Franklin Roosevelt and the Yalta Conference
Charting a Post War Europe Based on Free and Open Elections
The Yalta Conference of February 4, 1945 was the last meeting of the “Big Three,” Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Josef Stalin. Roosevelt died shortly after the conference, leaving a legacy of doubt and suspicion regarding agreements made at the conference. Historian Robert Sherwood aptly wrote that, “Yalta has been blamed for many of the ills with which the world was afflicted in the years following the total defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan.” Although many Americans believed that FDR had “sold out” Eastern Europe to Stalin, there is no evidence that this was the president’s intention.
Yalta and the Polish Question
World War II began with the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany, followed by Soviet invasion and occupation September 17, 1939. Both nations incorporated Poland as per the secret protocols of the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty. The legitimate Polish government fled to London. It was this exiled government that was recognized by the United States and Great Britain.
As the war drew to a close, however, German armies were retreating west. By the summer of 1944, the Red Army was ready to cross the Vistula River to liberate Warsaw. Polish resistance fighters – the Home Army, began a prolonged uprising against the German occupiers in the Warsaw Rising that would cost a quarter million lives. Although prodded into rising by the Soviets, the Red Army refused to cross the river, despite appeals from Roosevelt and Churchill.
Satisfied that the German defenders had eliminated any Poles that might offer similar resistance to the Soviets, the Red Army marched into a destroyed city five months later and installed the pro-communist Lublin government. At Yalta, Roosevelt was determined that the exiled Polish government should be included and that free elections must be held.
Franklin Roosevelt’s Declaration
Roosevelt’s “Declaration on Liberated Europe” proposed free elections in all Eastern European countries, particularly Poland, which was to include all factions: a "Provisional Government of National Unity.” Surprisingly, Stalin agreed to these proposals. At the same time, however, Soviet agents were busy setting up pro-communist governments in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.
Roosevelt was exuberant and felt that the conference had been a success. Commenting on the final agreements regarding Poland, his Chief of Staff, Admiral William Leahy, stated, “This is so elastic that the Russians can stretch it from Yalta to Washington without ever technically breaking it.” Roosevelt, however, believed it was the best the West could get out of Stalin.
Other Yalta Agreements
Stalin promised Roosevelt to enter the war against Japan 2-3 weeks after the final defeat of Nazi Germany. It was agreed that Russia would receive land concessions in Asia such as the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin. Also discussed were the protocols involving the new organization of nations – the United Nations, of which veto power was the most contentious question. Additionally, Russia demanded separate seats for Ukraine and Belarus.
On the issue of Iran, Russia refused to be drawn into a discussion. The Middle East, including the status of the Dardanelles, was important to the British. In an effort to maintain the strong Anglo-American alliance, Roosevelt supported Churchill on most issues but rejected his suspicions that Stalin could not be trusted and that the Russians would not abide by the agreements coming out of Yalta, notably the promise of free elections.
Big Three Motivations
Everyone at Yalta knew that the European war was rapidly drawing to a close. Stalin was already looking toward the post-war world. His agenda included war reparations and expansion. Churchill’s post-war goal was to maintain the Empire, particularly India. Roosevelt, however, still had to defeat Japan. This would require one million fresh soldiers in the Pacific, according to General Marshall. Each leader approached Yalta with a definite agenda and left with different short term aims.
Sources:
- Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Penguin Books, 1997)
- Irwin F. Gellman, Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Wells (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995)
- Robert E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, Volume II, January 1942-July 1945 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949)
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