Civil War Political Generals

Promoting Men Through Patronage Helped Serve a Purpose

May 4, 2009 Michael Streich

The appointment of political generals by Abraham Lincoln was part of an effort to help unify the North and guarantee support from ethnic and political constituencies.

When the Civil War began, Northern troop strength was low and it would take some weeks to begin the process of building an army. Exacerbating this situation was an acute shortage of officers. The majority of “West Pointers” on General Winfield Scott’s staff came from the South and most resigned their commissions to return to Southern states. Other seasoned officers – like Grant and Sherman, had left the army to pursue private ventures. Filling this gap, President Lincoln turned to political generals that frequently resulted in leadership incompetence.

The Benefits of Promoting Political Generals

Both the North and the South employed political generals, although the practice was, by far, more common in the North. Jefferson Davis was fortunate to have a large number of West Point graduates; 306 such men served in Southern armies. Yet even in the South political expediency caused the promotions of such unskilled men as Robert Toombs and Henry Wise.

Abraham Lincoln welcomed the opportunity to appoint political generals, but for reasons related to national unity. Civil War historian James McPherson writes that, “Each of the political generals represented an important ethnic, regional, or political constituency in the North.” Lincoln’s actions demonstrated patronage, an important element for producing loyalties, either from ethnic groups like the Germans or northern Democrats.

The classic example cited my many Civil War historians involved Lincoln’s choice of Alexander Schimmelfennig for the position of brigadier general, over the protests of Secretary of War Stanton. Lincoln, however, wanted a truly “Dutch” sounding name (the term “Dutch” often employed for German). Lincoln reasoned that ethnic Germans would be more apt to support his efforts if their local newspapers, often in the native language, highlighted the exploits of their own.

Contributions of Political Generals

Newspaper stories did, in fact, bolster the feats of political generals even if the reality of their combat contributions was far different. Schimmelfenning, fighting at Chancellorsville, was made the scapegoat by General Joseph Hooker for the large Union losses and setback. Others fared no better. Commenting on Benjamin Butler, a Massachusetts corporate attorney who managed to secure a command position, the young John Hay observed that Butler was “perfectly useless and incapable for campaigning.”

Politicians turned generals rarely had the experience necessary for leading men. Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson, enduring the rigors of military life for the first time, took ill and resigned after spending days inspecting the defenses of Washington. New York Senator Daniel Sickles, a Democrat, commanded no respect from the men under him and was frequently referred to as “brutal.”

Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman also owed their commissions to political connections. Grant was championed by an influential Illinois congressman; Sherman’s older brother was the United States Senator from Ohio and a founding member of the Republican Party. Unlike other appointments resulting from political considerations, however, both Grant and Sherman were West Pointers.

Some politicians given a rank distinguished themselves such as Rutherford B. Hayes and William McKinley, both from Ohio and both future presidents. It didn’t hurt James Garfield’s presidential election bid in 1880 to remind voters that he had served, albeit briefly, as a brigadier general.

Lincoln’s Strategy in Promoting Political Generals

Lincoln knew that the North would ultimately triumph even though some command positions were given to men without training or experience. These appointments filled a political necessity that was deemed important in the early months of the war. Lincoln needed a unified North behind him; political generals helped in that process.

Inevitably, this gave the South, initially at least, a distinct advantage, demonstrated by their ability to thwart many of the early advances of the North, beginning at Bull Run in July 1861.

Sources:

• James M. McPherson, “Lincoln and the Strategy of Unconditional Surrender,” Lincoln the War President, Gabor S. Boritt, ed. (Oxford University Press, 1992)
• Page Smith, Trial by Fire: a People’s History of the Civil War and Reconstruction (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982)
• T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (Alfred A. Knopf, 1952)

Copyright Michael Streich. Republishing requires written permission.