Civil War Diplomacy and the Trent Affair

Lincoln's efforts to keep Britain and France out of the Civil War isolated the South and contributed to the eventual Union victory in 1865

Seward Kept England Out of the Civil War - Library of Congress Image

 immediate years after the war are often dwarfed by the conflict, but United States’ relations with Europe, notably Britain, were crucial to the ultimate success and final victory. These efforts included intensive pressure to keep Britain out of the war by minimizing any potential British diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy as well as stopping any commercial assistance to the southern states.

The Trent affair as well as the construction of the CSS Alabama, a Confederate raider, threatened to unravel the uneasy non-interference of Britain. The efforts of Secretary of State William Henry Seward and U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain Charles Francis Adams proved indispensable in keeping Britain out of the conflict.

The Trent Affair of 1861 Almost Creates a War with Great Britain

In early November 1861, Captain Charles Wilkes, commanding the USS San Jacinto, overheard rumors that two special envoys representing the Confederate States of America were in Havana, Cuba, ready to board the British vessel Trent, bound for Southampton. Wilkes concluded that the ambassadors would be carrying diplomatic dispatches that might provide useful information for the Union.

Former U.S. Senators James M. Mason and John Slidell were carrying dispatches to London, although these documents were locked in a mail room once it became apparent that Wilkes meant to stop the British mail ship Trent. Dispatches were contraband if carried by the ship of a neutral nation even though ambassadors of a belligerent nation were aboard.

Captain Wilkes did not search the Trent but took Mason, Slidell, and their party aboard the San Jacinto, setting a course for Boston. While his actions turned him into an instant hero in the North, the British response was harsh. British Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, demanded that the envoys be released and that the United States apologize.

Britain Threatens War and Sends Troops to Canada

Secretary of State Seward initially applauded the action, retreating from his position after it became apparent that Britain would go to war over what was considered a gross insult to the British flag. Additionally, the British upper classes harbored open sympathies with the Confederate South. The Trent affair played to those sympathies.

Britain sent 11,000 troops to Canada and instructed the governor general, Lord Monch, to activate the Canadian militia if war seemed inevitable. The British navy prepared to blockade the American coast. President Lincoln, writing that he had several sleepless nights trying to find a formula that would placate Britain without the loss of national honor, finally agreed to the release of the envoy.

Senator Charles Sumner Sways American Opinion on the Trent Affair

Charles Sumner represented the voice of reason, arguing that a war with Britain would result in the instant recognition of the rebel states by Britain. The British navy was in a position to break the Union blockade and keep the South supplied with needed war material.

In the end, Lincoln and Seward released the envoys, ending the crisis and throwing Confederate leaders into despair. Southerners viewed the Trent affair as the best circumstance to bring England into the conflict, thus assuring Confederate independence.

The Diplomatic War Between Britain and the United States

The Trent affair represented the lowest diplomatic point between Britain and the United States during the Civil War. Other pro-Southern actions by England, such as building the Confederate raider CSS Alabama, would be revisited after the war when the U.S. government insisted Britain pay for Union losses directly related to the Alabama’s actions.

Lincoln, whose experience in foreign affairs was limited, came to appreciate the importance of Anglo-American relations. Credit must also be given to Seward, Ambassador Adams in London, and the American ministers in Paris and Madrid. Keeping Europe out of the conflict was as much a Union victory as any success on the battlefield.

Sources:

• Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War (Brassey’s, 2000)
• James A. Rawley, editor, The American Civil War: An English View, The Writings of Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley (Stackpole Books, 2002)
• Page Smith, Trial By Fire: A People’s History of the Civil War and Reconstruction (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982)

Copyright Michael Streich. Contact the author to obtain permission for republication.