Monday, November 30, 2020

 

The Fall of Singapore February 15, 1942

Poor Planning and Indecisive Leadership Led to Japanese Victory

Winston Churchill's Asian "fortress" was captured by General Yamashita as a result of inadequate defensive measures, inter-service rivalries, and vacillation.

Singapore, at the southern tip of Malaya, was founded in 1824 by Sir Stamford Raffles. The island city would serve as Great Britain’s most important Pacific Imperial outpost from which ships carried rubber and tin to other destinations of the world-wide empire. It was considered an impregnable fortress, the Asian “Rock of Gibraltar.” According to Noel Barber, it was a “polyglot city built on swamp…cocooned in the myth of utter security.” That myth was shattered in February 1942 when Japanese forces, having easily overwhelmed Malaya, captured Singapore.

The Defense of Singapore

As early as 1919 British Admiral John Jellicoe visited Singapore and perceived a possible threat from Japan, a nation in the process of militarizing and threatening the China “Open Door” policy. At the outbreak of the Pacific War on December 7, 1941, Singapore’s defenses, however, were still woefully inadequate. Several of the newly constructed air bases were impossible to defend and the existing aircraft were obsolete.

Inter-service cooperation between the RAF, the navy, and the army was poor, further exacerbating the inability of sound defensive planning. Although heavy guns pointed toward the sea, from which it was believed a Japanese attack would come, the northern part of the island, facing the Johore Straits, was left without defensive deterrents. Until the last days of Singapore’s freedom, even as Japanese units could be seen preparing their assault, General Percival, the commander, refused the pleas of officers to fortify the area, citing the possibility of declining morale.

On orders from Winston Churchill, the Repulse and the Prince of Whales were dispatched to Singapore as a show of force, significantly, without a carrier escort. These capital ships had been sent against the recommendations of the Admiralty. Commanded by Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, both ships would be sunk shortly after their arrival by Japanese aircraft as they patrolled north of Singapore. Command of the sea was lost.

Before the war, Singapore maintained a population of half a million inhabitants. That number soared to over a million as Japanese forces eventually moved down the peninsula. 88,000 troops, later reinforced by the British 18th Division, diverted from their initial destination of Burma, defended Singapore.

The Battle for Singapore

In early December 1941, Japanese troops under the command of General Yamashita landed at Kota Bahru, four hundred miles north of Singapore. Although opposition was fierce, Japanese forces enveloped defending forces more than once and began to chip away at the disorganized British strategy. The Japanese covered the 650 miles from Siam, their starting point, to Singapore in seventy days, thirty less than planned.

Relentless day-time bombing of the city filled hospitals. Although initial targets were the docks and military installations such as the air bases, civilian targets included Chinatown and later, as the end approached, the colonial government centers. Four steamers filled with women and children left the city under the cover of night, each reaching their destinations safely.

By the time Yamashita’s forces were ready to cross the Jahore Straits, General Percival finally gave the order to Brigadier Simson to fortify the northeast shore. The Japanese invasion, however, came from the northwest shore. Simson, an engineering officer who had repeatedly called for fortifying the entire shore line, attempted to move the fortifications, but it was too late.

Singapore fell on Sunday, February 15th at 6:10 PM, when General Percival signed Yamashita’s ultimatum of unconditional surrender. Poor and inadequate planning, leadership vacillation, and an inability by all leaders to work together had contributed to the fall. Additionally, Winston Churchill and Parliamentary leaders failed to grasp the true situation in Singapore in December 1941.

Would sending more, up-to-date, aircraft, as advocated in Parliament by Sir Archibald Southby, have helped? Should the north shore have been fortified sooner, creating an impregnable citadel? General Percival later admitted that not fortifying Singapore earlier had been a mistake.

Sources:

Louis Allen, Singapore 1941-1942: The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1977).

Noel Barber, A Sinister Twilight: The Fall of Singapore 1942 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968).

Holland, Tport

Michael Streich -

Retired History Adjunct Instructor




 

Franklin Roosevelt and the Yalta Conference

Charting a Post War Europe Based on Free and Open Elections

Although the Yalta Conference addressed a variety of issues including Soviet participation against Japan, the post-war status of Poland was at the top of the agenda.

The Yalta Conference of February 4, 1945 was the last meeting of the “Big Three,” Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Josef Stalin. Roosevelt died shortly after the conference, leaving a legacy of doubt and suspicion regarding agreements made at the conference. Historian Robert Sherwood aptly wrote that, “Yalta has been blamed for many of the ills with which the world was afflicted in the years following the total defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan.” Although many Americans believed that FDR had “sold out” Eastern Europe to Stalin, there is no evidence that this was the president’s intention.

The Yalta Conference and the Polish Question

World War II began with the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany, followed by Soviet invasion and occupation September 17, 1939. Both nations incorporated Poland as per the secret protocols of the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty. The legitimate Polish government fled to London. It was this exiled government that was recognized by the United States and Great Britain.

As the war drew to a close, however, German armies were retreating west. By the summer of 1944, the Red Army was ready to cross the Vistula River to liberate Warsaw. Polish resistance fighters – the Home Army, began a prolonged uprising against the German occupiers in the Warsaw Rising that would cost a quarter million lives. Although prodded into rising by the Soviets, the Red Army refused to cross the river, despite appeals from Roosevelt and Churchill.

Satisfied that the German defenders had eliminated any Poles that might offer similar resistance to the Soviets, the Red Army marched into a destroyed city five months later and installed the pro-communist Lublin government. At Yalta, Roosevelt was determined that the exiled Polish government should be included and that free elections must be held.

Franklin Roosevelt’s Declaration at the 1945 Yalta Conference

Roosevelt’s “Declaration on Liberated Europe” proposed free elections in all Eastern European countries, particularly Poland, which was to include all factions: a "Provisional Government of National Unity.” Surprisingly, Stalin agreed to these proposals. At the same time, however, Soviet agents were busy setting up pro-communist governments in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.

Roosevelt was exuberant and felt that the conference had been a success. Commenting on the final agreements regarding Poland, his Chief of Staff, Admiral William Leahy, stated, “This is so elastic that the Russians can stretch it from Yalta to Washington without ever technically breaking it.” Roosevelt, however, believed it was the best the West could get out of Stalin.

Other Yalta Conference Agreements Between FDR and Soviet Russia

Stalin promised Roosevelt to enter the war against Japan 2-3 weeks after the final defeat of Nazi Germany. It was agreed that Russia would receive land concessions in Asia such as the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin. Also discussed were the protocols involving the new organization of nations – the United Nations, of which veto power was the most contentious question. Additionally, Russia demanded separate seats for Ukraine and Belarus.

On the issue of Iran, Russia refused to be drawn into a discussion. The Middle East, including the status of the Dardanelles, was important to the British. In an effort to maintain the strong Anglo-American alliance, Roosevelt supported Churchill on most issues but rejected his suspicions that Stalin could not be trusted and that the Russians would not abide by the agreements coming out of Yalta, notably the promise of free elections.

Big Three Motivations at the Yalta Conference Led to the Cold War

Everyone at Yalta knew that the European war was rapidly drawing to a close. Stalin was already looking toward the post-war world. His agenda included war reparations and expansion. Churchill’s post-war goal was to maintain the Empire, particularly India. Roosevelt, however, still had to defeat Japan. This would require one million fresh soldiers in the Pacific, according to General Marshall. Each leader approached Yalta with a definite agenda and left with different short term aims.

Sources:

  • Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Penguin Books, 1997)
  • Irwin F. Gellman, Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Wells (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995)
  • Robert E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, Volume II, January 1942-July 1945 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949)
Holland, Tport

Michael Streich - Former Adjunct Instructor, History & Global Studies




 

Doolittle Raid, Coral Sea, and Midway Island

Three 1942 Military Successes Turning the Tide Against Japan

Each in their own way, the Doolittle Raid, the Battle of the Coral Sea, and the Battle of Midway helped turn the tide of war against Japan six months after Pearl Harbor.

The December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor unified Americans and ended the strong isolationist movement, but it also cast a cloud of melancholy among Americans, stunned that Imperial Japan could eviscerate not only the United States in the Pacific, but also Great Britain. President Roosevelt lost no time confronting the emergency, using executive power to organize the government into hundreds of boards and committees, giving the order to isolate potentially dangerous Japanese Americans, and giving the nod to the Manhattan Project. Yet it would be three 1942 military actions that would serve as the greatest morale boosters and provide the much needed turning point.

The Doolittle Raid

In April 1942, Lt. Colonel James Doolittle led a bombing mission against the home islands of Japan. Thought to be impervious to United States air attacks, the islands were suddenly vulnerable. Launched from the deck of the aircraft carrier Hornet, Doolittle’s B-25s bombed targets in Japan, including Tokyo, and flew on to China. More than anything, the Doolittle Raid raised American morale, although historians point out that the raid may have solidified Japan’s resolve to launch the Midway campaign.

Battle of the Coral Sea

One month after the Doolittle Raid, Japanese naval forces battled the Allies at the Coral Sea, off the coast of Queensland, Australia. The battle effectively stopped the southward advance of Japanese forces, enabling the survival of Australia which would prove crucial in future months. It was in Brisbane that General Douglas MacArthur established his headquarters and through Australia supplies would be funneled in the ensuring island-hopping campaign.

Battle of Midway

Without a doubt, Midway, occurring in early June 1942, was the turning point of the Pacific War. The elaborate Japanese plan, involving hundreds of ships, planes, and thousands of soldiers, was thwarted when US naval intelligence cracked the enemy code. Knowing that Midway was the intended target, Admiral Chester Nimitz ordered US carriers Hornet, Enterprise, and Yorktown to the region

The Japanese fleet, commanded by Admiral Yamamoto, was split into an attack fleet and an invasion fleet. A third group attacked the Alaskan Aleutian Islands as a diversion. The Japanese attack force was met by planes from the American carriers after launching its own attack on Midway Island. In the ensuring hours, American planes would destroy four enemy carriers, effectively ending Yamamoto’s plan and forcing the Japanese fleet to retire.

Effect of the Turning Point

Japan would never again have command of the Pacific. After Midway, Japanese forces were thrust into a defensive posture, fighting a war that would last three more long and bloody years. But the three military successes of early to mid 1942 helped to pave the way toward that ultimate victory and buy precious time for the Allies.

After Pearl Harbor, Admiral Yamamoto was to have said, “I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.” American victory, particularly at Midway, allowed the US to recover rapidly from Pearl Harbor, galvanize the nation’s industrial might, and prevail in both Europe and the Pacific theater.

Sources:

Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945) (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1978)

John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945 (New York: Random House, 1970)

Holland, Tport

Michael Streich - Former Adjunct Instructor, History & Global Studies


 

Argentina Violates British Sovereignty in the South Atlantic

Tension between the military junta in Argentina and Great Britain increased after an Argentine landing at South Georgia Island and the subsequent failure of diplomacy.

At 6:00 AM on April 2, 1982, Argentina, under the leadership of a right-wing dictatorship, invaded the Falklands Islands with two landing forces, seizing Port Stanley and violating British sovereignty. The islands had been part of the British community since 1833 and the invasion was termed a matter of “great gravity” by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. According to Thatcher, “British sovereign territory has been invaded by a foreign power.”

Why Argentina Invaded the Falklands

The Argentine military junta, led by General Leopoldo Galtieri, used the invasion to divert public concern from a weakening economy and criticism of human rights violations. Since 1978, an arms embargo by the United States, in tandem with new foreign policy objectives of the Carter administration, had further exacerbated Argentine objectives. This embargo was lifted in December 1981 during the Reagan administration and pushed through the US Congress by NC Senator Jesse Helms, a supporter of authoritarian regimes as a means to “keep communism out of this hemisphere.”

Confrontations and Public Opinion in the Falklands War

The Falkland Islands are only 400 miles from Argentina in the South Atlantic but over 8,000 miles from the British Isles. Despite earlier efforts by Argentina to claim the Falklands or Malvinas Islands as the Argentines called the island group, the inhabitants’ loyalties were with Britain. According to Prime Minister Thatcher, in an April 3rd speech to Parliament, the people of the islands did not want to be Argentines. Thus, the primary goal of the government was to pursue a policy freeing the islands “of occupation.” The “lawful” British government “had been usurped.”

Events leading to the invasion of the Falklands may well have begun in South Georgia Island, a dependency of the Falklands and claimed by Britain since 1775 when it was discovered by Captain Cook. On March 19, 1982, an Argentine warship arrived at S. Georgia and landed fifty men, ostensibly to threaten the British scientific station at the Antarctic base. Under British protests, most of the men were withdrawn.

Despite a February 1982 New York meeting between Argentine and British diplomats seeking a solution to the Falklands debate, newspapers in Buenos Aires printed inflammatory and “bellicose” stories regarding British claims to the Falklands, a harbinger of Argentine government policies regarding the disputed island group. According to Thatcher, however, the February talks were “constructive…cordial and positive…” and paved the way toward future negotiations.

The Argentine Invasion April 2, 1982 of the Falklands Islands

The British government was aware that the Argentine fleet had put to sea in the hours before the invasion. On March 28th, in a response to British inquiries, the Argentine Foreign Minister reasserted Argentine sovereignty over the islands and ended all diplomatic efforts to resolve the territorial dispute. An emergency meeting of the United Nation’s Security Council resulted in no solutions.

Prime Minister Thatcher called U.S. President Ronald Reagan to intervene in the crisis. Reagan, the U.S. State Department, and Congress supported British actions from the outset, sharing intelligence information with the British, albeit covertly. Only Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, later to chair the Foreign Relations Committee, supported Argentina. When Congress voted overwhelmingly to support Britain in an April 29th Resolution sponsored by Joseph Biden, Helms was the only Senator to oppose the measure.

Results of the Falklands War

European foreign ministers condemned the invasion and NATO leaders called for a diplomatic solution. In Britain, Argentine assets were frozen and export credits suspended. A naval task force, led by HMS Invincible, was dispatched to the South Atlantic. Although the British suffered losses, the Argentines ultimately withdrew. Argentine defeat eventually undermined the power of the military junta which was brought down by the Argentine people.

References:

  • Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, 8th Edition (Penguin Books, 1997) [general source]
  • William A Link, Righteous Warrior: Jesse Helms and the Rise of Modern Conservatism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988)
  • Speeches and papers of Margaret Thatcher.

Holland, Tport

Michael Streich -

Retired History Adjunct Instructor




 

Leader of the Communist International of Seamen & Harbor Workers



From the early 1920s until February 1933, Albert Walter led a world-wide organization that funded international Communist clubs, cells, and dispensed propaganda.

During the 1920s and until February 1933, Albert Walter was one of the most prominent leaders of the German Communist Party and the head of an international maritime union that sought to achieve Comintern (Communist International) goals throughout the world. Working out of Hamburg, Walter developed a highly organized system of control and intelligence. His shift in alliance to the Nazis and subsequent work for German intelligence prior to the outbreak of war shocked the Communist Party.

The Early Years in Hamburg

According to Communist defector Richard J.H. Krebs (alias Jan Valtin), Albert Walter was made a political commissar of the Baltic fleet by Lenin himself during a visit to Moscow shortly after the end of World War One. Walter had been a seaman, held in the United States after German merchant ships were seized. Returning to Hamburg after the war, he rapidly rose in the ranks of the party.

German Communists had been very active in the maritime trade. Their success among sailors of the Imperial fleet led to the naval mutiny of 1918 that turned Bremen into a war zone. Recognizing the value of converting sailors, the Comintern established the International Propaganda and Action Committee of Transport Works in 1922 with Albert Walter at the head.

This committee inaugurated the “Hamburg Method” designed to document every ship, the Communist cells aboard that ship, and all ship destinations. Through this efficient system, propaganda was sent throughout the world and local “clubs” established to further party goals. The Committee was headquartered in Hamburg because of the city’s great marine industry.

Throughout the early twenties, Soviet Russian officers were smuggled into Hamburg to “train” activists, turning these young men into “Red Marines.” Additionally, the international propaganda efforts paid off: at its height, the Committee supported 72 newspapers and over 4,000 worldwide Communist cells. Albert Walter facilitated the funding for the massive operation.

The Immediate Years before Hitler

In 1930 Albert Walter traveled to Moscow to attend a conference, part of which was to organize a new Seamen International. Goals included the formulation of plans to effectively tie up capitalist shipping in the event of war. This resulted in the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers (ISH for short), headed by Albert Walter. Revolutionary action included espionage as well as organizing cells. ISH had operating cells in 22 countries and 19 colonies while supporting 47 international clubs, including both coasts of the United States.

Arrest and Capitulation

Albert Walter was arrested during the night of February 27th, 1933 – the night of the Reichstag fire, along with other Communist leaders, and eventually imprisoned at Fuhlsbuettel Concentration Camp. Repeatedly tortured, he refused to break.

Richard Krebs, in his autobiography, states that Albert Walter had an “Achilles Heel,” which was his mother. Walter was utterly devoted to her. The Gestapo took him to a cell and allowed him to peer inside. Walter saw his mother and was told that if he did not work for the Gestapo, she would be tortured and executed.

This story conflicts with that told by members of his family who maintained that it was his friendship with the regional Gauleiter that got him out of the camp and convinced him to work for the Nazis.

After the War

Albert Walter was no stranger to politics and he was a survivor. In 1949 he became a member of the new German parliament, representing Hamburg on behalf of the conservative “Deutschen” Party (German Party) until 1957. He spent his retirement years in Hamburg, bequeathing his estate to the Seamen’s Union upon his death in 1980. This included a hand-carved chess set given to him by V. Molotov in the years before the war.

Sources:

  • Jan Valtin, Out of the Night (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1941)
  • Family archives

Holland, Tport

Michael Streich -

Retired History Adjunct Instructor




 

Franklin Roosevelt's 'Forgotten Man' of 1932

May 17, 2010 Michael Streich

FDR's April 8, 1932 speech focused on millions of Americans who were unemployed, about to lose their homes and farms, and without recourse to federal help.

By the end of 1932, 1,453 banks had closed during that year. In the previous two years, 3,646 banks closed. The nation’s farmers were particularly suffering as their costs soared and credit was unavailable. Many faced foreclosure. This was Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Forgotten Man,” coming out of his April 8, 1932 radio speech and from this would come the New Deal. This meant, according to Francis Perkins (Secretary of Labor from 1933 -1945) that “the forgotten man, the little man, the man nobody knew much about, was going to be dealt better cards to play with.”


Roosevelt the Progressive


Although the “Forgotten Man” speech signaled FDR’s intent to secure the Democratic nomination, it did not represent a departure in ideology. Historian Albert Fried, discussing Roosevelt’s moral ideals, states that they “kept faith in turn with the genteel mugwumpery of his youth and adolescence.” In the speech, Roosevelt refers to “These unhappy times…” and called for putting faith in “…the forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid.”

Roosevelt focused on restoring the buying power of small farmers, relief for homeowners and small – generally rural, banks, and the elimination of high protective tariffs. FDR took issue with the Hoover Administration’s solutions: “Here should be an objective of government itself, to provide at least as much assistance to the little fellow as it is now giving to the large banks and corporations.”


For Roosevelt, the economic picture was like a domino effect. “No nation can long continue half bankrupt.” If consumers could not buy the products that they were able to produce, unemployment would never be conquered. According to Roosevelt, “Main Street, Broadway, the mills, the mines will close if half the buyers are broke.” The 1929 Crash and subsequent depression created massive layoffs. Consumer credit was extinguished. Other than private charities, no federal assistance existed for Roosevelt’s “forgotten man.”


Reaction to the Forgotten Man



Al Smith, competing for the Democratic nomination, accused Roosevelt of being a demagogue and attempting to ignite class warfare. “I will take off my coat and fight to the end against any candidate who persists in…setting class against class and rich against poor.” (Jean Edward Smith, New York Times, May 14, 2007) Republicans also took issue with the “forgotten man” image and the promise of a New Deal. In September 1932, Hoover’s Secretary of War, Patrick J. Hurley, stated that President Hoover had “not forgotten any man of woman in America.” (New York Times, September 23, 1932)

Origin of the ‘Forgotten Man’


A September 18, 1932 New York Times article, “The Forgotten Man,” stated that the phrase “owes its genesis to an older decade: Professor William Graham Sumner of Yale, a noted opponent of socialism and protectionism…” In a National Review interview (June 12, 2007), Amity Shlaes also pinpoints the Yale philosopher while discussing her book, The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression. According to Shlaes, “During the Great Depression many people still recalled Sumner’s forgotten man.”


Will there always be a “Forgotten Man?”


Some argue that the New Deal never managed to affect all of the forgotten in American society. Blacks and other minorities experienced no relief nor, for that matter significant advances. FDR owed much of his support to the Southern political machines and was not about to confront segregation. Shlaes argues that the 1935 Schechter Poultry Corp. v United States Supreme Court decision was actually a victory for “the little man.” The case, which declared FDR’s National Recovery Act (NRA) unconstitutional, was a unanimous decision.


The American “forgotten man” may still exist. Timothy Eagan (New York Times, August 28, 2008) compared Barak Obama to FDR. Of Roosevelt, he wrote, “…with one speech, Franklin D. Roosevelt put himself on the side of a huge majority of Americans eager to throw out a president.” Eagan draws a parallel between the appeal of Obama and that of FDR. It may have been a reason Senator Obama was elected: voters that felt powerless in 2008 agreed with the phrase, “yes we can.”



References other than those noted in the article:

  • Anthony J. Badger, FDR: The First Hundred Days (NY: Hill and Wang, 2008)
  • Albert Fried, FDR and His Enemies (Palgrave: St. Martins Griffin, 1999)
  • Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (NY: The Viking Press, 1946)

© 2010 Michael Streich The copyright of the article is owned by Michael Streich and any attempt to republish in print or digitally requires written permission.




 

Decline and Fall of the American Empire

Niall Ferguson's Essay in Foreign Affairs March/April 2010


|

Mar 19, 2010 Michael Streich

Historian Niall Ferguson presents a different model for the decline and fall of empires, postulating that empires frequently fall rapidly and without warning.

It took just a few holes on the side of RMS Titanic to send the mighty liner to the ocean bottom one cold April night in 1912 in less than three hours. The “unthinkable” had happened and the so-called “unsinkable” Titanic went into the annals of maritime history as one of the worst disasters of all time. Niall Ferguson’s essay “Decline and Fall” in Foreign Affairs discusses how empires can dissolve catastrophically, often by seemingly unforeseen events. “Rome’s fall was sudden and dramatic,” Ferguson writes, evaluating empires in the light of current US dilemmas.


Why Empires Suddenly Collapse


Ferguson states that, “If empires are complex systems that sooner or later succumb to sudden and catastrophic malfunctions…what are the implications for the United States today?” He further asserts that “most imperial falls are associated with fiscal crises.” The United States may continue for an extended period with huge deficits as long as the perception of the US is positive. But, as Ferguson notes, “…one day, a seemingly random piece of bad news – perhaps a negative report by a rating agency…” will cause that perception to fade, leading to total failure.


On March 15, 2010, the Associated Press reported that Moody’s, a rating agency, had published a warning regarding the heavy national debts of the UK and the US, suggesting that this could jeopardize the top triple-A rating. Although much of that debt is tied to the so-called Welfare State, America’s wars abroad count heavily. Ferguson writes that, “Defeat in the mountains of the Hindu Kush or on the plains of Mesopotamia has long been the harbinger of imperial fall.” He cites the Soviet experience in Afghanistan as one recent model.


Other Perspectives Tied to Ferguson’s Thesis


Discussing the new role of the lone superpower following the dissolution of the Soviet Union (which Ferguson uses as an example of the swift-fall concept), British historian Eric Hobsbawm in 2003 wrote, “Megalomania is the occupational disease of global victors, unless controlled by fear.” In a February 2008 interview, Dr. Henry Kissinger identified three current problems, none of which can be adequately managed by one superpower or empire: “the disappearance of the nation state, the rise of India and China…” and a host of other problems “such as energy and the environment.”



Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order addresses similar themes. According to Huntington, new civilizations are emerging in a unipolar world, all of which must be addressed by the United States. Niall Ferguson takes the argument further, postulating that the decline of empires can be rapid, often within a generation and without warning. Part of this, according to Ferguson, is the notion of putting off the inevitable, relegating Armageddon to some future generation. One is reminded of British inhabitants in Singapore in 1942, sitting in the Raffles Hotel bar singing “There Will Always be an England” even as the Imperial Japanese army advanced into the suburbs.


Modern Empires May Fall Faster


Ferguson does not address comparative collapses in terms of imperial endurance. The Roman Empire lasted until the events of the 4th and 5th centuries. The Japanese Empire, in contrast, lasted but a few decades and might have lasted longer had it not been for a delayed scout plane at Midway discovering the American fleet too late. Thirty minutes potentially cost an empire years of life. Hitler’s projected 1000-year Reich lasted less than 15 years.


Niall Ferguson’s essay should be seen as a warning – a new lens to perceive how and why empires fall. Can the US avoid financial collapse? Are current leaders savvy enough to understand the lessons of history? Can one civilization co-exist with newly emerging ones? Finally, how will the answers transform an empire into one that endures or fails?


References:


  • Erin Conroy, “Moody’s warning on US, UK ratings lifts dollar,” Associated Press, March 15, 2010
  • Niall Ferguson, “Decline and Fall: When the American Empire Goes, It Is Likely to Go Quickly,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2010
  • Eric Hobsbawm, “Only in America,” The Chronicle Review, Volume 49, Issue 43, p B7, July 4, 2003
  • Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996)
  • Henry Kissinger, Spiegel Interview, February 18, 2008.

The copyright of the article Decline and Fall of the American Empire in American History is owned by Michael Streich. Permission to republish Decline and Fall of the American Empire in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.