The Crimean War Disrupted European Peace and branded Russia the Aggressor mike Streich
In 1853 the Metternich
system, designed to control and mediate conflicts between the great powers of Europe, fell apart with the outbreak of the Crimean War.
For the first time since the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the major powers were at
war with each other, Britain
and France supporting the
Ottoman Empire against Russia.
Although the war was preventable and foolish, the results paved the way for a
new order after 1856.
Napoleon III of France and
Tsar Nicholas I of Russia
The conflict began when
Napoleon III approached the Ottoman Empire
with an offer to act as protector of Christians within the Ottoman lands.
Additionally, the Roman Catholic Church sought to act as custodians of the
sacred sites in the Holy Land. Nicholas I was
outraged, seeing himself as the protector of Orthodox Christians and demanded
that the Holy Land sites continue to be served
by Orthodox priests. This “quarrel of monks” led to the break of relations
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.
Historians offer additional,
perhaps more salient motives for Russian and French actions. MacKenzie [1]
cites the overconfidence of Nicholas I following Russian success in assisting
with the suppression of European popular revolts in 1848. Henry Kissinger [2]
refers to the long standing Russian aim of controlling Constantinople and the Dardanelles. Others highlight Napoleon III’s desire to
break out of European isolation and possibly destroy the Holy Alliance.
Outbreak of the Crimean War
In October 1853, Turkey declared war on Russia following Russian troop movements into Moldavia and Wallachia
(Danubian Principalities). Shortly thereafter, Russian Admiral Nakhimov
discovered the Turkish fleet at Sinope and destroyed it. The “Sinope Massacre”
was enough to compel the British to send their fleet into the Black
Sea.
Russia, relying upon Austrian support, was severely
disappointed when the Austrians remained neutral in the conflict and occupied
the Principalities upon Russian withdrawal early in the war. This “monstrous
ingratitude,” as Nicholas I terms it, exacerbated the tenuous Russian military
situation because the Russian commander, Field Marshall Paskevich, had
dispersed Russian troops throughout the empire to control possible
insurrections.
Austria’s actions may have been motivated by the fear that in
supporting Russia, France would seize the opportunity to acquire
Italian provinces dominated by Austria.
By effectively rejecting the Russian alliance that dated to 1815, Austria may have hastened the rise of Prussia, also
neutral in the conflict.
Course of the War
With the Russian withdrawal
from the Principalities, the focus of the war shifted to the Crimea
and the 60,000 troops poised to take Sevastapol. Although predominantly British
and French, the allied force included thousands of Turkish troops under the
command of Omer Pasha as well as 16,000 troops from Piedmont-Sardinia. Count
Cavour of Piedmont-Sardina cunningly deduced that an allied victory would
include his nation at the peace table, furthering his goal of Italian
unification.
The Russians were initially
defeated at the Alma
River and withdrew to
Sevastapol, strengthening their defenses. The ensuing battles included the
legendary Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava
as well as the “Thin Red Line” that held back an onslaught of Russian cavalry.
In the end, Sevastapol fell and Russia,
now under Tsar Alexander II, agreed to a peace conference.
Results of the Crimean War
The war highlighted the need
for Russian military and economic reform. No railroad track was available below
Moscow,
imposing a tremendous burden on troop movements and supplies. Both sides fought
using strategies that dated back to the venerable Duke of Wellington in 1815.
Old alliances were broken as Russia began to
look with greater interest at the Balkans, promoting Pan-Slavism and eventually
conflicting with Austrian goals in that region. Prussia’s
Otto von Bismarck, the “honest broker,” used the events to plot the expansion
of Prussia
by developing new diplomatic ties and alliances. The Crimean War would create a
new European balance of power.
Sources:
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:
Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random
House, 1987).
[2] Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1994).
[1] David MacKenzie and
Michael W. Curran, A History of Russia, the Soviet Union,
and Beyond 4th Ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company,
1993).
Alan Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1992).
Tags
Crimea Light Brigade Piedmont Sardinia Napoleon III Tsar Nicholas II
