Taking Berlin in 1945: the Russians Always Respected Power Over Bravado

In 1949, General Dwight Eisenhower was asked about one of the most controversial decisions made in 1945, the taking of Berlin. Eisenhower’s answer was based on military considerations, yet he conceded that political issues – already agreed to at the earlier Yalta Conference, influenced the decision. Eisenhower’s decision to halt the Allied advance at the Elbe River ultimately supported Soviet domination of what would come to be called “Eastern Europe,” a region separated by what Winston Churchill labeled an “Iron Curtain.” Would the taking of Berlin have changed that?

 

The Allied Invasion of Nazi Germany 1944-1945

 

By the fall of 1944, it had become obvious that German resistance was weakening. Aachen became the first German city occupied by allied troops on October 21. Subsequent strategy called for smashing through the Siegfried Line and crossing the Rhine River for the final push to Berlin. Even as allied troops were accomplishing these goals in early 1945, the Soviet army under Marshall Zhukov was closing in on Berlin.

 

Beginning with Omar Bradley’s 12^th Army Group Rhine River crossing on March 7^th, the allies spectacularly advanced into the heart of Germany through March and into April 1945. Field Marshall Montgomery’s “Market Garden” operation, though not entirely successful, ultimately resulted in the encirclement of Field Marshall Model’s army group, the last field army to stand between Eisenhower and Berlin.

 

But on March 28^th, Eisenhower changed the plan. Although nothing stood between the allies and Berlin, army groups were ordered to secured the Baltic port cities like Lubeck, as well as moving into the Leipzig-Dresden area where German war industrialization was still in progress. The British were outraged; Field Marshall Montgomery stated afterwards that he could have taken Berlin before the Russians.

 

Effects of Eisenhower’s Decision

 

Eisenhower reasoned that the Russians were only 35 miles from Berlin while the bulk of his forces were 285 miles from the German capital. Additionally, taking Berlin might have cost 100,000 lives. Finally, Eisenhower was under pressure to end the European war quickly so that resources could be diverted to the Pacific theater.

 

It is also a fact, however, that American advance units were already in Potsdam and General William Simpson’s 9^th US Army had crossed the Elbe River. Simpson later wrote that, using the German autobahn, his army could have been in Berlin in 24 hours. The Russians, in contrast, had not yet crossed the Oder River. In essence, American units were only 53 miles from Berlin on April 11^th.

 

On April 12, however, Franklin Roosevelt collapsed and died. This act of destiny neutralized the vigorous efforts of Prime Minister Churchill and British military planners. On April 14, General Eisenhower ordered a halt at the Elbe River and called back American units that had already crossed. In 1949, Eisenhower stated, “The political heads of our government had already agreed that our line of occupation would be way back, starting at the north at Denmark, with Linz on the south, so what good would it have done us to capture Berlin?”

 

Both the political and military consequences would be played out after Germany surrendered. Soviet troops occupied large areas of middle Europe, establishing pro-Russian governments. Stalin looted these countries, dismantling factories and deporting populations to Siberia. He excused these actions as reparations of war.

 

Could Taking Berlin have Limited Stalin’s Gains?

 

If the allied leaders at Potsdam followed the agreements and protocols of the Yalta Agreements (February 4-11, 1945), it would not have made a difference which country actually “took” Berlin. But as Churchill had shown early in 1945 with the bombing of Dresden, the Soviets responded to a show of force and respected power. The new American President, Harry Truman, might have been able to call Stalin’s bluff, particularly with the success of the atomic bomb test in New Mexico.

 

Sources:

 

Douglas Botting, From the Ruins of the Reich: Germany 1945-1949 (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1985)

Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany: A New History (New York: Continuum, 1995)

 

 The Battle of Poltava Alters the European Balance of Power: Russia Defeats Charles XII of Sweden

On June 8, 1709, a vastly outnumbered Swedish army was decisively defeated by the highly drilled troops of Peter the Great at Poltava on the banks of the Vorskla River in the Ukraine. Hailed by scholars as one of the top twenty battles of importance, Russian victory prompted Tsar Peter to exclaim, “Now with God’s help the final stone has been laid in the foundation of St. Petersburg.” Poltava thrust Russia into European affairs as a dominant force, altering the balance of power as the supremacy of Sweden in Northern Europe declined.

 

Charles XII Invades Russia

 

Swedish king Charles XII, seeking to capture Moscow, divide Russia, and end the Great Northern War, advanced into the Ukraine in 1708. Over-confident and arrogant, Charles XII was not prepared for the unusually severe winter nor the lack of support from the Ukrainians. His supply train from Riga was destroyed while many soldiers succumbed to the effects of frigid weather conditions.

 

Reinforcements and supplies were destroyed in September 1708 at Lesnaia by Peter’s friend and general, Alexander Menshikov. With few serviceable artillery pieces and dwindling gunpowder, the Swedish army encamped in the small commercial city of Poltava. Charles XII’s only allies were 2,000 Ukrainian Cossacks under Hetman Mazepa, a far smaller number than he had anticipated.

 

Battle of Poltava

 

After Peter’s earlier defeat at Narva, the new Russian army had been reformed and was well trained. With more artillery than the Swedes, the Russians laid siege to Poltava, erecting strategic redoubts along the northern side of the city. Charles XII’s 22,000 veterans faced an army of 50-60,000 Russians. Most of the Swedes were exhausted after spending nearly two years in enemy territory. Charles had been wounded earlier and was unable to lead his troops. Additionally, the Swedes failed to deploy their artillery.

 

Ordering a direct attack against the Russians, Charles, carried into battle on a litter, watched his best men die, first from the unrelenting gun fire from the Russian redoubts and then from continuous cannon shots. After two hours of heavy fighting, Tsar Peter ordered a counter-attack, his army enveloping the Swedes in a semi-circle.

 

The Swedes turned in retreat, a disordered march down the banks of the Vorskla until they reached the Dneiper River. Only 1,500 men escaped across the river, seeking refuge in Turkish held lands. Among them were Charles XII and his ally Hetman Mazepa. Poltava decisively turned the tide of the Great Northern War. According to military historian Lynn Montross, “On that June day in 1709 a new European war power came into being as an old one declined.”

 

Altering the Balance of Power

 

Although Charles XII eventually returned to Sweden after cajoling the Turks into war with Russia, Swedish domination of Northern Europe ended. A new Russian fleet, built by Tsar Peter, supplanted Swedish naval hegemony in the Baltic. After Poltava, Peter commanded the largest military in Europe. The effects would be profound and long lasting. 19^th Century Russian writer and radical Vissarion Belinsky saw Poltava as a battle “for the existence of a whole nation, for the future of the whole state.”

 

Soviet historian E. V. Anisimov, writing in 1989, stated that, “The Poltava victory allowed Peter to seize the initiative… [resulting in] the birth of a new empire…” Russia’s rise as a great power with expanding influence would not have happened without Poltava. As historian N. V. Riasanovsky pointed out, this dramatic change in the balance of power “came as something of a shock” to other European countries, straining relations, notably with Britain.

 

Sources:

 

David Eggenberger, An Encyclopedia of Battles (NY: Dover Publications, 1985)

Lindsey Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (Yale University Press, 1998)

David MacKenzie and Michael Curran, A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond 4^th Ed (Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993)

Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages 3^rd Ed (NY: Harper & Row, 1960)

Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (Oxford University Press, 1969)

 

 Political Assassinations are Never an End to the Problems Existing

(Dedicated to US Senator Graham)

Political assassination has always been a means to replace leaders seen as weak, to eliminate political competition, create social insecurity, and instill terror. Frequently, assassinations are tied to radical groups furthering political agendas. This was true of late 19^th Century Russian revolutionaries, the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914, and – in modern history, the attempted assassination of Harry S. Truman November 1, 1950. Some notable assassinations may have been carried out as acts of revenge, as the stabbing of Marat by Charlotte Corday July 13, 1793 or the murder of French King Henry IV in May 1610 by a crazed Catholic cleric.

 

Assassination Used to Incite Social Terror and National Insecurity

 

In 1878 in St. Petersburg, Russia, Vera Zasulich walked into the office of General D. F. Trepov and shot him. Zasulich was part of the Nihilists whose program of political reform condoned violence. Like the Anarchists and numerous other groups at the time, political assassination was part of that program. In The Catechism of the Revolutionary, authors Sergei Nechaev and Mikhail Bakunin provide a list of “categories” – those that must be eliminated. “…the first to be destroyed are people who are especially harmful to the revolutionary organization and those whose sudden and violent death will create the greatest fear in the government…” (Paragraph 16)

 

Although the June 1914 assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife Sophie were directly related to the political goals of the Black Hand, a secret Serbian nationalist cell, it also was successful in exploiting terror and insecurity. Already viewed as a “powder keg” waiting to be ignited, the Balkans pitted the territorial goals of Austria-Hungary against Russia. In this case, what might be called the “assassination of the century,” launched World War One.

 

Assassination to Replace Potential Political Threats

 

The history of Rome is full of assassinations, often engineered to end the careers of leaders that had become liabilities, as in the case of Nero. In 44 BCE, however, members of the Roman Senate perpetrated the assassination of Julius Caesar, an event destined to become the subject of innumerable books, plays, and mock trials. It also ended the Roman Republic. William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar focuses on both the fears that Caesar was about to make himself a king (thus inspiring Brutus’ motive) as well as the jealousies and ambitions of key senators like Cassius (with the “lean and hungry look…”)

 

In December 1934, the popular Bolshevik Party boss of St. Petersburg, Serge Kirov was assassinated, ostensibly by members of a group opposed to Stalin but supportive of Leon Trotskii. Through the newly formed NKVD, formerly the secret police or GPU, Stalin was able to implicate fellow Bolsheviks like Zinoviev and Kamenev. Show trials and subsequent purges rid Stalin of any potential political threats. The murder of Kirov accomplished several goals, all of which enhanced the power and control of Stalin.

 

Military Assassinations

 

The Roman Praetorian Guard was not the last military group to make and unmake leaders. On July 20, 1944, Colonel Klaus von Stauffenberg entered a conference room at OKW HQ in Rastenburg carrying a bomb. Operation “Valkyrie” was planned to kill Adolph Hitler and involved many top generals that felt Hitler had to be replaced in order to swiftly end the war. The plot, however, failed. It was also unsuccessful in creating an anti-Hitler vanguard within the army ranks. As one former officer wrote, “We all took an oath. These generals supported Hitler when Germany was winning and they were receiving medals. Now they wanted to save themselves.” [1]

 

Political Assassinations are never a Solution

 

The use of violence and murder in history in terms of political assassinations has never demonstrated a positive result. When the Roman Senate assassinated Tiberius Gracchus his place was taken by his brother Gaius, who was also murdered. Their assassinations only further exacerbated the conflict between Roman farmers and the Senate. Political assassination is a crime against all notions of law and order in society as demonstrated by the historical record.

 

See also The Assassination of Tsar Alexander II

 

[1] Unpublished memoirs of Gunter Streich

 

References:

 

Virginia Cowles, The Russian Dagger: Cold War in the Days of the Czars (NY: Harper & Row, 1969)

Basil Dmytryshyn, editor, Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917  (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967)

Constantine FitzGibbon, 20 July (Berkley Publishing Co., 1956)

David MacKenzie, Violent Solutions: Revolutions, Nationalism, and Secret Societies in Europe to 1918 (NY: University Press of America, Inc., 1996)

Jack Pearl, The Dangerous Assassins (Monarch Books, Inc., 1964)

 

 Tsar Peter III: Summary

 

 

By late 1761, Russian forces had seriously weakened Prussia in the Seven Years’ War. Frederick the Great’s setback at Zorndorf and Kunersdorf augured for a ruinous end to the war for Prussia. All of this changed when Empress Elizabeth died on Christmas Day 1761, her nephew ascending the throne as Tsar Peter III. On open admirer of Prussia and Frederick, Peter immediately ended the war, giving up Russian gains, and treating the Prussian king as the victor. This began a process of alienation that resulted in his death six months later.

 

Peter of Holstein

 

Having grown up in Holstein, south of Denmark, Peter III retained his German influences once arriving in Russia as heir to Elizabeth. Unlike his wife Catherine, a German princess from Anhalt-Zerbst, Peter refused to convert to Orthodoxy, favoring Lutheranism. Given to parties and wild carousing, the future Tsar refused to learn Russian or understand the culture and people.

 

Upon ascending the throne in December 1761, he exacerbated the growing distrust against him. Concluding a peace with Prussia on less than favorable terms alienated members of the military. Catherine, recalling the events in a letter sent to a friend, stated that “Peter III lost what little intelligence he ever had.”

 

He promoted Protestantism, ordered the confiscation of church property, eliminated some icons, and forced the elite Guards regiments into Prussian uniforms. Perhaps his only positive act was the Charter to the Nobility of February 18, 1762 which freed the nobility from compulsory state service, in place since the reign of Peter I.

 

Bloodless Revolution

 

On June 28^th, Peter arrived at Peterhof, intending to meet his wife, Catherine. Soon the news of the coup d’etat reached him out of St. Petersburg. Catherine had been proclaimed Empress at the Kazan Cathedral and was supported by the three elite Guards units that had been so instrumental in the revolution. In desperation, Peter sailed to Kronstadt, the Russian naval base on the Gulf of Finland, in hopes of rallying troops.

 

Kronstadt was already loyal to Catherine, however. By now the Empress was riding back to Peterhof at the head of her Guards when two letters from Peter arrived. The first offered Catherine joint-rulership of Russia; the second requested that he be allowed to return to Holstein with his mistress. Neither letter was considered.

 

Peter III was imprisoned at an estate in Ropsha. From there, he would be taken to the Schleusselburg Fortress. Within a week, however, Peter III was dead, most probably murdered by Alexis Orlov, one of Catherine’s lovers. Catherine, writing of the event, states that she had Peter “opened” and it was found that he had died of “inflammation of the bowels and apoplexy.” Colic was the official cause of death.  Historians are in agreement that no evidence exists that Catherine planned or knew of his impending murder.

 

Summary

 

Peter III’s death ended an extended period of palace revolutions sometimes referred to a “second Time of Troubles.” Inept and mentally unbalanced, Peter III virtually drove Russia’s disaffected nobility, churchmen, and military leaders into the hands of Catherine, whose wise coalition building for several years ensured not only her bloodless accession to the throne but a long and successful reign.

 

Empress Elizabeth of Russia

 

 

Born December 10, 1709 to Peter the Great and Catherine I, Elizabeth became Russia’s empress following a palace revolution in November 1741. Although her reign was initially heralded as a “return to the glorious days of Peter the Great,” [1] Elizabeth’s tenure was marked by extravagance. Affairs of state were often left unattended while her greatest legacy might have been the 15,000 dresses she collected.

 

The Palace Coup of 1741 and Changes in Policies

 

Ending a period in Russian history that has frequently been referred to as a “second time of troubles” or an “era of palace revolutions,” Elizabeth seized the moment in November 1741. Soliciting the assistance of the elite Preobrazhensky Guards facing deployment in a war with Sweden, Elizabeth marched to the Winter Palace and arrested the regent, Anne Leopoldovna. The regent, her top German advisors, and the infant Tsar Ivan VI were exiled. Ivan VI would be imprisoned for life.

 

The immediate result was a shift from German influences to French. The coup had been urged on Elizabeth by several supporters, including the French Ambassador, La Chetardie. Elizabeth, who spoke French fluently, promoted a growing interest in French culture. Historian Ronald Hingly comments that her court became the “most luxurious and licentious in Europe.” [2]

 

Elizabeth’s Personal Life

 

Given to parties that lasted all night, Elizabeth, perhaps aware that palace revolutions occurred in the night hours, seldom went to bed before dawn. She left state affairs unattended for weeks and frequently moved her court back and forth between Moscow and St. Petersburg. Believing reading to be unhealthy, she disdained books.

 

Although never officially married, Elizabeth had numerous lovers. Hingly writes that she was, “the most sexually attractive Russian Empress.” Favorites included Alexis Razumovsky, a commoner from the Ukraine who aroused Elizabeth’s interest after she heard him singing in the chapel choir. Ivan Shuvalov, another favorite, founded the University of Moscow in 1755 and worked to promote Enlightenment ideas in Russia.

 

Accomplishments of Empress Elizabeth

 

Under Elizabeth, capital punishment ended in Russia. Although the Senate handed down capital sentences during her reign, she commuted all of them. Elizabeth called for the introduction of Russian porcelain, an industry that would expand rapidly and ensure a reputation for high quality craftsmanship throughout Europe.

 

For twenty years, Elizabeth’s court architect, Francesco Rastrelli, would leave his mark on St. Petersburg, building the Winter Palace on the Neva River and introducing the distinctive Russian baroque style. The palace would be enlarged under the reign of Catherine the Great.

 

Russian historian David MacKenzkie quotes Mikhail Lomonsov, a chronicler of the period, as saying, “Like Moses Elizabeth had come to release Russia from the night of Egyptian servitude; like Noah she had saved Russia from an alien flood.” [3] Yet under Elizabeth serfdom, Russia’s greatest social evil, continued and expanded.

 

At the time of her death in 1861, Russia was at the end of a successful war with Prussia, the European phase of the Seven Years’ War. Elizabeth had provided for an orderly succession in the person of her nephew, Peter III. And although Peter would be deposed by yet another palace coup, the monarchy had been substantially stabilized by Elizabeth’s twenty year reign.

 

Sources

 

[1] Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969)

[2]Ronald Hingley, The Tsars 1533-1917 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968.

[3] David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran, A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond, 4^th Ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993).