Korean War, Harry Truman, and Communism

Proving the Strength of Containment While Building Political Appeal

Jan 18, 2009 Michael Streich

The Democrats in 1950 were faced with an opposition party accusing it of being soft on Communism and allowing China to fall to Chairman Mao. Korea would prove them wrong.

On June 25th, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and began an invasion of the South. The very next day President Harry Truman reacted by extending the Truman Doctrine to the Pacific, announcing military support for the French in Indochina as well as the Philippine government fighting the Huks, and preparing a swift American response in Korea. It was a moment to demonstrate to the American people, the world, and particularly Communists in Russia and Asia that the United States would not tolerate expanding Communism.

The Cold War and Communism in American Politics

Two years into his second term, Harry Truman had been barely elected in 1948. The Republican Party had made significant gains, thwarting his social program and extensions of New Deal ideology. Communism was the single most foreign policy concern as Josef Stalin flexed his muscles, supporting pro-Communist movements – such as the Huks. Winston Churchill’s warning of an Iron Curtain descending in Europe seemed to be true in Asia as well.

The political parties blamed each other. “Who lost China?” was the question on many minds as Mao’s forces appeared to be preparing for an invasion of Taiwan, the island home of the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek. In the Congress, the House Un-American Activities Committee was engaged in hearings on potential Communist spying in the US. The Soviet Union had tested an atomic bomb in 1949, fifteen years before they were predicted to have such capabilities.

American troops occupied Japan, working to rebuild the nation both physically and politically. Yet even in Japan an emerging Communist Party was staging anti-US protest demonstrations. Japan and the Philippines were part of the American “line of defense,” as stated by Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Tom Connally in May 1950.

In Korea, split in September 1945 when Russian troops took the Japanese surrender in the North and American forces under General Hodge took the surrender in the South, an American puppet leader, Syngman Rhee, was struggling to remain in power. Immensely unpopular and undemocratic, Rhee, much like Vietnam’s Ngo Diem of later years, exacerbated Anti-American feelings and fed into Communist propaganda.

South Korea had not been a part of Connally’s “chain of defense.” Even the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had made similar statements, perhaps sending signals to the Communist North and its Kremlin supporters that the United States would not act if the South were invaded. The fact remains, however, that the Communist invasion offered Harry Truman and the Democratic Party a perfect opportunity to prove that they were strong in resisting Communism. Truman was well aware that the next general election was only two years away.

From Status Quo Ante Bellum to Thoughts of Liberation

If indeed the Democrats harbored any notions of emerging from Korea as the visible defenders of the free world, the strategy backfired. Josef Stalin ignored Truman’s early note of 1950 for status quo ante bellum and the war dragged on. Repulsing the South Koreans, Douglas MacArthur’s actions aimed at liberating the North, led to the threat of a wider conflict involving China.

As the war appeared to last beyond initial projections, Truman in late 1950 even considered using the atomic bomb. Ultimately, conduct of the war led to the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower who had only recently been appointed by Truman as the Supreme Commander Europe over NATO. Eisenhower told the American people he would personally go to South Korea and end the war.

Korea remained divided, as it is still today. Communism became more firmly entrenched, earning North Korea a spot in President George Bush’s “axis of evil.”

Sources:

Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Penguin, 1997) see chapter 7.

William J. Lederer, A Nation of Sheep (Fawcett Crest, 1967) see chapter 4.

Major Problems in American Foreign Policy Volume II, Since 1914, 2nd Ed. Thomas G. Paterson, editor (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1984)

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