Revolutionary Charleston Marks the Beginning of the End for British in Southern Campaign

Michael Streich June 29, 2009

By the end of 1779, Sir Henry Clinton, British commander of North American forces during the latter part of the Revolutionary War, turned his attention south, dispatching a sizeable force to take Charleston. The South Carolina campaign, begun with much promise, rapidly deteriorated into a type of guerrilla warfare with atrocities committed by both sides. Much of this was due to Lord Cornwallis, the southern commander after Sir Clinton returned to New York.

 

Clinton Moves against Charleston, South Carolina

 

According to Sir Henry Clinton’s memoirs, the taking of Charleston had long figured in his overall strategy to win the war against the American rebels. Loyalist support was thought to be strongest in the South, notably in the Carolinas. Finally, recent British successes in Georgia seemed to confirm a southern campaign might swiftly change the course of the entire war.

 

Charleston was defended by 5,000 men, many from militia units, under the command of Major General Benjamin Lincoln. (some sources cite the number of defenders at 7,000) Clinton left New York with almost 100 ships under the command of Vice Admiral Arbuthnot and nearly 8,000 troops. His second in command was Lord Cornwallis, who had only returned from England following the death of his wife.

 

The Siege of Charleston

 

After suffering losses on the seas, the British landed south of Charleston on John’s Island. The siege would last 42 days. General Lincoln, well aware that his forces could not successfully defend the South’s largest city, made plans to evacuate the Continentals while escape was still possible.

 

However, according to General William Moultrie’s journal entry of April 26, 1780, leading Charleston citizens threatened to open the gates to the city and “cut up his [Lincoln’s] boats,” if he evacuated his troops. What some military historians call Lincoln’s decisive mistake probably resulted in the largest single military defeat of the war.

 

At the same time Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s “British Legion,” composed primarily of saber-wielding cavalry, pacified the countryside, cutting off supply routes such as at Biggin’s Bridge, north of Charleston. Admiral Arbuthnot’s warships easily sailed past Forts Johnson and Moultrie. Charleston would endure a relentless bombardment from both land and sea.

 

The fall of Charleston

 

Lincoln surrendered Charleston on May 12, 1780. Although the Continentals were taken prisoner, civilians and militia soldiers were allowed to return to their farms, some officers even allowed to keep their swords. Clinton returned to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis and 4,000 men. Before he left Charleston, however, Sir Henry Clinton issued an order that was to prove fatal to the British cause.

 

Clinton, in essence, forced all provincial inhabitants to take an oath of loyalty to the Crown or be branded as rebels. Militiamen that had returned home viewed their repatriation as duplicity. Many neutral citizens that had not taken sides were now forced into a decision. Clinton’s order was the first step in the coming rural warfare that would culminate in some of the bloodiest atrocities of the war.

 

The Second Fatal Blunder

 

The second blunder occurred when Colonel Tarleton’s cavalry overtook the Virginia Infantry, commanded by Colonel Buford. Buford was heading north to join rebel forces in North Carolina. The encounter resulted in a bloodbath. Tarleton gave no quarter as surrendering men were cut down with saber. The wounded were bayoneted.

 

This atrocity galvanized Patriot forces in the Carolinas as men rushed to join the opposition, including a young Andrew Jackson who had helped to treat the few fortunate survivors of the massacre. Rebels attacked the homes and wives of Loyalists; Tories and British raiding parties retaliated. Many innocent civilians died. As historian Walter Edgar comments, the British stirred up a hornet’s nest. Much of the blame rests with Cornwallis, who allowed field commanders extensive freedom of movement and chose not to intervene.

 

Sources:

 

Walter Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats: The Southern Conflict That Turned the Tide of the American Revolution (HarperCollins, 2001)

Christopher Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes (New York: Avon Books, 1991)

The Spirit of Seventy-Six: The Story of the American Revolution as Told by its Participants Edited by Henry S. Commager and Richard B. Morris (Castle Books, 2002)

Copyright owned by Michael Streich. Contact Michael Streich for permission to republish. First published in Suite101.