Celebrating 75 Years: The Marshall Plan
The 1947 Marshall Plan was
one of the most successful United
States foreign policy initiatives during the
Cold War period. Former Secretary of State and Harvard historian Henry
Kissinger used it as an example to demonstrate positive outcomes when nations work
together out of common necessity and in view of a common foe. Senator J.
William Fulbright wrote that the Marshall Plan stopped the Soviet Union from
possibly taking over Western Europe “through
the manipulation of Communist parties, military intimidation, economic
strangulation, and even more direct military action.”
Proposing the Marshall Plan
Speaking at Harvard University
June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall presented the Marshall Plan
and the rationale for its immediate implementation. Marshall
had been to Europe and witnessed the
deprivations still evident from years of war. These were serious problems that
could derail European recovery efforts while playing into the hands of Stalin
and the emergent Communist parties.
Marshall’s report of the Fourth Session of the Council of
Foreign Ministers, April 28, 1947, detailed the cataclysmic nature of the
European economies. Marshall
used coal production to highlight the problems: “less coal means less
employment for labor and a consequent delay in the production of goods for
export to bring money for the purchase of food and necessities.”
Coal was also linked to steel
production. In short, the industrial infrastructure had to be rebuilt quickly.
Production also meant a balance of trade between the United
States and Europe, notably Germany. By early 1947, Germany was
using precious credits to purchase food imports but not able to produce export
goods. The Marshall Plan would change that.
European Participation and
the Costs
Representatives of sixteen
European nations met to create the proposal that would amount to $28 billion in
assistance over a ten year period. The proposals were accepted by Marshall and
President Truman, but created a furor in the Congress. The mid-term elections
in 1946 had given Republicans control of the Congress and they were financially
conservative. A key Republican leader, Senator Taft of Ohio, denounced the Marshall Plan as a
“European TVA.”
Despite dire warning from the
administration as well as forward thinking Republicans like Michigan’s Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the
initially requested amount was significantly lowered. The chief event that
caused passage of the Marshall Plan, however, was the early 1948 coup in
Czechoslovakia in which pro-democratic, moderate leaders were either removed or
murdered and replace by pro-Moscow Communists.
The Marshall
Plan and Eastern Europe
The Truman administration did
not want to exacerbate the Iron Curtain division between East and West,
possibly for a long period into the future, and thus invited all nations – including Russia, to
participate. There were enough strings attached, however, to keep Stalin from
participating. Historian Stephen Ambrose writes that this was the very
intention of the men like George Kennan, who crafted the policy and then
invited Soviet participation.
The Poles, Czechs, and
Hungarians wanted to participate, but were held back by Moscow. In his report on the Fifth Session of
the Council of Foreign Ministers, December 19, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall,
pointing to Germany, noted
that the Soviet Union had employed “a type of monopolistic stranglehold over
the economic and political life of eastern Germany
which makes that region little more than a dependent province of the Soviet Union.”
Employing similar economic
tactics in other Eastern European economies, Stalin not only made German
reunification far more difficult in terms of integrated European economies, but
forged a long term policy designed to distance European Communist nations from
ever effectively competing with the West or the possibility of future
integration.
The Marshall Plan worked.
Along with NATO, it transformed Europe into a
new society and promoted collective economic and political leadership in the
face of a common adversary.
Sources:
Stephen E. Ambrose and
Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism:
American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Penguin Books, 1997)
Documents on Germany,
1944-1961, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States
Senate (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968)
J. William Fulbright, The Crippled Giant: American Foreign Policy and its Domestic
Consequences (New York: Random House, 1972)