Mutiny in the Continental Army of Washington

M.Streich

1781 began with ominous tiding sent to George Washington from Brigadier General Anthony Wayne in Morristown, New Jersey. Large numbers of soldiers from the Pennsylvania Line had mutinied and were marching to Philadelphia to demand an end to their deprivations. For Washington, the news came after the events of 1780, all of which pointed to despair for the Patriot cause: in the South, Charleston had fallen to the British; Benedict Arnold had defected to the British and would forever be known as a traitor, and the British seemed stronger than ever, waiting out the winter in heavily fortified New York. The mutiny of Pennsylvania soldiers merely added to the despondency felt by the leaders of the Revolution.

 

Payment Grievances and Camp Conditions

 

By the end of 1780, morale in many of the regiments was low. Soldiers had not been paid and when they were, it was in Continental currency, issued by the Congress in Philadelphia. This paper currency was practically worthless. Historian Carl Van Doren comments that, “…a soldier’s pay for an entire year was worth only about a dollar in silver.” The phrase “not worth a continental” was rooted in this period of American History.

 

Many mutineers in January 1781 complained that they had never received promised bounties for enlisting. Others that had received bounties were cheated out of their money, often by their own officers. Their own state government in Philadelphia had exhausted all financial resources. According to Van Doren, “Pennsylvania might be, as Washington said, full of flour, but had no money to buy it with…”

 

The soldiers that finally mutinied in Morristown and marched on to Princeton had no fresh bread, no meat, and little alcohol to consume – all part of their daily ration. One of the first tasks General Wayne accomplished after accompanying the men to Princeton was to prevail upon the local inhabitants to feed the hungry men. This did much to dispel angry feelings and avoid their pillaging the countryside.

 

British Attempts to Recruit Pennsylvania Mutineers

 

Sir Henry Clinton in New York endorsed a concerted effort to send appeals to the mutineers at Princeton and later at Trenton. These appeals offered amnesty, cash bounties, and promises of employment – on paper, British soldiers were paid far less than the Continentals, but in reality their pay was still worth something as the patriot currency kept declining in value.

 

British agents managed to bring Clinton’s proposals to the mutineers, led by a committee of sergeants, but were apprehended and turned over to Anthony Wayne. Eventually sent to Trenton under heavy guard, the two captured spies were tried and hung. But there were other efforts on the part of the British as well as double-agents that worked both sides of the conflict for a price. There is ample evidence, however, that the mutineers had no intention of supporting the British or loyalist cause.

 

End of the Pennsylvania Line’s Mutiny

 

Following several days of negotiations that began in Princeton, the mutiny ended in Trenton and more than 1200 men were discharged, based on their sworn statements that their enlistments should have ended sooner, that their wages had not been paid, and that some enlistments were tied to excessive drinking! Recruiters used rum to seal the enlistments when the Revolution first began.

 

As the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line was ending, another, smaller mutiny erupted among New Jersey troops encamped at Pompton. Although their grievances paralleled those of the Pennsylvania Line, reaction was swift and decisive. Washington himself dealt with the uprising, surrounding the men at Chatham and authorizing the execution of two ringleaders. Rumors that more units were close to mutiny contributed to Washington’s prompt response.

 

Results of the 1781 Mutinies

 

Discipline within the Continental Army strengthened as a result of the early 1781 mutinies. Additionally, colonial assemblies took a more proactive role in supplying Washington with supplies, especially in New England. Swift suppression of the munities may have also facilitated greater French support in terms of loans used to purchase clothing as well as ammunition from Europe.

 

Van Doren suggests that the mutinies contributed to greater unity among the colonies, pointing out that Maryland ratified the Articles of Confederation at the end of January 1781 and that the Congress in Philadelphia published them on March 1^st.

 

The mutinies also demonstrated how vulnerable the cause of independence had become. Had Sir Henry Clinton sent troops into New Jersey, a risk he was reluctant to take, negotiations with the mutineers and their officers might have been jeopardized. At the same time, the leadership of Washington, Anthony Wayne, Lafayette, and numerous other officers characterized an effective command that used wisdom and decisive action to unify the Army while doing everything possible to address sincere grievances.

 

References:

 

Carl Van Doren, Mutiny in January (The Viking Press, 1943)

Robert Harvey, “A Few Bloody Noses:” The Realities and Mythologies of the American Revolution (Overlook Press, 2002)

Page Smith, A New Age Now Begins: A People’s History of the American Revolution, Vol. 2. (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976)

[Copyright owned by Michael Streich. Reprints require written permission]