Realpolitik and Idealism in Foreign Policy

State Security Policy Began with Cardinal Richelieu's Raison d'etat

Oct 16, 2009 Michael Streich

European and American foreign policy initiatives followed moralist approaches of idealism or the ruthless actions of Realpolitik to achieve goals favorable to the state.

The dichotomy between realism and idealism in history can be traced to the early 16th Century French statesman, Cardinal de Richelieu who advanced the idea of raison d’etat, writing that “the state has no immortality; its salvation is now or never.” A little over 200 years later, Count Camillo Cavour, in unifying Italy, stated that “if we did for ourselves what we do for our country, what rascals we should be.” Both Richelieu and Cavour demonstrated the success of Realpolitik, solutions based on realism. In both Europe and the United States, realism would contend with idealism, the notion that even states must exhibit morality.

Count Cavour and Otto von Bismarck

Both Cavour and Germany’s Bismarck ruthlessly employed Realpolitik in their efforts at state unification. Bismarck’s tools were “blood and iron.” For Germany’s chancellor, the old alliances such as the Holy Alliance dating to the times of the Congress of Vienna (1815) were worthless. Bismarck’s alliance system enabled him to defeat Austria in the Seven Weeks’ War in order to forcibly bring German kingdoms and principalities under Prussian domination. Diplomatically, Bismarck isolated Napoleon III of France in order to provoke the hapless emperor into a ruinous war.

Cavour also manipulated Napoleon III, provoking a war with Austria with French help in order to bring northern Italy under the leadership of Piedmont-Sardinia. By 1870, Cavour, using both war, plebiscites, and threats, unified Italy, even to the point of earning the scorn of the papacy which had lost its lands and was confined to what would later be the Vatican city-state.

Realism versus Idealism in the United States

Although Europe had its idealists, like British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain whose policy of appeasement paved the way for Nazi domination of Europe, idealism in America is best characterized by the visionary policies of Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter, both Nobel Peace Prize recipients.

Woodrow Wilson, coming from a strict Calvinist background, chose the so-called “moral high ground” when formulating his Utopian Fourteen Points, a blueprint for a new world order where war was not an option for settling disputes among states. The world, however, was not ready for Wilson’s political Sermon on the Mount. Similarly, Jimmy Carter, elected toward the end of the Cold War, injected his version of human rights into foreign policy. He altruistically returned the Panama Canal to the Panamanians, reversing US policy begun by a realist president, Teddy Roosevelt, who presided over the acquisition and building of the canal.

Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy is often equated with the old African maxim, “walk softly and carry a big stick.” The “big stick” fell hard on nations threatening American interests but was also used domestically against monopolists like J.P. Morgan. Roosevelt also received a Nobel Peace Prize, in part, for negotiating an end to the Russo-Japanese War.

Yet even this action was based on Realpolitik. US interests in Asia, notably China, were better served by salvaging a weak Russian presence rather than allowing the emerging Japanese military machine an opportunity to threaten the western “Spheres of Influence.” This motivation was lost on the Peace Prize committee.

The Modern Contradiction of Morality and Immorality in State Policy

When Cardinal Richelieu embarked upon a foreign policy radically different from earlier centuries, he set a precedent for state building and the pursuit of favorable foreign policy initiatives. In his book Diplomacy, Dr. Henry Kissinger writes that “raison d’etat replaced the medieval concept of universal moral values as the operating principle of French policy.” In the post-modern world of the 21st Century, realism may be more of a necessity than an optional policy.

President Jimmy Carter learned this lesson well when Soviet Russia invaded Afghanistan and when competing Middle East agendas made a mockery of the lofty Camp David Accords. Ronald Reagan’s covert support of Afghan rebels as well as Central American “Contra” groups was a realist approach to clandestinely further American security interests. The contradiction continues and it is up to American citizens to decide which best serves the nation’s interests.

Sources:

• Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster, 1994)
• Various general history survey texts like America Past and Present (Divine) and The Western Heritage (Kagan)

The copyright of the article Realpolitik and Idealism in Foreign Policy in American History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Realpolitik and Idealism in Foreign Policy in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.