The Russo-Japanese War Elevates Japan to Major Power Status and Demonstrates the Growing Weakness of Imperial Russia
Article Written by Michael Streich for Suite101 in 2010
Korean independence was a
casualty of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Japanese occupation would
continue until the end of World War II in 1945 and serve as an object lesson to
anyone who doubted that the start of the twentieth century heralded an entirely
new century identified with the most horrific wars in human history. In
November 1905, the Koreans still looked to the United States to assist in their
efforts against Japanese conquest. According to the New York Times, however, these assumptions were based on “false
hopes.”
General Causes of the
Russo-Japanese War
The Russo-Japanese War began
with the surprise attack against the Russian naval flotilla at Port Arthur on January 27, 1904. Japanese
forces subsequently overwhelmed the poorly trained Russian troops, ultimately
destroying a second Russian fleet on May 14, 1905 at the Battle of Tsushima.
For the first time since imperialist western forces had begun the carving up of
Asian spheres of influence, an Asian people had masterfully and soundly defeated
a European power.
Russia, led by the weak Tsar Nicholas II, needed a war to
instill patriotic feelings among an increasingly restless and
revolutionary-minded population. The millions of peasants would follow the
Tsar’s summons as if it were an order from God, but the same was not true of
the more literate urban populations. Foreign adventures, especially those
resulting in easy victories, diverted the curious away from radical ideologies.
But, as historian Virginia Cowles wrote, “As usual everyone thought Russia would
win, and as usual everything went wrong.”
Japan also had reasons to believe that war would change
perceptions of the empire of the sun. Japan had modernized rapidly since
western warships had forced the “opening” of the nation in 1853-1854. By 1873, Japan invaded Taiwan but received little for her
efforts. As the United States
entered the race for imperialist control of Asian spheres of influence, notably
with the acquisition of the Philippines
after the Spanish-American War, Japan
looked for an alliance, supporting the Open Door policy in China. Her principal ally in the
region was Great Britain.
Roosevelt’s Asian Balance of Power
The President most interested
in Japan
and her future intentions was Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt preferred Japan over Russia
during the 1904-1905 war, privately endorsing Japanese war aims and post-war
claims even as he attempted to portray himself as an honest broker during peace
negotiations at Portsmouth in New
England. Japan’s
taking of independent Korea
as a protectorate was an immediate effect of this brokered peace; it would lead
to continued Japanese aggressions in Manchuria and China,
paving the path toward an inevitable conflict with the United States in 1941.
Another effect of the
Russo-Japanese War was the influence of Japanese sea power. The Battle of
Tsushima resulted in the obliteration of Tsar Nicholas’ Baltic fleet, which had
sailed around Africa to confront the Japanese.
Historians argue that the Russian fleet was unequal to the newer Japanese ships
under the skillful leadership of Admiral Togo.
While that was true, of
greater importance was the perception: Europeans could not imagine that a
western power would be susceptible to Asian victory on the scale of Tsushima. It was the same faulty perceptions that allowed
the Japanese to overwhelm Singapore
in early 1942 and prove the superiority of air power over sea power at the
start of the Pacific War.
Long Term Results of the
Peace Treaty
Although Teddy Roosevelt
worked toward an Asian balance of power in the aftermath, according to
historian Warren Zimmermann, “…he wanted Japan to succeed but not too
overwhelmingly.” Part of the balance of power involved the sacrifice of an
independent Korea – despite
earlier American assurances to the contrary, in return for a Japanese pledge to
recognize U.S. hegemony in
the Philippines.
This quid pro quo was consolidated through Roosevelt’s envoy, Secretary of War
William Taft, during his visit to Tokyo
in 1905.
Tsar Nicholas II refused,
however, to pay any indemnity to the Japanese. This refusal became a source of
antagonism in Japan
and almost provoked a resumption of hostilities. The legacy of Russian defeat,
however, was swiftly turned into internal revolution in what some historians
regard as the first phase of the Russian Revolutionary movement that eventually
ended Romanov rule in March 1917.
The first modern war of the
twentieth century featured all of the players that would, to some degree, play
decisive roles in the ensuing world wars. In terms of Asia, Japan was the
long term victor, demonstrating the invincibility of the west and devoting the
national psyche toward further regional conquests. The United States played a double game,
clandestinely supporting Japan
over Russia
in the hopes of maintaining the China Open Door while preserving her own
colonial outposts.
Myths and Realities of the
First 20th Century War
As in the Crimean War and the
Russo-Turkish War, the Tsar’s military was out-maneuvered and ill-prepared,
this time by the better equipped Japanese. Despite these realities, the myth of
the “Russian steamroller” would prevail into 1914. Having learned from these
successes, including the surprise attack at Port Arthur,
Japan would use similar
techniques at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii in 1941
and Singapore
in 1942. Korea remained
occupied by Japan
until 1945, at which time it was divided between the democratic South and the
Communist North. It remains so to this day.
References:
James Bradley, The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire
and War (Back Bay Books, 2009)
Virginia Cowles, The Russian Dagger: Cold War in the Days of
the Czars (Harper & Row, 1969)
Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages (Harper & Row,
1960)
New York Times,
various articles from November 15 – December 5, 1905
Constantine Pleshakov, The Tsar’s Last Armada: The Epic Voyage to
the Battle of Tushima (Basic Books, 2002)
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (Oxford University
Press, 1969)
Warren Zimmermann, First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made
Their Country a World Power (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002)
(Copyright of this article is owned by Michael Streich; written permission required for reprints in any format)
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