The Second Afghan War 1878 - 1880

Aug 7, 2010 Michael Streich

Attempting to check Imperial Russian ambitions in Afghanistan, Britain sent military forces into the region but was unable to maintain control of the land.

The Second Afghan War, beginning in 1878, was caused by Russian diplomatic efforts designed to court the emir in Kabul, an action representing a direct threat to the imperial ambitions of Great Britain. Afghanistan was a buffer state bordering Britain’s “jewel in the crown,” India. Further, Afghan leaders had repeatedly refused to accept an official British mission in Kabul. After Emir Shere Ali signed a treaty with Russia in 1878, Lord Lytton, Viceroy of India, sent a military force into Afghanistan. The war ended in 1880 and British troops withdrew from a country they could not hold.

Roberts Leads the March into Kabul

Britain’s “forward policy” was advocated by British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli as well as Lord Lytton. Lytton described the policy, stating “Afghanistan is a state far too weak and barbarous to remain isolated and wholly uninfluenced between two great military empires such as England and Russia.” (New York Times, April 28, 1900) Three British armies were sent into Afghanistan. Major General Frederick Roberts’ command, the smallest with 6,300 British and native troops, achieved the greatest success, however.

Lt. General Samuel Browne commanded a force of 16,000 and Major General Donald Stewart, commanding the Kandahar Field Force, led 13,000. Roberts entered Afghanistan November 21, 1878 and proceeded down the Kurram Valley. It was here where Roberts distinguished himself and demonstrated superb leadership, out-flanking a superior force of Afghans at night around a mountain and defeating the insurgents. Roberts was reinforced with 2,685 troops and 868 cavalry, including the highly esteemed 92nd Gordan Highlanders.

The Cavagnari Massacre in Kabul

Emir Shere Ali fled Afghanistan, leaving his son Yakub Khan in charge of the fractured nation. The subsequent Treaty of Gandamuk allowed for a British mission in Kabul. The British mission delegation was led by Sir Louis Cavagnari.

Without significant British protection, however, his position was vulnerable. Two months after the treaty, Cavagnari, his staff, and the entire small military escort were murdered.

Britain’s Punitive Expedition to Kabul and Kandahar

General Roberts led the Kabul Field Force back into Afghanistan in September 1879 and swiftly captured and occupied Kabul. But in December, Afghans in the surrounding regions rose up again and Roberts faced an enemy force of 100,000. At the same time, the British suffered a disastrous defeat at Maiward.

Roberts held Kabul and defeated the Afghan insurgents. In August 1880, he marched into Kandahar, relieved the pitiful survivors, and pacified the region. But it was impossible to hold. The mountains were treacherous, teeming with Afghan insurgents. The British left Afghanistan, unable to hold the country or influence its fragile leadership.

Lessons from the Afghan Wars

Afghanistan has been called the “graveyard of empires.” Alexander the Great attempted to conquer the land but was unsuccessful. In the 1980s, Soviet Russia fought a costly and unsuccessful war for control of Afghanistan in what observers have called “Russia’s Vietnam.” Today, America and its European allies are fighting in Afghanistan, ironically, attempting to pacify Kandahar, the same region that witnessed a major British defeat in the second phase of the Second Afghan War.

Every invader has found the same thing in Afghanistan: a poor nation that is politically fractured and divided into spheres of power controlled by local warlords. The enemy is both a fanatic insurgency as well as difficult terrain. The wars have also been expensive. According to historian Simon Schama, “When the news of the expensive disaster came in the prime minister [Disraeli] was appalled…” Although the conditions of the contemporary Afghan War are very different, one fact remains the same: the Afghans refuse to be conquered.

Sources:

• Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972)
• Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (Little, Brown and Company, 1997)
• Andrew Porter, editor, The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford University Press, 1999)
• Simon Schama, A History of Britain, Volume III, The Fate of Empire 1776 – 2000 (Hyperion, 2002)

Copyright Michael Streich. Contact the author to obtain permission for republication.