The Franco-Prussian War and Balance of Power

Prussian Defeat of France Ensured a Powerful Continental Germany

Dec 14, 2009 Michael Streich

Defeating France in 1871 after unifying Germany enabled Otto von Bismarck to create the most militarily powerful nation in Europe, altering the prior balance of power.

When German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck proclaimed the German Empire at Versailles in January 1871 following the Franco-Prussian War, the final act was played that would change the European balance of power and lead toward the catastrophic conflict of 1914 that would be called the “Great War.” Bismarck had convinced German liberals before unification resulted in empire that the creation of the German state would not be accomplished by speeches but by blood and iron.

The German Empire and the New Balance of Power

After skillful diplomacy ensured a neutral Russia and a short war with Austria diminished Hapsburg influence in Germany, Bismarck maneuvered France’s Napoleon III into the Franco-Prussian War. The Ems telegram, which Bismarck likened to “waving a red cloak” in front of the French bull, resulted in a French declaration of war against Prussia. Because of the defeat of Austria in the earlier Seven Weeks’ War, all German principalities joined Prussia in the war against France.

It was a short war. Napoleon III was captured on the battlefield and Paris fell in January 1871. France, building a new Republic and a new identity, mentally prepared for the revenge that would surely come. France had lost Alsace and Lorraine to the newly proclaimed German Empire.

Austria, the “big brother” caretaker of the Germanic principalities since the 1815 Congress of Vienna, was forced to look elsewhere to expand its empire and influence. That expansion focused on the Balkans, setting up a competition with the fading Ottoman Empire and Imperial Russia, focused on Pan-Slavism and the protection of Orthodox Christians. Although the Ottomans were inconsequential (dubbed the “sick man of Europe” by British pundits, although also attributed to Tsar Nicholas I), the Russians were far more formidable, honoring an alliance with Serbia made in 1830.

The British Empire and Continental Europe

While British leaders viewed the rise and expansion of Prussia with a certain degree of consternation, the government was focused on the global empire. If Prime Minister Gladstone, for example, was adamantly opposed to sending British armies to police the world, the thought of entering a general European war was anathema. Further, the British did not maintain military alliances with the great powers of continental Europe. In an age of Imperialism, all European powers were potentially lethal competitors.

Even events between Turkey and Russia first at the time of the Crimean War of 1853 and later during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 invited British intervention solely because Russian domination of Constantinople and the Dardanelles would have adversely affected British interests in the Middle East, notably Egypt.

The Changing Balance of Power in Europe

The Concert of Europe, coming out of the 1815 Congress of Vienna, had been instrumental in confronting and resolving regional problems that might have disturbed the equilibrium of peace on the continent. The Crimean War effectively ended this system. Austria’s refusal to support Russia in 1853 ultimately led to an Austrian alliance with a newly unified Germany. Additionally, a newly unified Italy by Count Cavour brought another power to the European table.

After 1871, Imperial Germany represented the most significant force in Europe. Bismarck’s alliances with Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy bought time for Germany to further develop militarily and industrially. It was not until 1890, when the young Kaiser William II dismissed Bismarck, that the carefully constructed system unraveled. The Franco-Russian alliance again altered the balance of power, this time negatively affecting Germany.

Sources:

• George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War (Pantheon Books, 1984)
• Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster, 1994)
• Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (Random House, 1991)
• Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (The Macmillan Company, 1962

The copyright of the article The Franco-Prussian War and Balance of Power in W European History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish The Franco-Prussian War and Balance of Power in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.