Nagumo at the Battle of Midway
Vice Admiral Nagumo's string of successes included Pearl Harbor, Rabaul, Port Darwin, and Ceylon, leading to a feeling of invincibility & causing the blunders at Midway.
Up to June 4, 1942, the naval career of Japanese Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo had been stellar during the first months of the Pacific war. As Japan’s top carrier commander, Nagumo’s carrier strike force attacked Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. The surprise attack was a success, although no American carriers were affected. Between Pearl Harbor and Midway, Nagumo’s carriers expanded Japanese domination of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It was Admiral Yamamoto’s “decisive” Midway battle, however, that ended Nagumo’s string of successes. These successes also led to a notion of Japanese invincibility and over-confidence.
From Pearl Harbor to Midway Island
The attack on Pearl Harbor was simultaneous with other Japanese actions in the South Pacific. In these actions, Vice Admiral Nagumo played a significant role. His victories at Rabaul and Port Darwin were followed by a swing into the Indian Ocean with the intent of destroying British naval forces and bases centered at Ceylon.
Nagumo’s destruction of the Colombo naval base, including naval repair shops, railroads, and an airfield, enabled Japan to establish a defensive perimeter from Southeast Asia to Singapore while confining British naval threats to east Africa. The April 1942 campaign left his fleet sorely in need of overhaul as plans were already finalized to begin the Midway operation in early June.
Nagumo at the Battle of Midway
At the time Nagumo’s carrier force was within striking distance of Midway, Japanese intelligence had not discovered the presence of two American carrier task forces, let alone their exact locations. Task Force 16, commanded by Rear Admiral Ray Spruance, included the Hornet and the Enterprise; Task Force 17, led by Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher, included the recently repaired Yorktown, heavily damaged at the Coral Sea months earlier.
Although Nagumo was supported by Vice Admiral Kondo’s invasion fleet, Yamamoto had divided his carriers, a mistake that might have been a factor in the overall battle plan. Nagumo’s air strike against Midway depleted his planes. When the American carriers launched their attacks against Nagumo’s four carriers, he was outnumbered. If Nagumo had the light carriers Ryujo and Junyo, part of the diversionary operation at the Aleutians, the odds might have been in his favor.
Poor intelligence was also a key factor in Nagumo’s staggering losses. According to Paul Dull, “Nagumo’s air reconnaissance was grossly inadequate…” The inability to know the American carrier strength caught Nagumo off-guard as he exposed his flight decks while rearming his planes. Dull states: “The confusion involved in changing the armament of his planes after the Tone’s No. 4 plane sighted an enemy carrier was also the fault of his inefficient communications system.” (167)
Louis Allen cites possible Japanese over-reaching in the Bay of Bengal during the Ceylon operation as a long range factor at the Coral Sea and Midway. “If…Nagumo had not reached out for Ceylon…the carrier group might not have been short of skilled pilots and might have avoided the reverses….in the Coral Sea and at Midway.” (34)
Defeat of First Mobile Force, Carrier Strike Force
After dispatching the heavy carriers Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu, American aircraft located Hiryu, which had become separated from the main force. By the end of the battle, all four carriers had been destroyed. The Americans lost the Yorktown. Vice Admiral Nagumo was reassigned as Yamamoto ordered a withdrawal, unable to lure Admiral Spruance into a night battle involving capital ships.
Vice Admiral Nagumo committed suicide in 1944 at the end of the battle for Saipan, shot in the back of the head by a naval officer who had volunteered for the task. The long career of the “diminutive” admiral, known for his gruffness and uncommunicativeness, had ended. He was promoted to full admiral posthumously.
Sources:
Louis Allen, The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War: Singapore 1941-1942, series edited by Noble Frankland and Christopher Dowling (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1977).
Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945) (United States Naval Institute, 1978).
John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1933-1945, Vol. 2 (New York: Random House, 1970).
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