The SEATO Treaty Confronts Communism in Asia

Mar 4, 2011 Michael Streich

The 1954 SEATO treaty was a response to Communist aggression in Asia and later used to justify U.S. involvement in South Vietnam.

The early years of the Cold War were defined by the formation of alliances designed to contain Communism and promote prosperity and peace. In his memoirs, President Eisenhower wrote that, “Squalor and starvation worked to the advantage of Communist ambitions.” As leader of the “free world,” the United States forged alliances like NATO that would, in future decades, justify global policing. The 1954 South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was one such alliance.

The Presence of Communism in Asia after World War II

Just as Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” had divided Europe, so also a “bamboo curtain” in Asia separated vulnerable “free nations” from those under Communist control such as mainland China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. In other nations, like the Philippines, insurgent groups, supplied by Communist powers, sought to ferment revolution.

Most every former colonial possession in Asia faced an internal threat from pro-Communist elements. Immediately after World War II, Josef Stalin, the Soviet leader, even demanded a partition of Japan similar to the one in Korea. The expansion of Communism in Asia was viewed as a voracious attempt to control a number of struggling nations.

Although Eisenhower ended the Korean War, he agreed with his predecessor Harry Truman about the role the U.S. should play in world affairs, specifically in confronting Communism. To the extent that the American public also agreed is evident by Eisenhower’s victory in 1952.

As the commander of U.S. forces in Europe during World War II and the supreme commander of NATO forces, Eisenhower exuded confidence and leadership. The Communist threat in Asia impacted U.S. commercial interests while subverting legitimate governments struggling to develop into free societies.

Collective Security and Assurance of Sovereign Integrity

The pivotal clause of the SEATO treaty was found in Article IV, Section 1. Although a military response is not mentioned, the clause refers to “aggression” committed against “any of the Parties” in the treaty area. The presumption was that each member, after unanimous consent, would collectively respond to the aggression “in accordance with…constitutional processes.”

Neither Vietnam nor South Korea was a full partner in SEATO which was dominated by the former Asian colonial powers Britain, France, and the U.S. In many ways SEATO was an extension of both NATO and the Truman Doctrine. The U.S. Senate ratified the SEATO treaty with only one dissenting vote after being guaranteed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that treaty obligations would not lead to a ground war involving American soldiers. Vietnam disproved that guarantee.

SEATO and the Coming of the Vietnam War

In terms of Southeast Asia, Dulles had not only opened a Pandora ’s Box, but was responsible for its construction. The Johnson administration, for example, not only acted on the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, but used the SEATO protocols for authority to wage war in South Vietnam.

In response, Senator J. William Fulbright told Secretary Dean Rusk that, “I do not believe the SEATO treaty ever contemplated such action.” Rusk reminded Fulbright that it was the Senate that passed the measure.

In his memoirs, Undersecretary of State under Johnson, George W. Ball, quotes a memorandum by Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara in which they point out that, “We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism…we recognize that the introduction of United States and other SEATO forces may be necessary to achieve this objective.”

Appraisal of SEATO and the Impact of the Treaty on U.S. Foreign Policy

After the war, Senator Fulbright concluded that the world and specifically the U.S. might have been a different place had Dulles been encouraged to support the Geneva Accords of 1954 regarding Vietnam and never introduced the SEATO treaty. Although South Vietnam was not an initial partner to SEATO, a separate protocol tied it to SEATO objectives.

A noticeable absence in the organization was the inclusion of Asian nations other than the Philippines and Pakistan. It was, as one scholar noted, a “white man’s” attempt to preserve former colonial possessions from Communist influences. This paralleled the prevailing belief regarding Communism versus the free world in the early years of the Cold War.

Sources:

• Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Penguin Books, 1997)
• George W, Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (W. W. Norton & Company, 1983)
• Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change 1953-1956 (Doubleday, 1963)
• J. William Fulbright, The Price of Empire (Pantheon Books, 1989)
• Text of the SEATO treaty (Department of State Bulletin, September 20, 1954)

Copyright Michael Streich. Contact the author to obtain permission for republication.