Bombs We Now Call "Weapons of Mass Destruction" are bigger than ever and well past the midnight hour of usage. michael streich

The following was penned in 2009 for Suite101 and talks about a time all of these global fears first emerged. We spoke of containment, an "Iron Curtain", First Strike weapons, and taught the children how to duck and cover. I was one of those children. Born in 1953, in Germany, my mom and grandma (Oma) survived Operation Gomorrah, 1943, the near absolute destruction of Hamburg. Yet here in the United States, safety was an illusion.

People brave many obstacles to come here, to be those huddled masses yearning to be free. But there is also a price. Perennial war or wars, each time getting worse. Now we have to fear Russia's threats over Ukraine as they slip nuclear missiles into silos near southern Moscow, ostensibly one for London and one for Washington DC according to today's British newspapers.(16.12.2022)

And in Asia we are faced with an intransigent Taiwan, an ever belligerent Peking, and, of course. Donald Trump's lunatic "Rocket man" in Pyongyang.There are few remaining survivors of Pearl Harbor but their lives are a testament to the blood that must be shed to save Democracy and freedom in the world. 

All of these dilemmas face us as we begin 2023, a year of decision and a year of sobriety. Read the essay below, and make up your mind to stop the mad scramble to are the world with true weapons of mass destruction.

 

In the early years of the Eisenhower presidency, the atomic bomb dominated foreign affairs considerations. Ever since the Manhattan Project produced the bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the bomb was viewed as the ultimate weapon to be used in achieving U.S. goals containing Communism. Realists like J. Robert Oppenheimer realized the terrible potential and counseled against the development of more power nuclear weapons. Even Winston Churchill, in his prescient “Iron Curtain” speech, called for international control of the bomb.

 

From Containment to Liberation and the Use of the Bomb

 

In 1949 the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb, well ahead of U.S. intelligence analysis suggesting it would take the Communists years to develop. This, however, did not change assumptions regarding the use of the bomb. Rather, a policy of “massive retaliation” was developed by the Eisenhower administration. Even if the Soviets had the bomb, the U.S. would massively retaliate “by means and at places of our own choosing.”

 

There were many “places” that qualified between 1952 and 1955. The United States threatened to use the bomb during the Korean conflict, notably when disagreements erupted over prisoner exchanges. In 1954, the use of smaller, “tactical” bombs was discussed as a means to relieve the besieged French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. The fortress fell before final decisions could be made.

 

When the Chinese threatened to invade Quemoy and Matsu in an attempt to ultimately defeat Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, President Eisenhower again threatened to use the bomb against China. The bomb was perceived, in all of these cases, as a convenient solution, particularly since the U.S. defense budget had been significantly cut in efforts to balance the federal budget.

 

Yet each of these cases represented the potential of using such weapons of mass destruction against Asian people. The situation in Europe was quite different. The Iron Curtain separated NATO troops from the Warsaw Pact. The stalemate was beyond Containment and liberation was out of the question. This became painfully obvious in 1956 during the Hungarian uprising. Eisenhower was not prepared to risk a world war with both opposing sides using nuclear weapons.

 

Asia, however, was another matter, particularly since the chief protagonist of Communist insurgency was China, which possessed no similar weapons (although the Soviet Union was also very busy assisting the many wars of liberation and training its leaders in Russia). It was the fact of using the bomb against another Asian country that aroused serious concerns among the British.

 

Brinkmanship and the Erosion of Global Security

 

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles enunciated the policy of brinkmanship, the notion of going to the very brink of war in order to achieve specific outcomes. Threatening to use the bomb was one example of brinkmanship. As in the case of China and Taiwan, Russia urged Chinese restraint. Dulles knew that the Russians were as hesitant to use the bomb as the U.S. was, but wanted to confront the crisis with a show of strength.

 

As more bombs were constructed with the capacity to completely obliterate an enemy population, global security became a dream of the past. More nations eventually joined the “nuclear club” and ways were found to deliver warheads faster and more efficiently, such as from submarine platforms. In short, any direct confrontation could lead to annihilation. This was best seen with the practice of brinkmanship during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In that crisis, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated, “we were eyeball to eyeball and the other guy just blinked.”

 

Although the bomb may have ended the Pacific War and Harry Truman’s decision to use the weapon was sound, it turned into a sterile weapon that left a global legacy of fear and insecurity.

 

Sources:

 

Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima & Potsdam, The Use of the Atomic Bomb & the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (Penguin Books, 1985)

Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Penguin Books, 1997)

George F. Kennan, The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983)