OPLAN 34A and Covert Action in Vietnam

A Top Secret Operation Provides the Motivation for U.S. Escalation

Jul 15, 2009 Michael Streich

USS Maddox - US Navy: Public Domain Image

Begun by the CIA, OPLAN 34A called for covert action against Communist North Vietnam including aerial bombing in Laos and DeSoto destroyer missions in the Tonkin Gulf.

By early 1964 President Johnson had to confront the fact that American presence in Southeast Asia was not turning the tide against North Vietnam. Americans were convinced that the Communists in the north were heavily subsidized by the Soviet Union which had been busy promoting “wars of liberation.” South Vietnam was a domino. If it fell, Laos would be the next to fall until all of Southeast Asia was lost to the Communist cause. Thus, in early February, Operation Plan 34A (OPLAN 34A) was launched.

OPLAN 34A and Covert Operations

Facilitated under the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterintelligence and Special Activities, OPLAN 34A was top secret. Although run under the Department of Defense, the operation had begun in the early 1960s under the CIA. CIA covert operations can be traced back even further to the mid-1950s when Air Force Colonel Edward Lansdale implemented secret operations against North Vietnam.

Under President Kennedy, the covert plan was expanded to include the use of PT boats in assisting South Vietnamese clandestine naval operations against the North. By February 1964, President Kennedy had been assassinated and Lyndon Johnson had to deal with what appeared to be an escalating situation in Vietnam.

OPLAN 34A called for several responses to North Vietnamese actions against the South. The operation included commando raids, specifically to disable North Vietnam’s transportation system. In Laos, American planes flown by American pilots were to bomb North Vietnamese operations based in that country. The planes were marked as being part of the Laotian air force. Planes were also used to drop propaganda leaflets.

An important part of the operation involved the “DeSoto” missions: U.S. destroyers patrolling off the coast of North Vietnam that assisted with relaying intelligence to South Vietnamese forces regarding North Vietnamese naval operations and coordinating commando raids against the North. The destroyers were assisted by aircraft on the carrier Ticonderoga.

The Maddox and the C. Turner Joy

On August 2, 1964, the Maddox was patrolling secretly along the coast of North Vietnam when it was attacked by three North Vietnamese PT boats. Returning fire, the Maddox sunk one of the attacking boats and severely crippled the other two. Jets from the Ticonderoga supported the Maddox, which sustained no damage from the twenty-minute encounter. The response in Washington, D.C., however, was muted. While some leaders called for retaliatory action, President Johnson favored a moderate, wait-and-see approach, perhaps aware that the Maddox had not been in international waters when attacked.

OPLAN 34A continued on August 3rd and Captain Herrick, commanding the Maddox, was ordered to maintain his position off the coast of Vietnam. By this time the Maddox was supported by the C. Turner Joy, another destroyer. That night, in stormy seas, sonar abroad the Maddox registered in-coming torpedoes. Both destroyers returned fire. The attacks on the ship were never verified, however, and Captain Herrick claimed that faulty sonar readings prompted the false alarm.

Admiral Sharp, Pacific Operations commander in Hawaii, reported to Washington that the attacks had taken place. Despite efforts to keep the alleged attacks from reaching the media, the story was soon leaked, forcing President Johnson to react.

Reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks

The questionable second attacks gave Johnson the opportunity to widen American involvement in Vietnam. He was also acutely aware that his Republican opponent in November would be Senator Barry Goldwater, a vocal if not necessarily articulate “hawk” who led a conservative faction that saw Communism as nothing less than an anti-Christ movement. The ensuing Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed by Congress gave Johnson the weapon not only to defeat Goldwater, but to drive Communism from Vietnam.

Sources:

• George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: the United States and Vietnam 1950-1975 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986)
• Jon Margolis, The Last Innocent Year: America in 1964 [The Beginning of the “Sixties”] New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1999)
• Randall Bennett Woods, J. William Fulbright, Vietnam, and the Search for a Cold War Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, 1998)

Copyright Michael Streich. Contact the author to obtain permission for republication.