Monday, November 30, 2020

 

The Fall of Singapore February 15, 1942

Poor Planning and Indecisive Leadership Led to Japanese Victory

Winston Churchill's Asian "fortress" was captured by General Yamashita as a result of inadequate defensive measures, inter-service rivalries, and vacillation.

Singapore, at the southern tip of Malaya, was founded in 1824 by Sir Stamford Raffles. The island city would serve as Great Britain’s most important Pacific Imperial outpost from which ships carried rubber and tin to other destinations of the world-wide empire. It was considered an impregnable fortress, the Asian “Rock of Gibraltar.” According to Noel Barber, it was a “polyglot city built on swamp…cocooned in the myth of utter security.” That myth was shattered in February 1942 when Japanese forces, having easily overwhelmed Malaya, captured Singapore.

The Defense of Singapore

As early as 1919 British Admiral John Jellicoe visited Singapore and perceived a possible threat from Japan, a nation in the process of militarizing and threatening the China “Open Door” policy. At the outbreak of the Pacific War on December 7, 1941, Singapore’s defenses, however, were still woefully inadequate. Several of the newly constructed air bases were impossible to defend and the existing aircraft were obsolete.

Inter-service cooperation between the RAF, the navy, and the army was poor, further exacerbating the inability of sound defensive planning. Although heavy guns pointed toward the sea, from which it was believed a Japanese attack would come, the northern part of the island, facing the Johore Straits, was left without defensive deterrents. Until the last days of Singapore’s freedom, even as Japanese units could be seen preparing their assault, General Percival, the commander, refused the pleas of officers to fortify the area, citing the possibility of declining morale.

On orders from Winston Churchill, the Repulse and the Prince of Whales were dispatched to Singapore as a show of force, significantly, without a carrier escort. These capital ships had been sent against the recommendations of the Admiralty. Commanded by Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, both ships would be sunk shortly after their arrival by Japanese aircraft as they patrolled north of Singapore. Command of the sea was lost.

Before the war, Singapore maintained a population of half a million inhabitants. That number soared to over a million as Japanese forces eventually moved down the peninsula. 88,000 troops, later reinforced by the British 18th Division, diverted from their initial destination of Burma, defended Singapore.

The Battle for Singapore

In early December 1941, Japanese troops under the command of General Yamashita landed at Kota Bahru, four hundred miles north of Singapore. Although opposition was fierce, Japanese forces enveloped defending forces more than once and began to chip away at the disorganized British strategy. The Japanese covered the 650 miles from Siam, their starting point, to Singapore in seventy days, thirty less than planned.

Relentless day-time bombing of the city filled hospitals. Although initial targets were the docks and military installations such as the air bases, civilian targets included Chinatown and later, as the end approached, the colonial government centers. Four steamers filled with women and children left the city under the cover of night, each reaching their destinations safely.

By the time Yamashita’s forces were ready to cross the Jahore Straits, General Percival finally gave the order to Brigadier Simson to fortify the northeast shore. The Japanese invasion, however, came from the northwest shore. Simson, an engineering officer who had repeatedly called for fortifying the entire shore line, attempted to move the fortifications, but it was too late.

Singapore fell on Sunday, February 15th at 6:10 PM, when General Percival signed Yamashita’s ultimatum of unconditional surrender. Poor and inadequate planning, leadership vacillation, and an inability by all leaders to work together had contributed to the fall. Additionally, Winston Churchill and Parliamentary leaders failed to grasp the true situation in Singapore in December 1941.

Would sending more, up-to-date, aircraft, as advocated in Parliament by Sir Archibald Southby, have helped? Should the north shore have been fortified sooner, creating an impregnable citadel? General Percival later admitted that not fortifying Singapore earlier had been a mistake.

Sources:

Louis Allen, Singapore 1941-1942: The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1977).

Noel Barber, A Sinister Twilight: The Fall of Singapore 1942 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968).

Holland, Tport

Michael Streich -

Retired History Adjunct Instructor




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