Thursday, April 22, 2021

 America Has a Long History of Anti-Asian Action

In the days after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the New York World Trade Center building, comparisons to Pearl Harbor were frequently made. Both attacks resulted in a spirit of American unity. A common enemy was identified. A national government galvanized American energies to combat and destroy the forces that attacked the homeland. How true are comparisons of these events? In many ways, Pearl Harbor and 9/11 represented vastly different events that affected Americans in dissimilar ways.

 

Pearl Harbor and the American Aftermath

 

The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii roused American hatred and galvanized the nation. Discrimination against Asian peoples had long been part of American cultural and social history. In the latter 19th Century, political party platforms called for the limitation and cessation of Asian immigration, often labeled “Mongolian” immigration. San Francisco’s Angel Island was a stark reminder of American antipathy toward Asians seeking to migrate to the United States.

 

In early 1942, by Presidential executive order, Japanese-Americans living primarily on the west coast were taken to internment camps as a security measure following the massive Pearl Harbor raid that temporarily incapacitated the Pacific fleet. As John Toland comments, a national sense of outrage consumed Americans. According to Toland, news of the attack united Americans: “Strangers on the streets looked at one another with a new awareness.”

 

Toland relates that “on the banks of the Potomac someone cut down one of the cherry trees donated years before by Japan.” A New York Times letter to the editor (December 8, 1941) states that, “the unhoped-for has happened, and we shall unitedly arise to crush the offender; we project no happy ideal save the continuance and preservation for posterity of the American way of life.”

 

Secretary of War Stimson,  having been told by President Roosevelt of the December 7th attack by telephone, noted that “a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people.” As late as August 1945, after President Truman authorized the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Americans recalled Pearl Harbor and viewed the new weapon as just retribution for the attack that began the war.

 

September 11, 2001, the New Pearl Harbor

 

The aftermath of 9/11 saw a concerted effort on the part of the Bush Administration to forestall any anti-Muslim violence in the United States. Unlike 1941, no popular songs targeted Islamic or Muslim nations. National Public Radio’s “Performance Tonight” featured somber, mournful concerts from around the world. It was time of global solidarity. Americans bought stickers displaying the stars and stripes and pasted them on their cars. Members of Congress stood on the steps of the Capitol singing “God Bless America.”

 

But the enemy in 2001 was elusive, identified with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Unlike the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the fast-paced nature of American society soon forgot the initial shock. A prolonged war in the Middle East, first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, imposed no sacrifices on American society. Muslims in America were not put into camps or targeted, and great efforts were made to avoid “racial profiling.” In many ways, this was a step in the right direction.

 

Neither Pearl Harbor nor 9/11 evokes much passion among young Americans as the nation approaches the second decade of the new century. The pace of technology has relegated these events to the confines of “history.” Pearl Harbor was a rallying cry, much like “Remember the Maine” in 1898. But as the “greatest generation” passes on, the “day of infamy” becomes a foggy remembrance of a past that seems disconnected to the present.

 

Sources:

 

John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945, Vol. I (New York: Random House, 1970).

New York Times, “Letters to the Times,” December 8, 1941.

(First published in Suite101 by Michael Streich in 2009. Copyright owned by Michael Streich and reprints require written permission)

On April 22, 2021 The U.S. Senate passed anti-Asian legislation. Only one senator voted against it: Josh Hawley (R-MO) who stated the bill was too broad.

Saturday, April 17, 2021

The Council of Constance Ended the Period of Three Popes and Sought to Repudiate Heretical Beliefs

Michael Streich 

In the first decade of the 15th Century, the Catholic Church was plagued with corruption at the highest levels and split by three popes, all ruling simultaneously and each claiming sole legitimacy. The Council of Constance, which opened November 5, 1414, was called by the Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund to solve the problem of the three popes, return the church to morality through reform, and address the heretical factions begun in England by John Wycliffe and expanded by the Bohemian priest Jan Hus. By the close of the Council in 1418, its work was only partially successful.

 

Church Impotency Forced the Actions of the State

 

The 1409 Council of Pisa had attempted to resolve the issue of multiple popes but only managed to complicate matters by electing a third pope, expanding the Great Schism that divided Christendom in the West. Additionally, Pisa was a non-canonical council.

 

Thus, the only one of the three pontiffs to attend Constance, John XXIII, of the Pisan line of popes, could not legally convene a council that could be considered canonical.

 

The only one of the three popes who could claim any sense of legitimacy was Benedict XIII of Avignon. At the time of the Council of Constance, he was the only living prelate who had been a cardinal in 1378 and who participated in the conclave that elected Pope Urban VI in Rome – a dubious election given the circumstances of that papal election.

 

Given the intransigence of the Church in 1414, Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund took it upon himself to resolve the important issues of the day by convening the Council of Constance.

 

The Council of Constance Deposes Pope John and Burns Hus as a Heretic

 

Pope John XXIII’s mistake was in attending the council personally; neither of the other rival popes attended. Facing over fifty serious charges including sexual depravity and simony, and being confronted by Sigismund himself with an abdication document, John XXIII disguised himself and fled from Constance.

 

After a public reading of John’s sins, the Council deposed him, although John would abdicate shortly thereafter. Jan Hus, who had journeyed from Prague to answer charges of heresy, was not as fortunate, despite a guarantee of safe conduct from Sigismund.

 

Hus was kept in chains in a prison where his body slowly weakened. Brought before the Council and urged to recant, Hus, much like Luther at Worms in the next century, asked his inquisitors to prove his errors from Scripture. Declared a heretic, he was taken out of the city and burned, his ashes and skeletal remains thrown into the river.

 

The Council Demands Concurrent Jurisdiction with the Papacy

 

By declaring itself canonical and asserting its right of concurrent jurisdiction, the Council of Constance attempted to overturn the doctrine of Papal Primacy. Any such actions would result in the weakening of the pope’s authority and perhaps his gift to speak infallibly.

 

Pope Gregory XII of the Roman line abdicated July 4, 1415 but Benedict XIII refused to do so, even after meeting with Sigismund. It would be his Avignon successor, Clement VIII, who abdicated in 1429. The newly elected pope at Constance on November 11, 1417 was Martin V.

 

Church Reform Ignored by the Council of Constance

 

Widespread Church corruption had been a chief reason for the calling together of an Ecumenical Council at Constance in 1414. But the Council remained preoccupied with the papal schism and heresy. Church reform was never serious addressed or attempted. The new pope, Martin V, did not support Church reform.

 

Sigismund, however, had managed to demonstrate that the state could impose itself on the Church, especially when the Papacy was incompetent and its high ranking prelates were corrupt. When Pope Martin V closed the council on November 11, 1417, the words of Hus must have rung in several ears: the Council was nothing more than “the scarlet woman of the Apocalypse.”

 

Historian Marzieh Gail writes that, “The great failure at Constance…was the Council’s inability to deal with the problems of moral conduct – not of simple believers but of those who were supposed to guide them and set the example.” Although the next decades would see localized reform guided by wiser men and women, as in Spain, the laxity of  Church leadership, including popes, would feed the 16th Century Reformation.

 

The Partial Successes of the Council of Constance: Ending the Babylonian Captivity of the Church


 

The 1414 Council managed to end the Great Schism, but only after the efforts of a secular king forced the issue. By burning Hus, the Council sent a strong message to heretics. But the most important issue, Church reform, was ignored. This inaction directly led to further abuses as well as the election of men to the papacy whose spirituality was dubious, men such as Pope Julius II.

 

Contemporary Catholics are quick to point out that Constance was an unofficial council, not canonical. Although true, this convolutes the larger issue: does the spirit and passion to reform in order to more closely align the Church to Christ supersede centuries of tradition and canon law? Those men and women who advocated the former were later deemed saints, like Vincent Ferrer. But their words were seldom considered by the Church leadership while they were alive.

 

Sources:

 

Richard Cattermole, The Council of Constance and the war in Bohemia (Nabu Press, 2010)

Marzieh Gail, The Three Popes (Simon and Schuster, 1969)

Brian Tierney and Sidney Painter, Western Europe in the Middle Ages 300-1475, 5yh Ed. (McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992)

Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church, 3rd Ed. (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970)

(Copyright owned by Michael Streich; republishing in any form requires written permission)

 Constantine Transforms the Roman Empire Toward Christianity

The Pivotal Battle of the Milvian Bridge

Michael Streich

The Battle of the Milvian Bridge, just outside the walls of Rome, in AD 312, resulted in significant changes that ultimately would enable the rise of Christian institutions in the western empire to achieve a degree of power necessary in replacing secular control once the west was overrun by barbarian hordes. Emperor Constantine’s  acceptance of the Christian God inaugurated a new official respect for Christianity well beyond simple toleration. It began with a sign and ended with military victory, replacing paganism with a new faith now embraced by the emperor.

 

“With This Sign You Will Conquer”

 

The story of the miraculous sign from heaven is recounted, with distinct variations, by the writers Lactantius and Eusebius. Eusebius’ rendering is considered the more accurate because Constantine had personally told him the story and confirmed its truth by an oath.

 

According to Eusebius, the omen was seen by Constantine and his entire army days before the actual battle outside of the walls of Rome. Constantine recounted that the sign was an answer to a prayer he had made to the God of his father, Constantius, a Christian. The sign itself displayed a cross in the font of a sun. Eusebius continues that the sign was confirmed to Constantine that night in a dream during which Christ appeared to him.

 

Lactantius states that the sign occurred the night before the actual battle and refers to it as, “a heavenly sign from God.” The triumphal arch, dedicated to Constantine in AD 315, gives an account of the battle, stating that, “with the guidance of divinity…he freed…the Republic from a tyrant.” Although the phrase does not specifically identify the Christian God, scholars point out that Constantine’s public attribution confirms the reference.

 

Saxa Rubra and the Milvian Bridge

 

Constantine’s adversary, Maxentius, a co-emperor approving Christian persecutions, left the security of Rome’s walls to confront the army approaching on the Via Flamina. Why Maxentius didn't remain behind the walls is a mystery. He outnumbered Constantine and had enough supplies to last any long siege attempted by his opponent.

 

The armies first met nine miles from Rome at Saxa Rubra, Constantine’s army routing Maxentius’ feared cavalry, the cataphracti. This caused panic among the mercenary troops that began a disorganized retreat to the Tiber, crossing the river over a crude wooden bridge as well as the more stable Milvian Bridge

The battleground favored the attacker as there was little room to maneuver soldiers. The unfortunate Maxentius, however, could only depend upon the Praetorian Guard, fierce fighters that fought to the death. After the battle and once inside Rome, Constantine would disband the Guard forever. Constantine led the central attack himself, pushing toward the bridge as any hope for a retreating Maxentius evaporated. Maxentius died crossing the river, pulled down by his armor, according to later accounts. Constantine entered the city on October 29, AD 312.

 

Impact of the Battle

 

The long term consequence of Constantine’s conversion and victory went far beyond the basilicas he endowed (among them St. John Lateran in Rome). Brian Tierney and Sidney Painter, in Western Europe in the Middle Ages 300-1475, assert that, “the subsequent rise of Christianity and its acceptance as the official religion of the empire transformed the whole nature of late classical culture.” 

The sign that led to Constantine’s victory may have begun that process. Before his death, the Emperor helped to preside over the Council of Nicaea, one of the most significant early church councils that detailed key elements of Christian doctrine, including the creed. 

As the centuries progressed and Rome “fell,” at least in the west, it was the Church that provided stability and leadership, its bishops functioning as both secular and religious administrators, this the long term effect of AD 312.

Copyright owned by Michael Streich; any republishing requires written permission.

Regime Change in Iran in the Early Cold War

How the US Turned Iran into a Strong Middle East Ally 

Over a three week period in 1953, CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt and General H. Norman Schwarzkopf helped to stage a coup in Iran that overthrew the pro-communist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Although the restored Shah of Iran wrote that “the cold war really began in Iran,” the coup had more to do with oil than with Communism. It would also mark the beginning of United States active participation in the Middle East as part of global security concerns.

 

Nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

 

Prior to the 1951 nationalization of Iranian oil, Great Britain benefited from its monopoly of Iranian oil. Although Teheran received generous yearly stipends or royalty fees, the British built and maintained the oil fields. Iran possessed neither the expertise to do this not did it have the capacity to refine, transport, or market its oil.

 

Following the nationalization decree, passed by the Iranian parliament and signed by Prime Minister Mossadegh, the British withdrew all personnel from the oil fields, sent soldiers to Cyprus, and began to flex its colonial muscles. Mossadegh was portrayed as a pro-communist stooge, although he had been Time magazine’s man of the year in 1951.

 

It was at this point that a 37-year old Kermit “Kim” Roosevelt met with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen W. Dulles to discuss “Operation Ajax,” the plan to topple Mossadegh. Allen Dulles headed the CIA but both Dulles brothers were also senior partners in the law firm Sullivan & Cromwell. One of the firm’s clients was Anglo-Iranian Oil.

 

The Almost Failed Iranian Coup of 1953

 

Prior to the arrival of Roosevelt in Iran, both Britain and the U.S. began a vicious propaganda campaign against Mossadegh. The Prime Minister was portrayed as a madman who would ultimately sell his nation to the Soviet Union. The anti-communist aspect of the propaganda was particularly timely in 1953. In the U.S., Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy’s “witch hunts” were leaving a legacy of fear.

 

In Teheran, the Shah issued several decrees, replacing Mossadegh with General Zahedi. But the decrees were declared false by Mossadegh and his supporters. Riots broke out and the Shah fled to Rome, meeting with Allen Dulles in the Hotel Excelsior. Kermit Roosevelt, assisted by General Schwarzkopf (who had helped to train the Shah’s secret police), used $100,000 in bribe money as well as propaganda leaflets to turn the tide, just when all seemed lost. Police and royalist troops, many on the CIA payroll, gained control of the streets and surrounded the Prime Minister’s heavily fortified residence.

 

According to Shah Reza Pahlavi’s published account, Mossadegh fled across a roof top in his pajamas. The Shah’s memoir, published in 1979 (the same year Kermit Roosevelt published his own account, Countercoup), barely mentioned the CIA role. Both books coincide with the tumultuous events occurring in Iran at the time when the Carter Administration ended support for the man who called himself the staunchest ally of the United States.

 

The Oil Settlement

 

New agreements with the Shah gave Great Britain 40% and the United States 40% of total Iranian oil production. The fact that Josef Stalin had conveniently died in early 1953 also helped to diffuse the communist Tudeh Party, much as his death hurt Communist causes in other nations. For the United States, it was one of the first adventures in the Middle East that would highlight the crucial factor of oil, an important commodity the U.S. needed and had been running out of since the end of World War I.

 

Sources:

 

Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Penguin Books, 1997)

Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, Kingmakers: The Invention of the Modern Middle East (W. W. Norton and Company, 2008)

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day, 1979) 

(copyright of this article is owned by the author, Michael Streich;any republishing in any for requires written permission)