Failure to End the Korean War in 1953
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates began talks on July 19, 2010 with South Korean political and military officials aimed at up-coming joint naval war games in the wake of the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan on March 26, 2010. The sinking was blamed on a North Korean torpedo. The current tensions between the two Koreas are traced to the 1950 Korean War, ending on July 27, 1953 with an armistice but not a peace treaty or a permanent solution. In early 1953 President Eisenhower hinted at using atomic weapons to end the conflict; today, North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. History has come full circle.
The Failure to End the Korean Conflict
The Korean War was, in part, a gift for the Truman administration in 1950. A year earlier, the Soviet Union had successfully tested its own atomic bomb. Korea allowed Truman to react to Republican criticism that the Democrats were soft on Communism.
Former Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Arkansas; died 1995) wrote [1] that after loosing the 1948 election, “the Republicans became desperate in their search for a winning issue.” This issue became the threat of expanding Communism. It was this issue that forced Truman’s hand and ultimately, in 1953, resulted in the notion – then propagated by the new Eisenhower administration, that Communism must never be appeased.
The inconclusive settlement, partially the fault of South Korea’s strongman Syngman Rhee, left a divided Korea at the 38th parallel and created a militarized zone that still exists today and occupies thousands of U.S. soldiers. At the same time, North Korea evolved into one of the most restrictive and dictatorial societies, one of President George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” nations.
The Korean War in 1952 and 1953
After General Douglas MacArthur reached the 38th parallel following a massive U.S. retreat from the North, President Truman and the United Nations entered into negotiations to end the conflict by returning all parties to status quo ante bellum. Both MacArthur and Rhee, however, sabotaged peace efforts.
MacArthur believed that Communism in Asia could only be crushed once China was liberated. Korea was a stepping stone toward that goal as was the use of General Chiang in Taiwan, where the Chinese Nationalist government had taken refuge. MacArthur’s public policy break with Truman led to his dismissal.
Rhee also wanted to keep fighting the North. In early 1953, as the new Eisenhower administration was starting peace talks, Rhee freed 26,000 North Korean prisoners, enraging the Communist North. According to William J. Lederer [2], “He tried everything possible to block the armistice negotiations; and wanted, instead, to march north and take North Korea.”
Rhee ruled South Korea with American support and economic help until 1960. The rebuilding of South Korea cost $2.5 billion (1950 values). Rhee employed thugs to root out any political opposition. Elections were rigged and corruption abounded.
But Rhee was a fierce anti-Communist at a time the U.S. viewed Communism as the greatest threat to American democracy. As in Vietnam, the U.S. overlooked Rhee’s practices because he supported American policy. Rhee was eventually turned out of power by a popular uprising.
The Korean Conflict in 2010
Tensions and threats of war between the prosperous South Korea and the impoverished North Korea continue. North Koreans frequently label South Korean leaders as “traitors,” “puppets of the U.S.,” and “western lackeys.” [3] North Korea frequently threatens war after every effort to impose sanctions. The armistice was signed 57 years ago, but the failure to definitely craft a long-term resolution led to almost six decades of tension.
- [1] J. William Fulbright, The Crippled Giant: American Foreign Policy and its Domestic Consequences (New York: Random House, 1972)
- [2] William J. Lederer, A Nation of Sheep (Fawcett Crest, 1961, see “What We Aren’t Told about Korea”)
- [3] See The People’s Korea
Other Sources:
- Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (New York: Penguin Books, 1997)
- Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: a History (New York: Modern Library, 2010)
- Frederick Marks, Power and Peace: the Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles (New York: Praeger, 1995)
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