Alfred Thayer Mahan: Architect of a Modern America

 

 

 

 

Alfred Thayer Mahan died in 1914, the year World War I began and the year the United States was forced to make choices that would ultimately break the isolationist mentality. Mahan’s monumental Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783, published in 1890, had already contributed to the fever of imperialism. Mahan, however, stressed the historical significance of sea power, beginning with Hannibal’s defeat by Rome. The importance of sea power was keenly evident in the 1890’s, coming at a time Imperial Germany was building a modern fleet and providing a rationale to up-coming global powers like the United States.

 

The Limited Age of Capital Ships

 

According to Mahan, the American fleet was defensive in character, seldom possessing the size of navies of great trade empires like Britain or small powers in the Western Hemisphere. The Chilean navy, for example, was far more formidable, as observed while Mahan was on active duty in South America.

 

Although Mahan’s book was eagerly read in Europe, few policy-makers in the United States embraced his theories. Only Theodore Roosevelt became Mahan’s stalwart supporter, furthering the careers of men like George Dewey and advocating a naval policy that included foreign coaling stations such as Samoa and Hawaii and, as president, promoting construction of the Great While Fleet.

 

Mahan sailed through the Suez Canal and trekked across the Isthmus of Panama. He witnessed the future importance of a Panama Canal first hand. Historian Warren Zimmermann likens Mahan’s views to George Kennan’s Cold War theories, especially as they impacted U.S. hegemony of the vast Pacific region and American control of key Pacific islands like Guam.

 

Underestimation of Ground Troops Form a Weakness in Mahan’s Argument

 

Historian Paul Kennedy postulates that Mahan relied too strongly on naval ships to the detriment of “boots on the ground.” But Mahan himself acknowledged the role of ground forces when writing, for example, about France. Napoleon Bonaparte had a superb army, but was unable to cross the channel to England.

 

England maintained a small army, relying on a navy to protect trade routes. Trade routes became even more important in the latter 19^th Century as European powers competed for global colonies. For America, this “march of the flag” coincided with the Spanish-American War and the acquisition of the Philippines.

 

Mahan’s Theories Still Apply in a Modern Age

 

The age of capital ships came to an abrupt end in December 1941 when a squadron of Japanese planes sunk the British ships Repulse and Prince of Wales as they were steaming along the Malay coast. Mahan could not envision airpower or even the role of submarines.

 

Battleships stood alone in the late 1890’s, supported by lesser vessels. But his principles remained: successful nations could only compete globally if they possessed a superior navy.

 

Additionally, Mahan left a legacy of history: learning from the past in order to predict the future. Some aspects of Mahan’s study remain universal. These include a combination of defensive and offensive capabilities, deterrence, and the willingness to protect the flow of commerce. Such theories transcend technology and for this Mahan deserves credit.

 

Sources:

 

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 To 2000 (Random House, 1987)

Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, And The Coming Of The Great War (Random House, 1991)

Ivan Musicant, Empire By Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century (Henry Hold and Company, 1998)

Edward Zimmermann, First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country A World Power (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2002)

Published April 12, 2011 by M.Streich