was that Schrank’s actions were either directly or indirectly related to his actions on October 14^th.

 

Impact on the Election of 1912

 

Although one physician at Mercy Hospital declared that surviving the shot would seal victory in the November election (see Cochems’ account), Roosevelt lost to Woodrow Wilson. 1912 featured a three-way race. The Republicans were split between William H. Taft, the sitting President, and Teddy Roosevelt. Their combined popular vote was 7,604,518 to Wilson’s 6,293,454.

 

Notes:

 

[1] Henry F. Cochems, Oliver Ramey, and Wheeler P. Bloodgood, The Attempted Assassination of the Ex-President Theodore Roosevelt (Progressive Publishing Company, 1912)

[2] “The Attack Upon the President,” New York Times, October 16, 1912

[3] James Chace, 1912: Wilson, Roosevelt, Taft & Debs – The Election That Changed the Country (Simon & Schuster, 2004)

[4] New York Times, October 16, 1912

[5] “Progressives Here Had Great Fright,” New York Times, October 15, 1912

 

Other:

 

Theodore Roosevelt’s Milwaukee speech, October 14, 1912